People v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 03 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–09–1585.,1–09–1585. |
| Citation | 350 Ill.Dec. 727,409 Ill.App.3d 631,949 N.E.2d 215 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Charles JACKSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, IL (Alan D. Goldberg, Emily E. Filpi, of counsel), for Appellant.Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago, IL (Alan J. Spellberg, Kathleen Warnick, Emma Nowacki, of counsel), for Appellee.
[350 Ill.Dec. 729 , 409 Ill.App.3d 632] OPINION
After a bench trial, defendant, Charles Jackson, was found guilty of first degree murder, but mentally ill. At trial, defendant raised the defense of insanity. On appeal, he asks that this court excuse his procedural default and address whether the trial court abandoned its role as a neutral and impartial arbiter and denied him a fair trial by: (1) assuming the role of prosecutor when questioning defendant's expert witness in regard to defendant's sanity; (2) by interjecting its own personal knowledge of matters outside the record in considering defendant's IQ score and Cook County jail's psychotropic medication distribution practices; and (3) by disregarding evidence of defendant's brain damage and the defense expert's testimony regarding the antipsychotic medication Risperdal.1 We hold the trial court abandoned its role as a neutral and impartial arbiter of fact by adopting a prosecutorial role
[350 Ill.Dec. 730 , 949 N.E.2d 218]
when questioning defendant's expert witness and by relying on matters based on private knowledge of the trial court that were outside the record.
The circuit court sentenced defendant on June 15, 2009. Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on the day he was sentenced. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 603 and 606, governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case entered below. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 6; Ill S.Ct. R. 603 (eff.Oct.1, 2010); R. 606 (eff.Mar.20, 2009).
Defendant was charged with first degree murder for the shooting of his son-in-law, Pierre Champliss. The shooting in question occurred sometime between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m. on July 27, 2007, the facts of which are not contested by the parties. The evidence at trial established that defendant lived in the garage of a house owned by his elderly mother, Lillian Jackson. Defendant's daughter, Farrah Jackson, lived with her husband, Pierre Champliss, and their two children in the basement apartment of the house. Lola Connors, a family friend, also rented a room in the house. At the time of the incident, defendant was sitting on the front porch of the house with Connors, Caroline Jackson (defendant's sister), Regina Lee (defendant's niece), and Larry Edwards (defendant's brother-in-law). They were waiting for the ambulance that was transporting Lillian home from the hospital. Champliss was in front of the house waiting for his wife Farrah to come home. Connors testified that Champliss was walking up and down the sidewalk in the front of the house verbally abusing defendant and talking about what he was going to do to defendant and Caroline. At that time, the ambulance arrived, but was waiting in the driveway for a second ambulance to arrive so the paramedics could assist in carrying Lillian into the house.
Champliss approached defendant with his right fist in his left hand, striking it repeatedly. Connors testified that Champliss had threatened to kill defendant on “many occasions.” Defendant and Champliss were arguing over who was going to take Lillian Jackson's possessions once she passed away. Champliss was very close to defendant's face and told defendant “that's what I thought and walked away.” Defendant then went to the back of the house. Shortly after, defendant returned to the front of the house with a shotgun in his hand. Defendant then fired a shot at Champliss, who was standing at the front gate of the house. Champliss then ran across the street and fell. Defendant followed Champliss and shot him again. As Champliss was on the ground, defendant stated, “you can't talk now, can you?” Defendant shot Champliss again. Defendant also fired shots into Champliss's body as he stood over him.
Defendant then walked back across the street toward the house with the shotgun in his hand. He stated, By then, Farrah, defendant's daughter had arrived home. She was standing by her car as defendant approached and threatened her. At this point, defendant was in the middle of the street, trying to load the gun, but the gun was jammed. Farrah was walking toward her basement apartment. When Farrah reached her apartment, her daughter told her that Champliss was outside. She then ran out the door and the police were outside. Farrah did not see defendant again until trial. Connors and Caroline Jackson did not see defendant return
[350 Ill.Dec. 731 , 949 N.E.2d 219]
to the house after the shooting. Defendant then went to the liquor store, bought alcohol, and then went to the park across the street and watched the investigation.
On August 5, 2007, Officer Roberto Sena responded to an assignment over dispatch for a person wanted for murder. In responding to the assignment, he saw defendant riding his bicycle. Officer Sena spoke with Champliss's family and friends, who were in a car following defendant. Champliss's family and friends informed Officer Sena of defendant's name. When Officer Sena asked defendant his name, defendant told him a different name. Officer Sena then viewed a picture of defendant in the computer system to confirm that he was speaking with defendant. As Officer Sena approached him, defendant asked for a lawyer. Officer Sena informed defendant of his Miranda rights and then placed him under arrest.
Following defendant's arrest, he was taken to Cermak Health Services. At Cermak, defendant began receiving the medications Risperdal and Doxepin. He was also later prescribed Zoloft. Defendant then went from Cermak to the residential treatment unit at the Cook County jail, where he remained until his conviction.
The autopsy on Champliss's body revealed that he had a shotgun wound to the right upper chest, two shotgun wounds in the left chest area, and two shotgun wounds over the left, lower abdomen.
At his bench trial, defendant raised the defense of insanity. Defendant presented the expert testimony of Dr. Bruce Frumkin, an expert in forensic psychology, who testified that defendant was not sane at the time of the offense. Dr. Frumkin opined that defendant's insanity was the result of the mental defect of persisting dementia due to substance abuse and the mental illness of psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. The trial court interjected during Dr. Frumkin's testimony numerous times. The following paragraphs contain the interjections of note from the record made by the trial court during the direct examination of Dr. Frumkin.
Dr. Frumkin testified that he relied on an interview with defendant, psychological tests, interviews with family members, records, and police reports in formulating his opinion. On direct examination, defense counsel asked him about the importance of reviewing defendant's health records from Cermak Health Services, and the following colloquy took place:
Defense counsel then asked Dr. Frumkin whether he asked any other people to perform testing on defendant. The trial court interjected a question regarding a test that Dr. Frumkin had not requested to be performed on defendant.
“A. After I had done my evaluation of [defendant], I had a strong suspicion that there may be some neuropsychological issues with the Defendant. So, I called upon Dr. Robert Heilbronner to do a neuropsychological examination. Dr. Heilbronner, in addition to doing an interview with [defendant], did a number of neuropsychological tests.
The trial court next asked Dr. Frumkin for confirmation that defendant had attended college and from what school.
Dr. Frumkin testified that defendant notified him that he had injuries from boxing, a motor vehicle accident, and chronic substance abuse, and that he was exposed to paint and solvents without protective masks. The trial court stated;
The trial court asked Dr. Frumkin whether defendant was on any medication at the time of his examination. When Dr. Frumkin answered by describing the medicine defendant had been on, the trial court again interjected, questioning Dr. Frumkin's area of expertise.
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