People v. Inman

• Decision Date: 04 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5–12–0097.,5–12–0097.
• Citation: 2014 IL App (5th) 120097,378 Ill.Dec. 707,4 N.E.3d 590
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Thomas G. INMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2014 IL App (5th) 120097

4 N.E.3d 590

378 Ill.Dec. 707

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Thomas G. INMAN, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 5–12–0097.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Feb. 4, 2014.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, Thomas A. Karalis, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, IL, for Appellant.

Brendan F. Kelly, State's Attorney, St. Clair County, Belleville (Patrick Delfino, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, David M. Sanchez, Staff Attorney, Whitney E. Atkins, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Fifth District Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Thomas G. Inman, appeals an order dismissing his petition for postconviction relief at the second stage. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of natural life for murder and 30 years for attempted first-degree murder. After his natural-life sentence was vacated years later, the defendant was resentenced to 35 years on the murder charge, to be served consecutive to the 30–year attempted murder sentence. The defendant filed a postconviction petition, alleging that the resentencing court violated principles of double jeopardy by ordering his sentences to run consecutively. On appeal from the second-stage dismissal of that petition, the defendant argues that (1) the consecutive sentences violate his right to due process and (2) consecutive sentences constitute double jeopardy. We affirm.

¶ 2 The charges at issue in this appeal stem from an argument in a bar that escalated to a violent confrontation. The defendant and two friends waited outside the bar for two other men to leave. They then followed the other men in their car and ran the car off the road at the next exit. In the ensuing fight, one man was stabbed to death. The other was stabbed multiple times and suffered serious injuries, but survived. The defendant was arrested in March 1985 and subsequently convicted on one count of murder and one count of attempted murder. In August 1985, the trial court found that the murder was committed in an exceptionally brutal and heinous manner. Based on this finding, the court sentenced the defendant to natural life in prison for the murder conviction. The court sentenced the defendant to 30 years for the attempted murder conviction, to be served concurrently with the sentence for murder.

¶ 3 In August 2000, the defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2000)), which the court treated as a postconviction petition. He alleged that his natural-life sentence violated the rule annunciated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He argued that the sentencing court imposed this extended-term sentence relying on a finding which, under Apprendi, had to be made beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact. Specifically, the sentencing court found that the murder was committed in an exceptionally brutal and heinous manner (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, ¶ 1005–8–1(a)(1)).

¶ 4 In June 2001, the court granted the defendant's petition and vacated his natural-life sentence for murder.¹ The court directed the State to choose between two options. The State could again seek a natural-life sentence, which would require the State to retry the defendant and prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in an exceptionally brutal and heinous manner. Alternatively, the State could choose not to seek an extended-term sentence, in which case the court would hold only a new sentencing hearing. The State chose the latter option.

¶ 5 Most of the proceedings that followed involved the question of whether the trial court could impose consecutive sentences. The court ultimately determined that (1) under the sentencing law in effect in 1985, it had the discretion to impose consecutive sentences, and (2) consecutive sentences would not run afoul of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

¶ 6 The matter came for a resentencing hearing in July 2006. The defendant chose to be sentenced under the law in effect in 1985, when the murder was committed. See People v. Strebin, 209 Ill.App.3d 1078, 1081, 154 Ill.Dec. 420, 568 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1991). The parties presented evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Much of the evidence in mitigation concerned the defendant's rehabilitative efforts during the 21 years he had already served in prison. Much of the evidence in aggravation focused on the defendant's extensive prior criminal record and the nature of the offense. The court found that consecutive sentences were appropriate for two reasons: (1) the defendant committed a Class X or Class 1 felony and inflicted serious bodily injuries (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, ¶ 1005–8–4(a)), and (2) consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, ¶ 1005–8–4(b)). The court sentenced the defendant to 35 years in prison, to be served consecutive to his sentence for attempted murder. The sentencing order provided that the defendant was to be given credit for time served.

¶ 7 The defendant appealed that sentence, arguing that the resentencing court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. He did not raise the constitutional issues involved in this appeal. This court affirmed the sentence. People v. Inman, 375 Ill.App.3d 1161, 348 Ill.Dec. 934, 945 N.E.2d 703 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 8 The defendant next filed a pro se petition under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 to 122–8 (West 2008)). In relevant part, he alleged that consecutive sentences violated the double jeopardy clause and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. The postconviction court dismissed the defendant's petition summarily, finding it to be a successive petition filed without leave of the court. On appeal from that ruling, this court found that the petition at issue was the first petition to challenge the 2006 sentencing order. We thus concluded that it was not a “successive” petition and the defendant, therefore, “did not require leave of the court to file it.” People v. Inman, 407 Ill.App.3d 1156, 1162, 349 Ill.Dec. 682, 947 N.E.2d 319, 324–25 (2011). We reversed the court's order dismissing the defendant's petition and directed the court to docket the matter for second-stage proceedings. Inman, 407 Ill.App.3d at 1163, 349 Ill.Dec. 682, 947 N.E.2d at 325.

¶ 9 On remand, counsel was appointed to represent the defendant. Counsel filed an amended petition on behalf of the defendant, which also alleged that consecutive sentences violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The amended petition further alleged that both appellate counsel and counsel at the resentencing hearing were ineffective. The State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant's petition. The postconviction court found that there was no double jeopardy violation. In support of this conclusion, the court noted that (1) the resentencing court had the statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences and (2) the length of the murder sentence was reduced, not increased. The court therefore granted the State's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

¶ 10 In this appeal, the defendant raises two issues. He first argues that the consecutive sentences violate principles of due process under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). He next argues that consecutive sentences violate the double jeopardy clause. Before considering the merits of these arguments, we must address the State's contention that the defendant has forfeited both of these arguments.

¶ 11 The State argues that the defendant has forfeited his arguments for two reasons. First, the State contends that both arguments are forfeited because the defendant could have raised them in his direct appeal, but did not do so. We note, however, that the defendant has alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. The State further contends that the defendant forfeited his due process argument because he did not raise it in his amended postconviction petition. We note that forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not the courts. People v. Haissig, 2012 IL App (2d) 110726, ¶ 20, 364 Ill.Dec. 558, 976 N.E.2d 1121 (citing People v. Carter, 208 Ill.2d 309, 318–19, 280 Ill.Dec. 664, 802 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (2003)). We further note that the arguments are closely connected. We will therefore consider both of the defendant's arguments on their merits.

¶ 12 This case was dismissed at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. Our review is therefore de novo. People v. Clark, 2011 IL App (2d) 100188, ¶ 17, 354 Ill.Dec. 61, 957 N.E.2d 162 (citing People v. Simpson, 204 Ill.2d 536, 547, 275 Ill.Dec. 34, 792 N.E.2d 265, 274–75 (2001)).

¶ 13 The defendant first argues that principles of due process precluded the court from imposing consecutive sentences on remand. The relevant principles were discussed by the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce. There, the Court explained that “it would be a flagrant violation” of a defendant's right to due process if a sentencing court were to impose a harsher sentence after remand from a successful appeal “for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant” for filing the appeal. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723–24, 89 S.Ct. 2072. The Court noted, however, that “there exists no absolute constitutional bar to the imposition of a more severe sentence upon retrial.” Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723, 89 S.Ct. 2072. The Court held that when a trial judge imposes a more severe...