People v. Inman

• Decision Date: 04 January 1910
• Citation: 90 N.E. 438,197 N.Y. 200
• Parties: PEOPLE v. INMAN.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

197 N.Y. 200

90 N.E. 438

PEOPLE

v.INMAN.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 4, 1910.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by the People of the state of New York against Horace Inman. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (130 App. Div. 892,114 N. Y. Supp. 1141) affirming a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.Frank L. Bell, for the People.

Henry V. Borst, for respondent.

CULLEN, C. J.

The action is ejectment to recover possession of a piece of land known as Big Island, in Raquette Lake, Hamilton county. The complaint is in the ordinary form, alleging that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the possession of the land, and that the defendant unlawfully entered thereon and withholds the possession thereof. The answer states two defenses: (1) A general denial of plaintiff's title. (2) Adverse possession by the defendant for more than 40 years.

In support of its title the plaintiff put in evidence three deeds from the Comptroller of the State made on tax sales of property which it is claimed embrace the premises in controversy: (1) Deed dated February 1, 1875, made in pursuance of a sale held in 1871 for unpaid taxes of the years 1861 to 1865, inclusive. (2) Deed dated August 10, 1881, made in pursuance of a sale held in 1877 for unpaid taxes of the years 1867 to 1869, inclusive. (3) Deed dated October 31, 1884, made pursuant to a sale held in 1881 for unpaid taxes of the years 1871 to 1873, inclusive. At the commencement of the trial the parties entered into this stipulation: ‘Defendant admits that he is now and has been many years in the possession of the island or premises described in the complaint, and was so in possession of the same at the commencement of the action.’ The defendant gave no proof of title, nor evidence that he entered under a claim of title. The referee held that the tax sales were void, and for that reason directed judgment in favor of the defendant.

We think that the certified copies of the deeds in the office of the Comptroller were sufficient to show their record in the county of Hamilton, especially as when they were offered in evidence with indorsements thereon stating that they had been recorded in that county, no objection was made by the defendant that to prove the record there should have been another certificate by the county clerk. The statute (Laws 1885, p. 758, c. 448) provides: ‘All such conveyances that have been heretofore executed by the Comptroller, and all conveyances of the same lands by his grantee or grantees therein named, after having been recorded for two years in the office of the clerk of the county in which the lands conveyed thereby are located * * * shall, six months after this act takes effect, be conclusive evidence that the sale and all proceedings prior thereto, from and including the assessment of the land and all notices required by law to be given previous to the expiration of the two years allowed by law to redeem, were regular and were regularly given, published and served according to the provisions of this act, and all laws directing or requiring the same, or in any manner relating thereto.’ This statute may operate not only as a curative statute, but also as a statute of limitations. Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N. Y. 371, 56 N. E. 838,76 Am. St. Rep. 322. But to be effective as a statute of limitations there must be given an opportunity to enforce adverse claims. If the deed ran to a private party the six months allowed by the statute would be sufficient, but the state cannot be sued except by its own consent. Sanders v. Saxton, 182 N. Y. 477, 75 N. E. 529,1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 727, 108 Am. St. Rep. 826. Hence the statute would not commenceto run until such consent was given. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 88 N. E. 753. We have held that under section 4 of chapter 453, p. 763, of the Laws of 1885, when the Comptroller advertises the lands as therein provided, he becomes vested with the actual possession of the same so as to authorize an action to be brought against him. In this case, however, it does not appear that the Comptroller ever advertised the lands as required by the statute. Hence the record of the tax deeds could not operate to set the statute running as a statute of limitations. The efficacy of such record in curing defects will be considered later.

At the second and third tax sales the lands were withdrawn from public bidding, and were bought in by the state for the unpaid taxes on the theory that they were already the property of the state. If the deed under the first tax sale conveyed title to the state, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to rely on the deeds given on the second and third sales. But if, on the contrary, the first deed transferred no title to the state, the subsequent sales were void because of the withdrawal of the lands from public competition. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, supra. Therefore the plaintiff's title must rest solely on the first tax sale. The referee held that sale void for defects in the imposition of the taxes for which the sale was made. The learned counsel for the appellant strenuously argues that the defendant was in no position to attack the validity of the plaintiff's deed, and many authorities are cited in support of that claim. These authorities are misunderstood. It is the general rule of law, well settled by the authority of the decided cases and of the text-writers, that the plaintiff in ejectment must succeed on the strength of his own title, not on the weakness of the defendant's. Chamberlain v. Taylor, 105 N. Y. 185, 11 N. E. 625;Roberts v. Baumgarten, 110 N. Y. 380, 18 N. E. 96. To this rule there are certain well-defined exceptions. The tenant may not deny the title of his landlord, that is to say, he cannot deny the title of the landlord at the time the tenant entered into possession, though he may show that the landlord subsequently has been divested of his title. Hoag v. Hoag, 35 N. Y. 469. Where legal title is established by neither party, the one showing the prior possession in himself or in those through whom he claims, although for a period less than that which is requisite to confer a title by adverse possession, will be deemed to have the better right. Whitney v. Wright, 15 Wend. 171; Tyler on Ejectment, 72; Hunter v. Starin, 26 Hun, 529. Possession is always sufficient to recover as against a mere trespasser or intruder without title. The plaintiff, however, does not bring its case within this exception to the general rule, for it failed to prove any prior possession in itself. The presumption of possession following the legal title which the plaintiff undoubtedly at one time had as the original owner of all the lands in this portion of the state was destroyed by proof of the deed or letters patent made by the state on August 14, 1786, of a large tract of land embracing the premises in suit. Therefore, though the defendant proved merely naked possession in himself without claim of title, it was sufficient to enable him to succeed in his defense if the plaintiff failed to prove title on its part. The very case relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant establishes this proposition. Wing v. De La Rionda, 131 N. Y. 422, 30 N. E. 243, was in ejectment to recover a lot of land in the city of Brooklyn. The plaintiff claimed title through a sale on the foreclosure of a mortgage given by one concededly the owner of the property. The judgment of foreclosure was rendered in 1852. In November, 1869, a sale thereunder was had, and the premises bid in by one Luman B. Wing. In October, 1875, an order was made relieving Wing from his purchase. In February, 1886, the plaintiff having become the assignee of Wing's bid, an order was made vacating the previous order relieving the purchaser and directing the referee to complete the sale and make the proper conveyances thereunder. The defendant was in possession, but apparently without any claim of title. He contended that the orders in the foreclosure suit were void because one Blanco, the owner of the equity of redemption, had no notice of the application for them. Of this contention the court said: ‘It would seem that a defense to this action would in that event be made out, even if the...