People v. Jackson

• Citation: 89 N.E. 924,196 N.Y. 357
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JACKSON.
• Decision Date: 09 November 1909
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

196 N.Y. 357

89 N.E. 924

PEOPLE

v.JACKSON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 9, 1909.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Trial Term, Washington County.

Frank Jackson was convicted of murder, and from a judgment of death he appeals. Affirmed.

Frederick Fraser and A. N. Richards, for appellant.

Erskine C. Rogers, Dist. Atty., for the People.

CULLEN, C. J.

The appellant, a colored man, was convicted of murder in the first degree in having caused the death of Elizabeth Jackson, a colored woman, on the 24th of August, 1908. Though not man and wife, the appellant and deceased had been living together as such for some time; the relation having been formed in 1907. For a few weeks prior to the homicide the parties had been boarding with one Mosher in Sandy Hill, the deceased being in the service of the family of Judge Ingalsbe as cook, but returning to Mosher's to spend the night with the appellant. The appellant became jealous of the deceased consorting with other men and reproached her for her conduct. The dispute between the parties, though not extending to physical violence, was sufficiently grave to induce the Moshers to order them from the house, and the deceased spent the night preceding the homicide at Judge Ingalsbe's and the appellant somewhere without the Mosher house. The next morning he packed his personal effects, which were at the Moshers, in a suit case, which he carried with him to Judge Ingalsbe's. There, at about a quarter to 7 in the morning, he met George Robillard, a coachman in the employ of Judge Ingalsbe, and the only eyewitness of the homicide. That witness testified: That he was sweeping the rear stoop when the appellant approached him and asked if his (Jackson's) wife was up. That he nodded assent. That Jackson then went into the kitchen, and in about three minutes he heard a scream. The deceased rushed out followed by the appellant. That the deceased slipped on one of the steps and fell on the lawn. That the appellant jumped upon her, putting his knee on her breast. Then he saw the appellant strike towards her throat three times, though he did not see whether there was any weapon in his hand. The appellant then ran away, leaving his suit case behind him. That the deceased got up. The blood spurted out of her throat, and in a second her white waist was covered with blood. The deceased went into the kitchen, and the witness ran for a doctor. It further appeared from the testimony that the deceased was immediately taken to the office of a physician. He found a wound from some sharp instrument which had severed the carotid artery and jugular vein. The physician proceeded to tie up the artery and stop the hemorrhage; but before that could be entirely accomplished, and in a very few moments after she had been brought to the office, the patient died from the injuries she had received. The alarm being given, search was made for the appellant by a number of police officers. He was found hiding under the stoop of a house. One of the officers said to the appellant: ‘This is a bad job. You have killed her.’ He replied: ‘I could not help it. It had to be. I just caught her cheating, and I cut her.’ Being asked whether he had the razor with which he cut the deceased, the appellant replied, ‘No; I threw it away in the yard when I cut her.’ Shortly after a razor was found in the yard covered with stains, which, on expert analysis, proved to be human blood. The story of the defendant, testifying on his own behalf as to what happened at the time of the homicide, was: That on entering the kitchen he found the deceased putting wood on the stove. That he asked for a shirt of his that she had and a bottle of perfume. That the deceased told him to get out; that Mrs. Ingalsbe did not want him there. That she took the teakettle off the stove and ‘started for him,’ when he ran out of the house. She followed, and words followed between them. That again she ‘started for him,’ and ‘I tripped her, and as I tripped her she fell. She had something in her hand, but I could not discern what it was, and when she fell she hollered. Before she could get up, I grabbed her. In the scuffle some way she got cut. It was not anything on my part at all, I am satisfied that it was not. I first saw the razor afterward on the ground. When she hollered so it commenced to work on me, and I couldn't seem to stand her screaming, and I kind of stood undecided a few minutes, and then I left the scene. I saw blood flowing. That is what excited me. That is what unnerved me. I did not take hold of her hand that I know of, I may have in the scuffle, I cannot say.’

If the jury believed the witness Robillard, who was entirely disinterested, there can be no doubt that the homicide was committed by the appellant. Though it was testified that the appellant had a razor, the particular weapon with which the deceased was wounded was not shown to have been his, save by his own admission to the officer upon his arrest; but, if the razor had not been discovered at all, the jury would have been warranted in finding that the appellant had wounded the deceased with some sharp weapon, though the identity of the weapon was not disclosed. In addition to that, the jury had the admissions of the appellant himself made to the officer. On the other hand, the story told by the appellant on the stand seems quite improbable.

The evidence also was sufficient to warrant the finding that the homicide was committed with premeditation and deliberation. The weapon used and the part of the body against which it was directed-in fact it was an attempt to cut the woman's throat-tended to establish that the appellant's intent was to kill. The circumstances surrounding the occurrence also warranted the inference of deliberation. If the razor was the appellant's, as the jury might well find, if indeed it was not compelled to so find, then the fact that he carried it on his person, instead of placing it in the suit case with the rest of his effects, indicates that even...