People v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 20 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 88474.,88474.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lawrence JACKSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

793 N.E.2d 1

205 Ill.2d 247

275 Ill.Dec. 521

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lawrence JACKSON, Appellant.

No. 88474.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 20, 2001.

Rehearing Denied April 1, 2002.

Stephen E. Eberhardt, Crestwood, and Eric J. Bell, Chicago, for appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Linda Woloshin, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court.

Defendant, Lawrence Jackson, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing his amended petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Because defendant was sentenced to death for his underlying convictions, his appeal lies directly with this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition.

BACKGROUND

At a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, eight-year-old Urica Winder testified that defendant and codefendant Bobbie Driskel came to her family's apartment at 1850 West Washington late in the evening on September 24, 1986. The two men stabbed to death her mother, Vernita Winder, her four-year-old sister, Dana, her mother's boyfriend, Mark Brown, and her mother's friend, Shirley Martin, and then stole a television set and VCR. Urica, too, was brutally stabbed, but survived the attack by pretending to be dead.¹

Based on Urica's testimony and other evidence, including defendant's own inculpatory statements to police, defendant was convicted on June 23, 1988, on four counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted murder, one count of aggravated battery of a child, five counts of home invasion, five counts of armed robbery, and one count of residential burglary. Following the convictions, a death penalty sentencing hearing was held. The jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty and, after hearing evidence in aggravation and mitigation, found that the mitigation evidence did not preclude imposition of the death penalty. On September 7, 1988, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death, and imposed terms of imprisonment for the nonmurder convictions. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. People v. Jackson, 145 Ill.2d 43, 163 Ill.Dec. 859, 582 N.E.2d 125 (1991).

After our decision issued, defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. In response, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to this court for further consideration in light of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). See Jackson v. Illinois, 506 U.S. 802, 113 S.Ct. 32, 121 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992). Thereafter, on September 26, 1991, this court issued a judgment affirming defendant's convictions and nondeath sentences. In accord with Morgan, however, defendant's death sentence was vacated and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a new death penalty sentencing hearing.

A new sentencing hearing was held and defendant again was found eligible for the death penalty based on three aggravating factors: multiple murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3)); felony murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)), and murder of a child under the age of 12 when "the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7)). The resentencing jury also determined that the mitigating evidence was insufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g). Therefore, on April 24, 1995, defendant was resentenced to death. On May 23, 1995, defendant filed a notice of appeal directly to this court.

On August 29, 1996, while the direct appeal was still pending, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition, challenging the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel and the fairness of his death penalty sentencing hearing. Upon receipt of the petition, the circuit court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. Nothing further was filed, however, until this court issued an opinion on defendant's direct appeal, affirming the imposition of the death penalty upon resentencing. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998). Thereafter, on March 12, 1999, with the assistance of counsel, defendant filed an amended post-conviction petition, raising 14 claims. A fifteenth claim was added later.

Upon the State's motion, the trial court dismissed defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. Because this is a capital case, defendant seeks review of the dismissal of his post-conviction petition by this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a). Before this court, defendant asks that an evidentiary hearing be held on the following nine claims: (1) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at resentencing because his attorney failed to investigate and present evidence of a family history of mental illness; (2) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his appellate attorney failed to argue on direct appeal that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to the introduction of victim impact evidence concerning unrelated offenses; (3) whether his constitutional rights were violated when the State used peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty; (4) whether he was denied a fair sentencing hearing due to (a) judicial bias, (b) the presentation of hypnotically enhanced testimony, and (c) erroneous rulings; (5) whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentence in this case; (6) whether the court questioned prospective jurors in a manner which suggested that the jury would have to find unanimously that mitigation evidence outweighed aggravation evidence; (7) whether a new sentencing hearing is required because of the cumulative effect of all of the constitutional violations alleged above; (8) whether the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it has no burden of persuasion; and (9) whether the death penalty statute is unconstitutionally discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious because it precludes the imposition of death in cases where an individual requires "special forms of communicative assistance" at trial.

The evidence presented at defendant's second death penalty hearing is presented in detail in our opinion on defendant's direct appeal and will not be recounted here. We will discuss only those facts necessary to the disposition of this appeal.

ANALYSIS

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)) is a statutory vehicle which provides criminal defendants with an opportunity to obtain relief from substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights that occurred at trial or sentencing. People v. Towns, 182 Ill.2d 491, 502, 231 Ill.Dec. 557, 696 N.E.2d 1128 (1998). A petition filed under the Act is not an appeal, but a collateral attack on the judgment of conviction or sentence. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill.2d 142, 253 Ill.Dec. 678, 745 N.E.2d 1212 (2001); People v. Williams, 186 Ill.2d 55, 62, 237 Ill.Dec. 112, 708 N.E.2d 1152 (1999). Consequently, the purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is not to determine guilt or innocence, but to inquire into constitutional issues which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d 65, 72-73, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill.2d 501, 161 Ill.Dec. 306, 578 N.E.2d 952 (1991). Matters that were raised and decided on direct appeal are res judicata, and matters that could have been raised on appeal, but were not, will ordinarily be deemed waived. People v. McNeal, 194 Ill.2d 135, 252 Ill.Dec. 19, 742 N.E.2d 269 (2000); People v. West, 187 Ill.2d 418, 425, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664 (1999).

In a capital case, once a post-conviction petition is filed, the circuit court has 90 days in which to examine the petition and, if the petitioner is without counsel or the means to procure counsel, appoint counsel for him. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 2000). The petition is then docketed for further consideration and the State must "answer or move to dismiss." 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2000). If the State seeks dismissal of the petition, the circuit court must rule on the sufficiency of the allegations, without engaging in any fact finding and taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 388, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). Unless the circuit court finds that the allegations in the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated, the petition may be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. People v. West, 187 Ill.2d 418, 425, 241 Ill.Dec. 535, 719 N.E.2d 664 (1999); Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 381,233 Ill.Dec. 789,701 N.E.2d 1063; People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill.2d 294, 304, 222 Ill.Dec. 341, 677 N.E.2d 875 (1997). A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as of right. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d at 73,227 Ill.Dec. 338,687 N.E.2d 820.

A circuit court's ruling on the sufficiency of the allegations contained in a post-conviction petition is a legal determination. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 388, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063. We review de novo a post-conviction petition that has been dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill.2d 142, 253 Ill.Dec. 678, 745 N.E.2d 1212 (2001); Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 389, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063.

With these principles in mind, we address defendant's claims in the order that they were raised.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first two claims, defend...