People v. Interstate Dress Carriers

• Citation: 203 Misc. 883
• Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., et al., Appellants.
• Decision Date: 25 March 1953
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

203 Misc. 883

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., et al., Appellants.

March 25, 1953.

Samuel Schaeffer for appellants.

Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney (Richard G. Denzer and Paul A. Stone of counsel), for respondent.

KOZICKE, P. J., FARRELL and LOSCALZO, JJ., concur.

Per Curiam.

Appellants here challenge four judgments of the Manhattan Traffic Court finding them guilty of violating section 190 of the Traffic Regulations of the City of New York (also known as Special Midtown Truck Regulations) in that: "On June 13, 1951, the defendant did park a vehicle between the hours of 7:25 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. on 224 West 35th Street, a public highway in the County of New York, City and State of New York, contrary to restrictions properly posted on authorized signs of the Police Department which indicated special parking regulations on such street in violation of Article 2, Section 10, Subdivision i of the Traffic Regulations adopted by the Traffic Commission of the City of New York, contrary to Special Midtown Truck Regulation, Article 15, Section 190." (Italics supplied.)^[*]

The regulation, so far as here material, provides: "Between the hours of 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. daily except Sundays from 14th to 59th Streets, 3rd to 9th Avenues, all inclusive, in the Borough of Manhattan * * * No driver shall stop or stand a vehicle or combination of vehicles for the purpose of loading or unloading merchandise or materials in any one block of streets herein designated, for a period of more than two hours. A vehicle or combination of vehicles not being expeditiously loaded or unloaded is deemed to constitute a parked vehicle subject to parking regulations applicable to that particular location."

The four cases were submitted below on a single agreed statement of facts in which it was stipulated that defendants owned the trucks involved, that same were at the locations mentioned for a period in excess of two hours, and that they were being expeditiously loaded and unloaded.

Under this stipulation, the substantial question presented for our determination is whether a vehicle may properly be said to be "parked" while it is being loaded and/or unloaded with reasonable promptness.

Appellants, arguing that it cannot, refer us to subdivision 20 of section 2 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which defines the words "Park", "parking" or "parked" as meaning: "the stopping of a motor vehicle * * * upon any public highway and leaving such motor vehicle * * * unattended by a person capable of operating it, for a period longer than necessary to load or unload passengers or freight. This definition shall apply to all ordinances made by local authorities as provided by this chapter, notwithstanding the provisions of any local ordinance made prior to the adoption of this subdivision."

It may no longer be doubted that the Vehicle and Traffic Law has as its underlying purpose the establishment throughout the State of "a uniform system regulating the operation and regulation of motor vehicles and their use". Nor may it be questioned that except where otherwise specifically provided, the provisions of this chapter are applicable to the City of New York (Great Atlantic &...