People v. Inghram

Decision Date05 October 1987
Docket NumberNo. 63830,63830
Parties, 113 Ill.Dec. 65 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, v. Julia A. INGHRAM, Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant).
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Roma Jones Stewart, Sol. Gen., Chicago, for appellant; Patricia Rosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

Justice WARD delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Julia A. Inghram, was issued a traffic summons on April 2, 1986, for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and her driving privileges were summarily suspended (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1). Inghram filed a petition for limited driving privileges in the circuit court of Adams County requesting the issuance of a Judicial Driving Permit (JDP), as authorized by section 6-206.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6- 206.1). The petition alleged that it was necessary to have an automobile to travel to her place of employment. The circuit court dismissed the petition on the ground that section 6-206.1 is unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1). The Secretary of State (hereafter Secretary) appealed directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (107 Ill.2d R. 302(a)). The defendant has not filed a brief in this court.

Where relevant, section 6-206.1 provides:

"Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared a policy of the State of Illinois that the driver who is impaired by alcohol or other drugs is a threat to the public safety and welfare. Therefore, to provide a deterrent to such practice and to remove problem drivers from the highway a statutory summary driver's license suspension is appropriate. It is also recognized that driving is a privilege and that in some cases the granting of limited driving privileges, within the bounds of public safety, is warranted during this period of driver's license suspension in the form of a judicial driving permit to allow the person to continue employment and drive in connection with other necessary activities where no alternative means of transportation is available." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1.

The statute provides that one who has been arrested for the first time of driving while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, after notification of the statutory summary suspension of driving privileges, may petition the circuit court for a JDP to avoid undue hardship. The issuance of a JDP is to be subject to certain conditions if issued to a petitioner in order to drive to his place of employment and subject to other conditions if issued to allow a means of transportation in order to receive alcohol or drug treatment or other medical care. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-206.1(a)(1), (a)(2).) The statute also provides that a JDP shall not be issued to (1) any person unless the court is satisfied, after reviewing evaluations of the person's alcohol or drug use, that granting limited driving privileges will not endanger the public safety or welfare; (2) any person convicted of reckless homicide within the previous five years; and (3) any person whose driver's license was invalid at the time of arrest for DUI. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-206.1(a)(3)(i) through (a)(3)(iii).)

The statute further provides:

"(b) Prior to the issuance of a JDP the Court should consider at least, but not be limited to, the following issues:

1. Whether the person is employed and no other means of commuting to the place of employment is available or that the person must drive as a condition of employment. * * *

2. Whether the person must drive to secure alcohol or other medical treatment for himself or a family member.

3. Whether the person has been repeatedly convicted of traffic violations or involved in motor vehicle accidents to a degree which indicates disrespect for public safety.

4. Whether the person has been convicted of a traffic violation in connection with a traffic accident resulting in the death of any person within the last 5 years.

5. Whether the person is likely to obey the limited provisions of the judicial driving permit.

6. Whether the person has any additional traffic violations pending in any court.

* * *

* * *

(c) Any JDP issued by the court under this Section shall be limited to the operation of a motor vehicle between the petitioner's residence and place of employment and shall specify days of the week and specific hours of the day when the petitioner is able to exercise the limited privilege of operating a motor vehicle. In addition, the court may establish whatever privileges or other limitations may be relevant to the granting of the JDP. If the Petitioner, who has been granted a JDP, is issued a citation for a traffic related offense or is convicted of such an offense during the term of the JDP, the court shall consider cancellation of the limited driving permit. A cause for cancellation of a JDP may exist if a petitioner who has been granted a JDP is issued a citation for operating a motor vehicle outside the limitations prescribed in the limited driving permit, or is issued a citation for a violation of Section 6-303. In any case, if the Petitioner commits an alcohol related offense, the JDP shall be cancelled." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-206.1(b), (c).)

The statute also provides that the Secretary shall provide the official JDP forms to the clerk of the circuit court and that the form shall include a notification of the issuance of a JDP to the Secretary. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-206.1(d).

The circuit court held that section 6-206.1 improperly assigns to the judicial branch the responsibility for the issuance of hardship driver's licenses on the ground that that was a function normally performed by the Secretary as a member of the executive branch of government. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the circuit court observed that, although section 2-101 of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-101) vests the Secretary with numerous powers and duties of administration under the Code, section 6-206.1 "purports to vest the power to issue a special type of driving permit in the courts." The circuit court went on to say that courts have power over justiciable matters, but that the issuance of a driver's license is not an adjudication of a right to drive. Rather, the issuance of a driver's license is, the court said, an administrative decision. The court judged that its decision on this was supported under sections 2-118(e) and 6-212 of the Code, which subject decisions of the Secretary concerning driver's licenses to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 2-118(e), 6-212.

At the outset we would note that legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality (Bernier v. Burris (1986), 113 Ill.2d 219, 227, 100 Ill.Dec. 585, 497 N.E.2d 763; People v. Joseph (1986), 113 Ill.2d 36, 41, 99 Ill.Dec. 120, 495 N.E.2d 501), and a party challenging a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity (People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517). This court has long recognized that "it is our duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to uphold their constitutionality and validity if it can reasonably be done, and, further, that if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of the law attacked." McKenzie v. Johnson (1983), 98 Ill.2d 87, 103, 74 Ill.Dec. 571, 456 N.E.2d 73, quoting Illinois Crime Investigating Com. v. Buccieri (1967), 36 Ill.2d 556, 561, 224 N.E.2d 236, cert. denied (1967), 389 U.S. 848, 88 S.Ct. 75, 19 L.Ed.2d 117; see also Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill.2d 350, 363, 95 Ill.Dec. 510, 489 N.E.2d 1374; People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill.2d 155, 161, 66 Ill.Dec. 294, 442 N.E.2d 855.

The separation of powers clause to our 1970 Constitution provides, "The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1.) The clause was not designed to produce a complete separation of the three branches of our single State government (City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 174, 311 N.E.2d 146); rather, the doctrine of separation of powers is designed to ensure "that the whole power of two or more of the branches of government shall not be lodged in the same hands." (In re Estate of Barker (1976), 63 Ill.2d 113, 119, 345 N.E.2d 484; City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 174, 311 N.E.2d 146.) The doctrine, with respect to the relationship between the executive and judicial branches of government, is violated when the challenged provision would confer powers to one branch of government which properly should be exercised by another branch (see City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill.2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146 (legislature's grant of authority to the Pollution Control Board to impose discretionary fines on violators of the State environmental laws was not an unlawful delegation of judicial power to an administrative agency)) or when one branch usurps the authority of another branch (People v. Joseph (1986), 113 Ill.2d 36, 41, 99 Ill.Dec. 120, 495 N.E.2d 501; see also People ex rel. Daley v. Moran (1983), 94 Ill.2d 41, 46, 67 Ill.Dec. 790, 445 N.E.2d 270 (separation of powers clause was violated when circuit court ordered, upon its own motion, that the State's Attorney file a criminal information or charge)). Too, this court determined in In re Estate of Barker (1976), 63 Ill.2d 113, 345 N.E.2d 484, that a circuit court may perform certain nonjudicial functions, as provided by a statute, without violating the doctrine. In Barker this court acknowledged that the...

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