People v. Izquierdo-Flores
Decision Date | 28 August 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 2-04-0515.,2-04-0515. |
Citation | 305 Ill.Dec. 246,854 N.E.2d 1156 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carlos IZQUIERDO-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Linda A. Johnson (Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Carlos Izquierdo-Flores.
Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Attorney, Waukegan, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, Kristine A. Karlin, Mt. Prospect, for the People.
After admitting that he strangled his aunt, defendant, Carlos Izquierdo-Flores, was charged by indictment with second-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)). More than 120 days after defendant filed a speedy-trial demand on the original second-degree-murder charges, the State filed a second indictment charging first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)). Relying on speedy-trial and compulsory-joinder principles, defendant moved to dismiss the second indictment, and the trial court granted his motion based upon the speedy-trial claim. The State appealed, and this court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court on the first-degree-murder charges. People v. Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d 632, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286 (2002). Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) we should reconsider our decision in the prior appeal in light of our supreme court's decision in People v. Williams, 204 Ill.2d 191, 273 Ill.Dec. 250, 788 N.E.2d 1126 (2003); (2) the trial court erred by failing to accept his guilty plea to second-degree murder; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) he is entitled to an additional day of credit against his sentence. We vacate defendant's conviction in light of Williams and remand for further proceedings. Because of the vacatur on the first issue, we determine that the last three issues on appeal are moot, and we do not address them.
We begin by summarizing the facts preceding the first appeal in this case. On September 6, 2000, defendant was arrested in connection with the death of his aunt, Adelina Flores. According to defendant, his aunt had attacked him with a belt. Acting in self-defense, he strangled her using his bare hands. On September 7, 2000, the State charged defendant by complaint with second-degree murder. On the same date, defendant filed a speedy-trial demand. Also on that date, forensic pathologist Dr. Nancy Jones performed an autopsy on Flores's body. The autopsy report, dated September 16, indicated that strangulation was the cause of death.
On September 20, 2000, the State filed a two-count indictment charging defendant with second-degree murder. Count I alleged that, on September 6, 2000, while committing first-degree murder and acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the victim, defendant choked Flores with his hands, thereby causing her death. Count II alleged that defendant acted under an unreasonable belief that circumstances that would justify or exonerate the killing were present.
Over the next several months, the parties agreed to several continuances and engaged in plea negotiations. During a January 16, 2001, hearing, the State sought leave to dismiss the second-degree-murder charges and file first-degree-murder charges. The State explained that the second-degree-murder charges were based on defendant's statement to the police that he and Flores got into a fight and that, while defending himself, he strangled Flores with his hands. However, Dr. Jones's findings showed that defendant's theory was implausible. According to the State, Dr. Jones had been out of the country for the entire month of December. When she returned in January 2001, she reviewed the autopsy photographs and her report and opined on January 12, 2001, that the strangulation could not have been accomplished manually. Instead, she opined that the marks on the victim's neck were made by a ligature, such as a rope, belt, or piece of clothing. As a result, the State now intended to pursue first-degree-murder charges. Defense counsel objected to the new charges, noting that defendant had been in custody for months and was prepared to offer a "straight" plea to the second-degree-murder charges. The trial court expressed concern over speedy-trial issues and reserved ruling on the State's motion. The case was continued.
On January 17, 2001, the State filed a second, three-count indictment charging first-degree murder. The second indictment alleged that defendant used an object to strangle the victim. Defendant moved to dismiss the second indictment. Relying on speedy-trial principles, the trial court granted this motion. In particular, the court found that the new charges arose from the same acts that gave rise to the original charges and that the new charges were not the result of newly discovered evidence. As a result, the first-degree-murder charges were subject to the original speedy-trial term. Because the first-degree-murder charges were not before the court when defendant requested or agreed to the continuances, any delay that was attributed to defendant in connection with the original charges could not be applied to the new charges.
The trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider and denied defendant's request to be released pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(3)). On February 8, 2001, the State filed a certificate of impairment and a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the State argued that the first-degree-murder charges were not "new and additional charges." Because the second-degree-murder charges included all of the elements of first-degree murder, the State reasoned that the first-degree-murder charges were actually before the trial court from the beginning of the prosecution. Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d at 637, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286. In response, defendant argued that, although the second indictment did not add any new elements to the charged offense, it did place a burden on him that did not exist before. Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d at 637, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286. Defendant pointed out that by charging him with second-degree murder, the State alleged that it could prove the elements of first-degree murder, but conceded the presence of mitigating factors. Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d at 637, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286. Thus, if the State were allowed to withdraw the second-degree-murder charges and charge him with first-degree murder, he would be required to litigate whether a mitigating factor was present. Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d at 637, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286. This court agreed with the State that the first-degree-murder charges in the second indictment were not "new and additional charges." Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill. App.3d at 639, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286. We stated that, "[b]ecause the first-degree murder charges here do not require defendant to defend against any elements that were not before the trial court previously, allowing the State to proceed on the second indictment would not frustrate the purpose of the speedy-trial statute." Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d at 639, 266 Ill.Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286. Accordingly, the delays attributed to defendant in connection with the second-degree-murder charges applied to the first-degree-murder charges as well. Because the speedy-trial term had not expired when the State filed the second indictment, we held that the trial court erred by dismissing the second indictment. Izquierdo-Flores, 332 Ill.App.3d at 639, 266 Ill. Dec. 216, 773 N.E.2d 1286.
On remand, defendant was arraigned on three counts of first-degree murder. Pursuant to the State's motion, the trial court dismissed the second-degree-murder charges. A bench trial commenced in January 2004, and defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which the trial court denied. The court sentenced defendant on only one count of first-degree murder, imposing a term of 30 years' imprisonment. Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, and the trial court denied that motion. Defendant's timely notice of appeal followed.
Defendant first argues that we should reconsider our decision in the prior appeal in light of Williams, a case decided by our supreme court after defendant's first appeal. Relying on Williams, defendant argues that the State violated (1) the speedy-trial statute by charging him with first-degree murder more than 120 days after he filed a speedy-trial demand on the original charges, and (2) the compulsory-joinder statute by failing to prosecute both the first-degree-murder and the second-degree-murder charges at the commencement of the prosecution. The State responds that the law of the case doctrine bars review of this issue. While the State acknowledges that the law of the case doctrine does not limit this court's power to revisit an issue if our initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice (Bond Drug Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 323 Ill.App.3d 190, 198, 256 Ill.Dec. 196, 751 N.E.2d 586 (2001)), the State contends that Williams does not conflict with our previous decision. We disagree.
In Williams, our supreme court discussed the relationship between the speedy-trial statute and the compulsory-joinder statute. There, the defendant was originally charged with one count of contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in connection with the murder of James Patterson. Williams, 204 Ill.2d at 196, 273 Ill.Dec. 250, 788 N.E.2d 1126. Then, 168 days after he was arrested on the contributing charge, the defendant was also charged with...
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