People v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 01 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | Appeal Nos. 3-19-0621,3-20-0022 (cons.) |
| Citation | 2022 IL App (3d) 190621,193 N.E.3d 916,456 Ill.Dec. 676 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Quanzes R. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shawn Katrell Joiner, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Justin Joseph, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Jodi Hoos, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Jessica A. Theodoratos, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 A police officer pulled over defendant Shawn Katrell Joiner for failing to activate his turn signal as he parked next to a curb on a residential street. Defendant Quanzes Jackson was a passenger in the vehicle. The officer found marijuana on Jackson, and the State charged him with unlawful possession of cannabis ( 720 ILCS 550/4(b) (West 2018)) and unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis (id. § 5(c)). The officer found a gun in the vehicle, and the State charged Joiner with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)).
¶ 2 Joiner and Jackson filed a joint motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Both defendants participated in stipulated bench trials and were found guilty. The trial court sentenced Joiner to 7 years in prison and Jackson to 12 months of conditional discharge. On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion to quash and suppress. We reverse the trial court's denial of defendants’ motion and reverse defendants’ convictions outright.
¶ 4 On March 21, 2019, defendant Shawn Katrell Joiner was driving on Arago Street in Peoria with defendant Quanzes R. Jackson as his passenger. Arago Street is a residential roadway with two lanes of traffic, one in each direction. There are no markings on the roadway designating lanes. Vehicles can park along the curbs of the street, but there are no markings designating parking spaces or a parking lane. While driving on Arago Street, Joiner maneuvered his vehicle to the right to park along the curb in front of Jackson's house. Joiner did not activate his turn signal before or after he did so.
¶ 5 Officer Tyler Hodges of the Peoria Police Department executed a traffic stop of Joiner's vehicle because of Joiner's failure to signal. As Hodges approached the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of marijuana and observed an open bottle of alcohol in Joiner's lap. Hodges asked defendants to step out of the vehicle. When they did, Hodges smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Jackson. Hodges asked Jackson if he had marijuana on him, and Jackson admitted he did. Hodges searched Jackson and found six individually wrapped bags of marijuana weighing a total of 22 grams.
¶ 6 Hodges searched the vehicle and found a .22-caliber handgun behind the driver's seat. Hodges arrested both defendants. The State charged Joiner with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and Jackson with unlawful possession of cannabis and unlawful possession with intent to deliver cannabis.
¶ 7 Defendants jointly filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that Hodges's stop was unreasonable because Joiner did not violate the Illinois Vehicle Code ( 625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2018)) when he moved his vehicle to the curb to park in front of Jackson's house without signaling. Following hearings, the trial court denied defendants’ motion, finding that section 11-804 of the Vehicle Code (id. § 11-804) required Joiner to use his turn signal because he "changed lanes" when he moved his vehicle from his "lane of travel to the parking lane." Defendants filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied.
¶ 8 The court conducted a stipulated bench trial for Joiner. The court found Joiner guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Joiner filed a motion for acquittal or a new trial, alleging that the court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Joiner to seven years’ imprisonment. Joiner filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.
¶ 9 At Jackson's stipulated bench trial, the court found Jackson guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver. Jackson filed a motion for a new trial based on the trial court's denial of his motion to quash and suppress. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Jackson to 12 months of conditional discharge.
¶ 11 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Tramble , 2012 IL App (3d) 110867, ¶ 11, 366 Ill.Dec. 895, 980 N.E.2d 1254 ). The temporary detention of individuals during a traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. (citing Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). Thus, the decision to stop a vehicle is constitutional only if the police have at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the stop. Id. (citing People v. Hackett , 2012 IL 111781, 361 Ill.Dec. 536, 971 N.E.2d 1058 ). A police officer may stop a vehicle where he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver violated the Vehicle Code. People v. Mott , 389 Ill. App. 3d 539, 544, 329 Ill.Dec. 314, 906 N.E.2d 159 (2009).
¶ 12 An officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law does not violate the fourth amendment. People v. Gaytan , 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 45, 392 Ill.Dec. 333, 32 N.E.3d 641. However, where a traffic stop is based on an unreasonable mistake of law, it is unconstitutional as violative of the fourth amendment. People v. Kaczkowski , 2020 IL App (3d) 170764, ¶ 17, 449 Ill.Dec. 447, 179 N.E.3d 366 ; Mott , 389 Ill. App. 3d at 543-44, 329 Ill.Dec. 314, 906 N.E.2d 159. An officer conducting a traffic stop commits an unreasonable mistake of law by misinterpreting an unambiguous statute. People v. Rice , 2021 IL App (3d) 180549, ¶ 21, 451 Ill.Dec. 154, 183 N.E.3d 200 ; Kaczkowski , 2020 IL App (3d) 170764, ¶ 15, 449 Ill.Dec. 447, 179 N.E.3d 366.
¶ 13 Section 11-804 of the Vehicle Code is unambiguous. Kaczkowski , 2020 IL App (3d) 170764, ¶ 16, 449 Ill.Dec. 447, 179 N.E.3d 366 ; United States v. Stanbridge , 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016). At the time of Joiner's stop, the statute provided in pertinent part:
¶ 14 The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Dome Tax Services Co. v. Weber , 2019 IL App (3d) 170767, ¶ 10, 434 Ill.Dec. 596, 136 N.E.3d 1121. The most reliable indicator is the language of the statute itself. Id.
¶ 15 Pursuant to its plain language, section 11-804 of the Vehicle Code "requires an appropriate signal be used when a vehicle makes a turn, changes lanes, encroaches onto the other side of the street or road, and leaves the roadway." Tramble , 2012 IL App (3d) 110867, ¶ 14, 366 Ill.Dec. 895, 980 N.E.2d 1254. Moving within a single lane, even moving as far right within a lane as possible, does not require a signal. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17 ; see also People v. Bowden , 2019 IL App (3d) 170654, ¶ 29, 431 Ill.Dec. 436, 127 N.E.3d 969 (). "As a practical matter, ‘changing lanes’ requires the existence of more than one lane: In order to change lanes from Lane A to Lane B, Lane A must exist." Mahaffey v. State , 364 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
¶ 16 The word " ‘[l]ane’ is not defined [in the Vehicle Code] (and the Illinois courts have not had occasion to construe the term, especially as applied to an unstriped roadway)." Stanbridge , 813 F.3d at 1037. However, the Vehicle Code defines "[l]aned roadway" as "[a] roadway which is divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic." 625 ILCS 5/1-136 (West 2018). And, according to the Vehicle Code, "[t]raffic" contemplates the use of "any highway for purposes of travel." Id. § 1-207. "[I]n common practice, a traffic ‘lane’ is one in which vehicles legally and customarily are driven toward their destinations." People v. Mueller , 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, ¶ 21, 431 Ill.Dec. 328, 127 N.E.3d 861.
¶ 17 Where words are not defined in a statute, they should be given their ordinary meaning. People v. Cardamone , 232 Ill. 2d 504, 513, 328 Ill.Dec. 917, 905 N.E.2d 806 (2009)...
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