People v. Jablonski

Decision Date21 January 1972
Docket NumberNo. 2,11193,Docket Nos. 11192,2
Citation195 N.W.2d 777,38 Mich.App. 33
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter JABLONSKI and Albert Stoponi, Defendants-Appellants
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Arthur J. Tarnow, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendants-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Walter W. Turton, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and BRONSON and TARGONSKI, * JJ.

McGREGOR, Presiding Judge.

Defendants were found guilty by a jury of the felony of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a larceny; M.C.L.A. § 750.110; M.S.A. § 28.305. Their convictions arose out of the breaking and entering of Bill's TV Store, in Marysville, Michigan. At trial, Louis O'Neill testified that he and his wife were awakened at about 4 a.m. by the sound of breaking glass. The O'Neill residence is located across the street from Bill's TV. Upon looking out their window, the O'Neills were able to observe a car parked next to the TV Store, see that the front window of the store had been broken, and that the car parked next to the store was a light colored convertible. The police were called.

At trial, Dean Keith DeShon, the owner of the store, testified that the store had been locked and that no one had been given permission to enter. He testified also that he was able to determine what was missing by comparing the merchandise on the floor of the store against inventory sheets. The TV sets found in defendants' possession at the time of their arrest were marked. At trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the admission of these TV sets, the motion was denied, and the sets were admitted into evidence and were identified as being from the store. The captain of the Marysville Police Department testified that at about 4:30 a.m. on the day in question, he received a radio call on his car radio that there was a breaking and entering in progress at Bill's T.V. Store. Upon receiving this message and being advised that a convertible was involved, the captain proceeded to Gratiot Avenue by the quickest route, which caused him to be at a point southwest of the store where he observed a convertible driving on Gratiot; he radioed his partner that he had spotted a car similar to the suspected car, and proceeded to follow the car. The officer turned on his overhead light and the suspect car stopped. The police officer's partner arrived and the two officers searched the car; they found two TV sets in the back seat and the defendants were arrested. The men and the car were searched; a pair of gloves were found on the front seat and two pry bars were found on the floor. The captain testified that his partner read the defendants their rights. He further testified that, at the time of their apprehension, the police officers talked to the defendants and they did not care to discuss anything about it. Counsel for the defendants objected and moved for a mistrial on the basis that such a statement amounted to adverse comment on the defendants' rights to remain silent. The motion was denied. Later, the other officer was permitted to testify, over defense objection, that the defendants were informed of their right to remain silent and that they then remained silent when asked if they wished to talk.

This Court is now asked whether reversible error resulted when the arresting officers were allowed to testify, over the objections of the defense, that the defendants had been informed of their right to remain silent, and had been made no response to the question of whether they had anything to say.

The prosecution may not use at trial the fact that a defendant exercised his privilege of silence in the face of accusation, for such would penalize the defendant for exercising the privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 720 (1966).

In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), the prosecution commented in closing argument that the defendant failed to take the stand and testify as to his alibi; the Supreme Court held:

'Comment on the refusal to testify * * * is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.'

The Court then went on to hold that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government and in its bearing on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.

A year later Miranda v. Arizona, Supra, applied Griffin, supra, to the interrogation stage. In footnote 37 the Court says:

'In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.'

Long before Miranda, the rule in Michigan was that the prosecutor could not comment on the failure of a defendant to make a statement in the face of an accusation. See People v. Bigge, 288 Mich. 417, 425, 285 N.W. 5 (1939). This Court, in People v. Gisondi, 9 Mich.App. 289, 156 N.W.2d 601 (1967), held that statements of a person in custody may be used in evidence against him, but his silence may not.

The case of State v. Stuart, 456 S.W.2d 19 (Mo., 1970), while unique in the manner in which the testimony came before the jury, seems to be applicable to the instant case. In response to a question asked by one of the jurors, the police officer indicated that defendant remained silent...

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31 cases
  • Dorsey v. State, 9
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • January 9, 1976
    ...supra, that the harmless error rule 'has been and should be carefully circumscribed for the reasons given in People v. Joblonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 38-39, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972), where it is said 'Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt......
  • Ware v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • September 14, 2000
    ...211, 219 (1974). And the continuing validity of the majority's harmless error analysis makes what was said in People v. Jablonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972): "Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to get such testimony in, since t......
  • Harris v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • April 12, 2018
    ...to buttress the case to gain a conviction and then hope that the issue is not raised on appeal. Id. (quoting People v. Jablonski , 38 Mich.App. 33, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972) ).To be sure, a single reference to a defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights is not always prejudicial......
  • Rubin v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • September 1, 1991
    ...be carefully circumscribed." Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 248, 322 A.2d 211, 219 (1974). In that case, quoting People v. Jablonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972), we pointed "Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to get such testimon......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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