People v. In the Interest of J.D.
| Decision Date | 01 December 1999 |
| Citation | 989 P.2d 762 |
| Parties | (Colo. 1999) |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court, Morgan County, Honorable Douglas R. Vannoy, Judge.
Mark T. Adams, District Attorney, Thirteenth Judicial District, Christian J. Schulte, Deputy District Attorney, Fort Morgan, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Sara Allen, Fort Morgan, Colorado, Attorney for Juvenile-Appellee
No appearance by or on behalf of Respondent-Appellee.
As a general rule, statements of a juvenile made in the course of a custodial interrogation are not admissible against the juvenile unless a parent is present during the interrogation and both the juvenile and parent are first advised of the juvenile's Miranda rights.1 See 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (1999); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1222 (Colo. 1999). In this case, the Morgan County District Court (trial court) ruled that the statements of a juvenile, J.D., made in the course of telephone conversations she initiated with the police, were not admissible. The trial court so ruled because it found that the statements made by J.D. arose out of a "custodial interrogation." Therefore, relying upon that determination, the trial court concluded that J.D. was entitled to but was not given her Miranda warnings nor the benefit of the presence of a parent.
On interlocutory review, we must decide whether the trial court erred when it suppressed J.D.'s statements. We conclude that the trial court did err. Under the totality of the circumstances standard, applying the factors announced in People v. Denison, 918 P.2d 1114 (Colo. 1996), we conclude, as a matter of law, that the telephone interrogation of J.D., initiated at J.D.'s request while she was detained in a Nevada state juvenile facility, did not constitute a "custodial interrogation."
We hold that a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the four-factor "'restriction' standard" announced in Denison, when determining whether a juvenile detained in a state facility has been subjected to a custodial interrogation because she is not "free to leave." See id. at 1116. We also hold that the voluntary telephone statement of a juvenile should not be suppressed when given during the course of an encounter with police that does not amount to a "custodial interrogation," even if the juvenile's statement is made without the benefit of Miranda warnings. We further hold that because section 19-2-511 only covers statements that are made during a "custodial interrogation," J.D.'s statements may not be suppressed merely because they were made outside the presence of a parent. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and return this matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
This is an interlocutory appeal filed by the People (State) pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1 and section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (1999). The facts of this case are not in dispute. We set forth those undisputed facts discussed in the trial court's ruling and found in the briefs of the parties and in the record before us.
On October 28, 1998, J.D., a juvenile,2 was detained in Colorado by Fort Morgan police and transported to a state juvenile detention center in Stateline, Nevada. The Fort Morgan police detained J.D. solely in connection with a probation violation in Nevada. At that time, Detective Keith Kuretich asked J.D. if she would answer questions regarding an armed robbery in Colorado. She refused. In response, Kuretich gave her his name and telephone number, in case she changed her mind and wanted to speak with him later.
On October 29, 1998, J.D. made a telephone call from the Nevada state detention facility to Kuretich in Fort Morgan. Because Kuretich was not available, J.D. left a message asking Kuretich to return her call.
The next morning, Kuretich returned J.D.'s telephone call and was able to speak directly to her. During the course of this conversation, J.D. told Kuretich that she wanted to talk with him about the armed robbery. In response, Kuretich told her that he would call again later and asked J.D. to make arrangements for someone she trusted to be present during their conversation.
After his conversation with J.D., Kuretich contacted J.D.'s mother. Kuretich sent her a written Miranda warning and told her about J.D.'s telephone call to him. J.D.'s mother advised Kuretich that she knew J.D. wanted to talk to him and indicated her approval.
Later that same day, at about 2:00 p.m., Kuretich returned J.D.'s telephone call, as previously agreed, to allow J.D. to tell him about her participation in the armed robbery. Another detective, Nick Gardner joined Kuretich and listened through a speakerphone. Presumably as Kuretich had suggested earlier, J.D. arranged for two adults to be present during their telephone conversation, Steve Hagen, J.D.'s Nevada probation officer, and June Foster, a detention officer at the Nevada facility.
The telephone conversation lasted approximately forty minutes. At the outset of the telephone conversation, Kuretich offered to "do what [he could] to dismiss" the other charges against J.D. for "resisting arrest, obstructing and criminal mischief." Regarding the armed robbery, the trial court found Kuretich "assured" her that under Colorado law she could be charged as an adult, but if she cooperated, "there would be minimal or no charges brought"; that is, she would be charged as a juvenile, which would make a big difference. As the trial court characterized it, "[t]here was active encouragement directed by words toward the juvenile to cooperate and to give a full statement" and "the probation officer in Nevada was actively encouraging her to make a statement as he felt it would be in her interest to do that." J.D. then agreed to proceed, asking Kuretich, "Well[,] do you want to know what happened, or not?" J.D. then discussed details of the armed robbery, including the identities of participants and the weapon used, a shotgun. At the end of the telephone conversation, Kuretich thanked J.D. for her help, to which she replied, "You're welcome." Kuretich also told J.D., Hagen, and Foster that J.D.'s mother had "agreed to th[e] interview" earlier in the day.
Kuretich did not give J.D. her Miranda warnings at any time during the telephone conversation. At no time during the conversation about the robbery did J.D. ask to terminate their discussion or otherwise indicate any unwillingness to talk about her role in the subject robbery.
As a result of J.D.'s detailed statements describing her participation in the armed robbery, she was arrested. Consistent with Kuretich's "assur[ance]" at the beginning of the telephone conversation, J.D. was not charged as an adult. The State did, however, initiate delinquency proceedings against her for acts that would constitute felonies if they had been committed by an adult, including acts that would constitute aggravated armed robbery.3
On February 19, 1999, J.D. filed a motion to suppress the statements she made to Kuretich and Gardner. Specifically, J.D. claimed that her telephone statements should be suppressed because they were the products of a custodial interrogation conducted without the benefit of a Miranda warning. Moreover, J.D. argued that because she was interrogated outside the presence of a "parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian," her statements could not be admitted in her delinquency proceedings in accordance with section 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (1999)4. J.D also claimed that her statements should be suppressed because the officers made promises to her.
A brief motions hearing was held on February 26, 1999, at which only Detective Kuretich testified and, in accordance with the agreement of both parties, the transcript of the telephone conversation was admitted into evidence. During the motions hearing, the trial court inquired as to whether J.D. was "[i]nitially . . . detained for [the robbery]?" Defense counsel replied, "That is correct, your Honor." In addition, the trial court asked whether "[t]here was an arrest warrant actually executed in the case." Defense counsel stated, "There was." However, J.D.'s motion to suppress states that she "was detained by the Fort Morgan [Colorado] [p]olice . . . to transport her to the Douglas County Juvenile Detention Center in Stateline, Nevada, in connection with a probation violation in that jurisdiction." Kuretich testified that J.D.'s detention and transfer to Nevada authorities were not related to the robbery charges pending in Colorado.
On March 19, 1999, in open court, the trial court issued its ruling. The trial court suppressed the statements made by J.D., concluding that, under the "factors of particular significance" adopted in People v. Denison, and "look[ing] to the level of restriction involved as to an inmate," this was a custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and within the meaning of 19-2-511. Thus, because J.D. was in a juvenile detention center at the time of the interrogation and under its application of the Denison factors, the trial court found that J.D. had been subjected to a custodial interrogation. The trial court further reasoned that J.D.'s statements were not only inadmissible because she was not given her Miranda warnings, but were also inadmissible because "no parent or parental figure [was] in attendance at the time of the interrogation," contrary to section 19-2-511. The State timely filed this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling.
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