People v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 26 September 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 27608,27608 |
| Citation | 570 P.2d 527,194 Colo. 93 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence Thomas JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Deborah L. Bianco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colo. State Public Defender, James F. Dumas, Jr., Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Lee J. Belstock, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree assault against a peace officer and resisting arrest. As constitutional questions were raised, we accepted jurisdiction of this appeal from the Colorado Court of Appeals. We affirm the district court.
At about midnight two Pueblo police officers came upon the defendant and his brother as they were pounding on the locked door of a tavern. The defendant admitted that he had a knife, but testified that he dropped it to the ground when asked to do so. The officers testified that the defendant lunged at them several times with the knife, and that he dropped it only as a result of a blow by one of the officers, who struck him with a flashlight.
The assault charge was laid under section 18-3-202(1)(e) which provides:
The defendant contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. He predicates his argument upon two statements:
In accordance with the definition in section 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S.1973, the court instructed the jury:
" 'Serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body."
We see nothing vague in the definition of "serious bodily injury." We believe it obvious to a juror that "serious bodily injury" has as a threshold requirement a greater degree of intended injury than "bodily injury." See People v. Martinez, Colo., 540 P.2d 1091 (1975).
We do not subscribe to the position that a jury cannot determine the defendant's intent without the benefit of evidence of actual injury. The existence of specific intent, like that of any other element, is a question of fact for the jury. People v. Archer, 173 Colo. 299, 477 P.2d 791 (1970). Intent need not be proved by direct substantive evidence, but may be discerned from the circumstances surrounding the offense. People v. Edwards, 184 Colo. 440, 520 P.2d 1041 (1974); and Baker v. People, 176 Colo. 99, 489 P.2d 196 (1971).
The defendant's second contention is that the first-degree assault statute violates his constitutional guarantee of equal protection in that, as was the case in People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975), there is no sufficiently pragmatic difference between it and the second-degree assault statute, section 18-3-203, C.R.S.1973. The latter statute reads:
There are fundamental distinctions between the two statutes. In subsection (a), (b) and (d) the victim is "another person", whereas the applicable portion of the first-degree assault statute involves "a peace officer or fireman." Under subsection (c) and (f) of the second degree assault statute the defendant must either intentionally cause bodily injury or violently apply physical force, whereas there is no such requirement under the portion of the first-degree assault statute here involved. There is no merit in the defendant's argument that subsections (c) and (f) are more serious acts and, therefore, there is a violation of equal protection. Subsection (e) is obviously completely different.
The defendant would have us rule that the evidence was insufficient to establish specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. His argument in support of this proposition is that we should find the evidence to the contrary more convincing. There is evidence that the defendant had the knife in his hand and was attempting to get around his brother in order to reach one of the police officers; that the defendant was trying to stab the officer; that the defendant was ordered by the officers to drop the knife, but did not do so; and that one of the officers struck the defendant's arm with the flashlight, causing him to drop the knife. This testimony was sufficient to support the jury's finding of specific intent. People v. Focht, 180 Colo. 259, 504 P.2d 1096 (1972).
The defendant argues that the action should be dismissed as a result of unavailability of the videotape of the booking procedure. The defendant was charged and arrested on November 1, 1974. The preliminary hearing was held on April 21, 1975. In September, 1975 the defendant moved for the production of...
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...People v. Benjamin, 197 Colo. 188, 591 P.2d 89 (1979), even as applied to cases where no actual injury is inflicted. People v. Jackson, 194 Colo. 93, 570 P.2d 527 (1977). Certainly, intent is no more concrete than are threats. Indeed, while threats typically are uttered aloud, intent usuall......
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...in injury to a child statute prohibiting infliction of “serious bodily injury” not unconstitutionally vague); People v. Jackson, 194 Colo. 93, 570 P.2d 527, 528 (1977) (“We see nothing vague in the definition of ‘serious bodily injury.’ We believe it obvious to a juror that ‘serious bodily ......
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