People v. Williams
Decision Date | 03 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 93573.,93573. |
Citation | 204 Ill.2d 191,788 N.E.2d 1126,273 Ill.Dec. 250 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Byron WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, John M. McCarthy, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Stephen E. Norris, Trent M. Marshall, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.
Following a jury trial in the Madison County circuit court, the defendant, Byron Williams, was convicted on two counts of first degree murder (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)) and two counts of contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile (see 720 ILCS 5/33D-1 (West 1996)). The defendant received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for the murder convictions and 20 years' imprisonment for the contributing convictions. A divided appellate court panel affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. No. 5-99-0452 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed his petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a). We now reverse and remand.
On January 28, 1997, two East St. Louis teenagers, Terril Williams (Williams) and Terril Madison, telephoned an acquaintance, Alton teenager Tineisha Haynes, to confront her about causing problems between their friends, Albert Greenlee and Demario Ursery. When Haynes refused to talk and hung up the telephone, Madison and Williams called her pager to harass her. Haynes then telephoned Williams, who initiated a three-way call with Madison, and an argument ensued. Madison threatened to kill Haynes and her cousin, Alton teenager Darryl Womack. Womack eventually took the telephone from Haynes and asked Madison and Williams to stop calling her. Madison repeated his threat; Williams then threatened Womack. Williams said that he had a gun, and Womack replied that he also had a gun. They then threatened each other with an escalating variety of weapons, including machine guns, bazookas, missiles, and tanks. The argument continued until Womack challenged Williams to come to his neighborhood. According to Madison, Williams said, "[Y]ou're gonna die," and hung up the telephone.
In the evening of January 30, 1997, Robert Brock, an acquaintance of the defendant, approached the defendant, Williams, and Madison outside the defendant's uncle's house. The group was quiet, watching people. Brock overheard Williams talk to the defendant about going to Alton and "taking care of business." According to Brock, the defendant told Williams "to shut his mouth up" before anyone realized what they intended to do. Williams continued to talk and patted his side where Brock observed a small caliber handgun with a "red bottom." According to Brock, the defendant again told Williams, "Stop running your mouth before everybody knows what's going on and stop telling people stuff before I take my gun." The defendant said he planned to find a ride to Alton. At some point, the group left.
Later that night, Felipe Luckey drove the defendant, Williams, Madison, and Greenlee from East St. Louis to Alton. According to Greenlee, Williams was wearing dark clothes, brown boots, and a red cap with a yellow "T." On the way to Alton, Luckey stopped by the Sullivan housing projects, so that Madison and Williams could visit a woman. Madison and Williams went to the woman's apartment and learned that she was not home. According to Madison, when he and Williams returned to the car, the defendant passed a gun with red tape on it to Williams; Williams put the gun into his coat. Luckey also stopped at a gas station. According to gas station attendant Eldon Smith, between 8 and 8:30 p.m., the defendant bought a snack and asked for directions to Belle Manor, the apartment complex where Womack lived.
Around 9 p.m., Luckey and the others arrived at Belle Manor, where Williams saw Womack walking with James Patterson. Luckey passed them and parked further up the road on a hill. Williams, Madison, and Greenlee exited the car. While Greenlee stood between two nearby apartment buildings, Williams and Madison approached Womack and Patterson. Words were exchanged, and Williams pulled the gun from his coat. When Patterson stepped forward, Williams shot him. When Womack turned to run, Williams shot him in the back. Three Belle Manor residents who witnessed the shootings later described the shooter as wearing a dark jacket and a red cap.
After the shooting, Williams and Madison ran back to the car. Greenlee, frozen in fear, urinated in his pants. Williams yelled at Greenlee to get into the car and threatened to shoot him. Greenlee returned to the car, and Luckey quickly drove away. According to Madison, the defendant asked Williams if "he took care of that," and Williams said yes. Everyone joked about Greenlee's wet pants, and the defendant told Greenlee that he would be hurt if he talked about the shootings. According to Madison, the defendant suggested that Madison and Williams go back to Alton to ensure no one saw the shootings. Madison drove Williams to Alton. According to Madison, Williams telephoned Haynes around 11 p.m. and said, In the background, Madison added, "Yeah, bitch you're going to die." That night, Ursery talked to Madison and asked what Madison had done earlier. Madison responded that he was riding around in a car with Luckey, Williams, and the defendant.
The police investigation eventually led to the defendant. On March 13, 1997, he was indicted on one count of contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in connection with Patterson's murder and arrested. On August 11, 1997, 152 days after he was arrested, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss under the speedy-trial provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (speedy-trial act) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1998)). The trial court denied this motion, finding that several delays were attributable to the defendant and that only 99 days had run for speedy-trial purposes.
On August 27, 1997, the State filed an amended information, recharging the defendant with contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in connection with Patterson's murder, and charging him with three additional offenses: one count of contributing to the criminal delinquency of a minor in connection with Womack's murder, one count of first degree murder pertaining to Womack, and one count of first degree murder pertaining to Patterson. On September 3, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Patterson murder charge under the speedy-trial act, alleging that 168 days had passed since he was arrested on the contributing charge in connection with Patterson's murder. The trial court denied this motion.
At trial, the State's case rested primarily on testimony from Greenlee and Madison. The defendant's case rested on testimony from several alibi witnesses, who stated that they saw the defendant at an East St. Louis bar playing pool on the night of the shootings and that he did not go to Alton. The defendant then testified on his own behalf. He stated that he never gave Williams a gun and that he never went to Alton to shoot someone. The defendant testified, consistently with his alibi witnesses, that he went to a bar and played pool on the night of the shootings.
The jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of first degree murder and two counts of contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment on the murder convictions and 20 years' imprisonment on the contributing convictions. A divided appellate court panel affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. No. 5-99-0452 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a).
The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to impeach the defendant with facts not in evidence; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present evidence that its key witnesses received threats before testifying at trial.
First, the defendant contends that the State violated the speedy-trial act when it charged him with first degree murder in connection with Patterson's death 168 days after it charged him with contributing to the criminal delinquency of a juvenile in connection with Patterson's death. The defendant claims that, because these charges were subject to compulsory joinder, pretrial continuances attributable to him on the contributing charge were not attributable to him on the murder charge.
The speedy-trial act provides, "Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant * * *." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 1996). Application of the speedy-trial act is a straightforward counting exercise when the defendant is charged with a single offense. Its application, however, becomes more complicated when the defendant is charged with multiple, but factually related, offenses at different times. In such cases the speedy-trial guarantee is tempered by compulsory joinder principles.
The compulsory-joinder provision of the Criminal Code of 1961 states:
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