People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 13 April 1998
• Parties: 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 3443 The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ted JACKSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 781

670 N.Y.S.2d 781

1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 3443

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ted JACKSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division Second Department.

April 13, 1998.

Ethel P. Ross, Rye, for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Roseann B. MacKechnie and Nancy F. Talcott, of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brill, J.), rendered February 18, 1993, convicting him of assault in the second degree and disorderly conduct, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. By decision and order of this court dated March 25, 1996, the appeal was held in abeyance and the matter was remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to hear and report on the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was denied the right to a speedy trial (see, People v. Jackson, 225 A.D.2d 794, 639 N.Y.S.2d 941). The Supreme Court, Kings County, has conducted a hearing and filed its report with this court. Justice Rosenblatt has been substituted for the late Justice Hart (see, 22 NYCRR 670.1[c] ).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

We concur in the findings of the Supreme Court that the defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.30) was not violated.

The defendant was arraigned upon a felony complaint on September 18, 1990, and therefore the People had to be ready for trial within six months of that date (see, People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 239, 501 N.Y.S.2d 793, 492 N.E.2d 1209; see also, People v. Durette, 222 A.D.2d 692, 637 N.Y.S.2d 164), a period here amounting to 181 days. The People's first unambiguous, affirmative representation of trial readiness did not occur until May 26, 1992 (see generally, People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287). Nevertheless, upon deducting from the 181 days the delay resulting from the defendant's and the codefendants' pretrial motions, delay to which the defendant or his codefendants consented, delay caused by continuances requested by the defense, and the periods of time during which a defendant was without counsel through no fault of the court (see, CPL 30.30[4] ), only 163 days of the period from September 18, 1990, to May 26, 1992, are chargeable to the People. Therefore, they were ready within the time limit of the statute. Further, we find no post-readiness delay chargeable to the People (see, People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 498 N.Y.S.2d 119, 488 N.E.2d 1231; People v. Caussade, 162 A.D.2d 4, 8-9, 560 N.Y.S.2d 648). Accordingly, the defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied.

The defendant's claim that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support his conviction is not preserved for appellate review (see, People v. Bynum, 70 N.Y.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 492, 518 N.E.2d 4; People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245, 250, 541 N.Y.S.2d 9). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to...