People v. Ingles

Citation218 P.2d 987,97 Cal.App.2d 867
Decision Date05 June 1950
Docket NumberCr. 2641
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesPEOPLE v. INGLES.

Wm. F. Cleary, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Deputy, Alfred Del Carlo, Asst. Dist. Atty., San Francisco, for respondent.

BRAY, Justice.

Appellant pleaded guilty to an information charging him with violation of section 476a of the Penal Code, a felony. After sentence to San Quentin thereon, and after the judgment of conviction became final, he petitioned the superior court for a writ of error coram nobis. From a denial of his petition he appealed.

Question Presented.

The main question presented is whether coram nobis will lie where a defendant pleads guilty to a crime charged in an information, which crime is a different one than that set forth in the complaint which initiated the proceeding in the committing magistrate's court.

Facts.

The facts are undisputed. On March 12, 1949, the prosecution of appellant was commenced with the filing in the municipal court of a complaint charging him with a violation of section 476 of the Penal Code, setting forth in substance that, with intent to defraud 'De Ferrari & Peters,' he feloniously made, passed, uttered and published a certain fictitious check, which was in words and figures as follows:

'Factory Payroll Check

The National Company

Check

Number 3958

PAY Twenty Seven

To the Order of

G. Grant Ingles

302-1503186 OD

46-02 N. W. Baker

Any Bank or Trust Co.

Anywhere (signed) L. R. Prentez' and said check was indorsed by said G. Grant Ingles in words and figures as follows:

'G. Grant Ingles

'2001 California St., San Franciso'; that there was no such firm as The National Company, which appellant well knew, and that appellant well knew that the check was fictitious.

Appellant waived a preliminary examination and the judge of the municipal court, on March 16, 1949, held the petitioner to answer 'for the offense of 'Felony to-wit, 476-A Penal Code'.' (Emphasis added.) Thereafter and on March 25, the district attorney filed an information in the superior court charging appellant with violation of 476a, Penal Code. The information did not set forth a copy of the check, but in substance charged that appellant, with intent to cheat 'De Ferrari & Peters and Bank of America, N. T. & S. A., a corporation,' feloniously made, drew, uttered, and delivered to De Ferrari & Peters a check and draft for the payment of $27.38, drawn upon a bank, 'to wit, Bank of America,' knowing at the time that he had not sufficient funds in, or credit with said bank to meet the check and draft upon its presentation for payment.

It will be noted that the charge of violating section 476a of [97 Cal.App.2d 869] the Penal Code, that is, uttering a check on a bank without sufficient funds, is an entirely different crime than that charged in the complaint, namely, violating section 476, that is, uttering a fictitious check. The information also charged appellant with a prior conviction and incarceration.

On March 29 appellant was arraigned. The record shows that he was present with an assistant public defender who was appearing for appellant's attorney, Eyman. The reading of the information was waived. At the request of the attorney the time to plead was continued to April 5. On that day appellant was present without his attorney, who was engaged elsewhere. The district attorney stated that Mr. Eyman had requested that the matter be continued to April 8. This was done. On that day appellant was present with his counsel and pleaded 'guilty of the offense charged,' but denied the prior. Appellant waived time for pronouncement of sentence and then made a motion for probation. On May 9, appellant being present without counsel, the hearing of the probation report was continued to May 10.

On that day Attorney Eyman informed the court that appellant and his mother desired to substitute Attorney Sullivan, and that the latter desired the matter continued to the 12th. The court thereupon stated that it saw no necessity for a continuance, that the record showed that appellant had been 'in trouble since 1943, at which time he was picked up in San Francisco at the request of his mother. He cashed a series of twenty checks and was in trouble not only in San Francisco, but in Denver and Oakland. His difficulties seem to stem from a bad family situation involving his mother and aunt. He has an extremely bad record. He has been given probation before, once for a period of five years, and every opportunity he has been given he has failed miserably. It is to be hoped that through proper psychiatric treatment which may be rendered to him while in the custody of the Youth Authority he might return as a normal member of society, and for that reason I am recommending he be referred to the Youth Authority for their consideration and possible acceptance.'

