People v. J.A. (In re J.A.)

• Decision Date: 26 August 2022
• Docket Number: E078558
• Parties: In re J.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.A., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

In re J.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.A., Defendant and Appellant.

E078558

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Second Division

August 26, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No. J290213, Susan Slater, Judge. Affirmed as modified with directions.

Savannah R. Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Collette C. Cavalier and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

CODRINGTON J.

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I. INTRODUCTION

J.A. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional orders. He contends (1) the probation condition prohibiting him from "possessing or acting like he possesses a deadly weapon" is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (2) the 15-percent administrative processing fee requiring him to pay restitution to the victim should be stricken pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 177; and (3) the maximum term of confinement should be stricken from the court's order because he was not removed from parental custody. We find probation condition 10 to be constitutional. However, we strike the 15-percent administrative processing fee pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 177, as well as the court's maximum term of confinement finding because minor was placed on home probation. Agreeing with him in part, we will modify the judgment and direct the juvenile court to amend the written conditions of probation and the dispositional order.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Minor and S.S. began a relationship in October 2019 when S.S. was 12 years old and minor was 15. During their relationship, minor coerced, forced and pressured S.S. to engage in various sexual activities, including oral copulation and vaginal intercourse. The sexual abuse continued from October 2019 until July 2020.

Following a jurisdictional hearing, on January 25, 2022, the juvenile court found true that minor committed three counts of lewd acts upon a child under 14 years of age

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(Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The court thereafter declared minor a ward of the court, placed him on formal probation in the custody of his father, and imposed various terms and conditions of probation.

Among others, probation condition 10 stated: "Do not possess, or act like you possess, a dangerous or deadly weapon, including but not limited to any knife, gun, anything that looks like a gun, any part of a gun, ammunition, blackjack, bicycle chain, dagger, or any weapon or explosive substance or device as defined in [P]enal [C]ode section 16100-17360 and/or [P]enal [C]ode section 626.10." Probation condition 18 required that minor "[p]ay the victim, S.S., for any injuries or damages [he] caused by committing this crime, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 730.6/730.7, in an amount to be recommended by the probation officer and ordered by the court, plus a fifteen percent (15%) fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1 and San Bernardino County ordinance 3026 for the administrative cost of processing the account."

The juvenile court set a maximum term of confinement of 10 years. Minor timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Probation Condition 10

Minor argues the probation condition prohibiting him from acting like he possesses a deadly or dangerous weapon is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He thus requests we strike the language "or act like you possess" from probation condition

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10. The People contend the condition is sufficiently precise, such that a person of common intelligence could understand it. We agree with the People.

The juvenile court "has wide discretion to select appropriate conditions and may impose '"any reasonable condition that is 'fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.'"'" (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.) "We review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo." (People v. Holzmann (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1244.)

"Probation conditions, like statutes, are unconstitutional if they are not sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him or her. [Citation.] That is because of the due process requirement of fair warning, which is embodied in both the federal and state Constitutions. [Citation.] If a law does not provide fair warning of what it prohibits or requires, those to whom it applies will not know what conduct subjects them to punishment. [Citation.] Further, a vague law invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (People v. Holzmann, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1244-1245.) However, "[m]erely because a condition could have been drafted with more precision does not make it unconstitutional." (Id. at p. 1246.)

In other words, "[t]o withstand a vagueness challenge, 'a probation condition must be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine whether the probationer has violated the condition.' [Citations.] A probation condition is not impermissibly vague '"'simply because there may be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is covered by

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its language.'"' [Citation.] We give the condition '"the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader."'" (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261.) Hence, "[a] probation condition survives a vagueness challenge if it can be given any reasonable and practical construction." (Ibid.)

Minor asserts that the part of the condition prohibiting him from "acting like" he possesses a dangerous or deadly weapon is vague and overbroad because it fails to give him fair warning of what conduct is prohibited. We disagree with minor's claim that the phrase "act like you possess" is unconstitutionally vague. A probation term should be given "the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader." (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606.) The condition prohibits minor from acting like he possesses a dangerous or deadly weapon such as a gun, knife, dagger, or explosive device. A reasonable, objective reader would interpret "'act like you possess'" to mean pretending or making a...