People v. Williams
Decision Date | 19 February 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 83244,83244 |
Citation | 237 Ill.dec. 112,708 N.E.2d 1152,186 Ill.2d 55 |
Parties | , 237 Ill.Dec. 112 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Frank WILLIAMS, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Dawn D. Durante, Attorney at Law, Itasca, Timothy M. Gabrielsen, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Frank Williams.
Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State's Attorney, Hon. Jim Ryan, Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Div., Chicago, for the People.
The defendant, Frank Williams, appeals from a Cook County circuit court order dismissing his amended post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. Because defendant was sentenced to death, this court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(a). 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a). For the following reasons, we now affirm the circuit court.
The facts in this case are adequately set forth in this court's opinion on defendant's direct appeal, and only a brief summary of the facts is necessary here. Anthony Cole and Michelle Brueckmann, defendant's former fiancee, were leaving Brueckmann's home when defendant emerged from behind a van and screamed, "I told you I was going to kill you when I saw you together." Defendant shot Cole, and Cole fell to the ground. Defendant then shot Brueckmann in the head, and shot Cole again as Cole tried to flee. The police arrested defendant at his sister's home and recovered a .38-caliber revolver from defendant's jacket. Subsequent testing revealed that this gun fired the bullet removed from Cole's body. While in custody A jury in the circuit court of Cook County convicted defendant of, inter alia, the murder of Michelle Brueckmann and the attempted murder of Anthony Cole. Defendant waived a jury for sentencing. The trial court found defendant eligible for the death penalty based on the cold, calculated and premeditated manner of the murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(11)), and sentenced defendant to death. This court affirmed defendant's conviction and death sentence on direct appeal (People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996)), and the United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. Williams v. Illinois, 520 U.S. 1122, 117 S.Ct. 1260, 137 L.Ed.2d 339 (1997).
[237 Ill.Dec. 114] defendant gave an oral statement in which he admitted he shot Cole and Brueckmann because he was upset after seeing them together at a shopping mall.
Defendant subsequently filed a pro se post-conviction petition in which he alleged: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the assistance of a blood-type expert to type the blood on Brueckmann's clothing; (2) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the chain of custody of the bullet removed from Cole's body; and (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge on direct appeal the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that certain blood spatters were inconsistent with defendant's version of events. The circuit court appointed Ernest DiBenedetto as defendant's post-conviction counsel. DiBenedetto filed an amended post-conviction petition which included a fourth claim: defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "retain the services of a mitigation specialist in ample time to allow for a full and complete investigation and presentation of factors in mitigation." No affidavits were attached to the amended post-conviction petition.
The circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss the amended post-conviction petition, holding the allegations in the petition were frivolous and technically without merit. The circuit court also held that defendant's claim regarding the mitigation specialist was barred by res judicata.
Defendant raises only one argument on appeal. Defendant argues his post-conviction counsel failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) by not supporting the claims in the amended post-conviction petition with affidavits or other evidence. 1 This court reviews the dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 378, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).
It is well established that a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. People v. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d 227, 237, 182 Ill.Dec. 1, 609 N.E.2d 304 (1993); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993, 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 546 (1987). Counsel for indigent capital defendants who file pro se post-conviction petitions, however, is provided by statute. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 1996); see also 134 Ill.2d R. 651(c). Rule 651(c) establishes the level of assistance appointed counsel must provide to post-conviction petitioners. Rule 651(c) provides in relevant part:
In People v. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d 227, 182 Ill.Dec. 1, 609 N.E.2d 304 (1993), this court held that post-conviction counsel has no obligation under Rule 651(c) to locate witnesses not specifically identified by the petitioner or to conduct an investigation to discover the identity of witnesses who would provide evidence to support a claim in the post-conviction petition. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d at 247-48, 182 Ill.Dec. 1, 609 N.E.2d 304. In Johnson, we noted:
(Emphasis in original.) Johnson, 154 Ill.2d at 247-48, 182 Ill.Dec. 1, 609 N.E.2d 304.
Applying these principles to the instant appeal, defendant's post-conviction counsel clearly had no obligation to seek out a blood-type expert or to conduct a fishing expedition for evidence regarding the chain of custody of the bullet removed from Anthony Cole's body. Defendant, not his appointed post-conviction counsel, was responsible for providing this information, and the record is devoid of any indication that defendant provided this information to his post-conviction counsel. Similarly, defendant provided little if any evidence in his affidavit accompanying his pro se post-conviction petition to support his claim regarding the prosecutor's comments on blood spatters during closing arguments. Defendant merely averred in his affidavit that the blood spatter argument was more prejudicial than the record revealed because he observed several jurors nod in agreement when the prosecutor made this comment. This information, however, was not necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's contention, and post-conviction counsel's failure to include it in the post-conviction petition was not unreasonable. Therefore we hold the failure of defendant's appointed post-conviction counsel to support the first three claims in the amended post-conviction petition with affidavits or other evidence did not fall below the reasonable level of assistance required by Rule 651(c).
We need not address whether defendant's post-conviction counsel had an obligation to procure affidavits from additional mitigation witnesses to support the fourth claim in the amended post-conviction petition because defendant's underlying claim regarding the retention of the mitigation specialist is barred by res judicata. A post-conviction petition "represents a collateral attack on a prior judgment; it is not an appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence." People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill.2d 1, 9, 138 Ill.Dec. 201, 547 N.E.2d 170 (1989). As a result, in post-conviction proceedings the "[d]eterminations of the reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are res judicata as to issues actually decided." People v. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d 65, 73, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997). A post-conviction petitioner may not avoid the bar of res judicata simply by rephrasing issues previously addressed on direct appeal. See People v. Franklin, 167 Ill.2d 1, 23, 212 Ill.Dec. 153, 656 N.E.2d 750 (1995); People v. Emerson, 153 Ill.2d 100 Defendant's claim in the post-conviction petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain the mitigation specialist early enough to give him sufficient time to complete his investigation is simply a rephrasing of the claim he presented on...
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