The court made an order denying probation and then ordered the cause referred to the Youth Authority and continued the cause to May 24 'for report.' On that day, appellant appearing without counsel, the cause was continued to May 27. On that day, the court stated: 'I understand Mr. Sullivan, the defendant's lawyer, will not be here. However, there is nothing he could do for this man if he were here, and I do not think the law requires that his attorney be present at this proceeding. This young man has applied for probation. He was referred to the Youth Authority and the Youth Authority has refused to accept him. The report of the Probation Department, with which the Court is familiar, indicates he has passed about twenty checks, totaling about $400 in San Francisco alone. He has been in trouble since 1943, exclusive of the trouble he had in the Army. He has been charged with armed robbery and burglary, and he offers no excuse other than to say he can't stop his depredations. It is the thought of the Court that through the medium of phychiatric and psychological studies, for whatever benefit they may be, which is dubious, some help might be accorded to him. However, the Youth Authority has advised the Court they do not believe he would be benefited by their training and treatment. So, therefore, this Court has no other alternative than to deny the motion for probation.' The court thereupon sentenced appellant to San Quentin. On June 9, in the absence of appellant, the district attorney moved for a dismissal of the prior conviction charged in the information. The motion was granted. As amended judgment of conviction under section 476a of the Penal Code and an amended sentence to San Quentin was then made by the court.

On August 22, appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the grounds of the existence of facts which, had they been before the court, would have precluded the rendition of the judgment.

The Difference In Offenses.

Unquestionably the crime for which appellant was held to answer and which was charged in the information, is entirely different from that charged in the complaint. To determine whether such fact justifies the relief of coram nobis it is necessary to consider the scope of the latter writ.

Appellant quotes the following language from 31 Am.Jur. 323: 'A writ of coram nobis or coram vobis, where available, is used to obtain a review of a judgment where it appears that certain mistakes of fact have occurred which were not put in issue, were unknown to the court, and were not passed upon by it'; and relies principally upon that quotation and similar language taken from People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 259, 232 P. 457, 36 A.L.R. 1435. However, such language gives only a part of the test. The other part is set forth in 31 Am.Jur. 325 as follows: 'It is essential to the availability of the remedy of coram nobis or coram vobis that the mistake of fact relied upon for relief was unknown to the applicant at the time of the trial, and could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by him in time to have been presented to the court, unless he was prevented from so doing by duress, fear, or other sufficient cause, so that it was by no negligence or other fault of his that the matter was not made to appear at the former trial.' It is not merely that a judgment is made upon the assumed existence of a fact or condition which did not in truth exist, and the nonexistence of which, if it had been known, would have precluded the rendition of the judgment, which justifies the issuance of the writ of coram nobis, but there is one additional requisite, namely, the existence of that fact must not have been known, and could not have been known to the appellant by the exercise of reasonable diligence. People v. Shorts, 32 Cal.2d 502 at page 506, 197 P.2d 330, contains an exhaustive discussion of the principles of the 'extraordinary remedy' of coram nobis as applied in this state. It is there said in 32 Cal.2d at page 513, 197 P.2d at page 336: 'One who applies for a writ of coram nobis upon a ground such as the one here presented must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ; otherwise he has stated no ground for relief.' As said in People v. Adamson, 34 Cal.2d 320, 326, 210 P.2d 13, 15, coram nobis is a remedy of 'narrow scope. * * * Its purpose is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition, if the trial court had known it and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not then known to the court. (Citations.)' See also People v. Thompson, 94 Cal.App.2d 578, 211 P.2d 1.

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8 cases
  • People v. Banks
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 31 Diciembre 1959
    ...8 Cal.2d 752, 758-760(2, 3), 68 P.2d 354; People v. Herod (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 764, 766(4), 247 P.2d 127; People v. Ingles (1950), 97 Cal.App.2d 867, 874(2), 218 P.2d 987; People v. Harincar (1942), 49 Cal.App.2d 594, 596(2), 121 P.2d 751; People v. McVicker (1940), 37 Cal.App.2d 470, 474......
  • Huffman v. Alexander
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 11 Febrero 1953
    ...quash the information pursuant to the authority of statute. See 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, § 806; People v. Reid, supra. In People v. Ingles, 97 Cal.App.2d 867, 218 P.2d 987, the court observed that habeas corpus has been held available in situations where the defendant was not given the opport......
  • People v. Carroll
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 1 Abril 1957
    ...People v. Moore, 9 Cal.App.2d 251, 253, 49 P.2d 615; People v. Whitton, 112 Cal.App.2d 328, 332, 246 P.2d 60; People v. Ingles, 97 Cal.App.2d 867, 871, 218 P.2d 987; People v. Herod, 112 Cal.App.2d 764, 766, 247 P.2d 127; People v. Dunlop, 102 Cal.App.2d 314, 316-318, 227 P.2d 281. For an a......
  • People v. Vaitonis
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 9 Febrero 1962
    ...a motion to dismiss the information under section 995. He cannot raise the question now. (See Pen.Code, § 996; People v. Ingles (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 867, 873, 218 P.2d 987; People v. Leon (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 49, 312 P.2d 2. CORAM NOBIS. Treating defendant's motion as a petition for writ o......
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