People v. Jaimes
| Docket Number | A164781 |
| Decision Date | 03 November 2023 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGELINA LACY JAIMES, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 500-201038-7)
Angelina Lacy Jaimes, who was convicted of residential burglary (Penal Code,[1] section 459) and property crimes, contends that recent amendments to subdivision (c) of section 1385 (section 1385(c)), as added by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) required the trial court to dismiss two findings she identifies as "enhancements" subject to section 1385(c). Section 1385 has long given courts discretion to dismiss sentence enhancements." 'Building on the California Rules of Court that guide judges in certain sentencing decisions, SB 81 aims to provide clear guidance on how and when judges may dismiss sentencing enhancements and other allegations that would lengthen a defendant's sentence. By clarifying the parameters a judge must follow, SB 81 codifies a recommendation developed with the input of the judges who serve on the Committee on the Revision of the Penal Code for the purpose of improving fairness in sentencing while retaining a judge's authority to apply an enhancement to protect public safety.'" (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 19, rev. denied (Mar. 22, 2023) quoting the September 8, 2021 Senate Floor Analysis, p. 5).) The statute provides that, with one exception, a court "shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so" (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)) and that, in exercising its discretion, "the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence . . . that any of [nine enumerated] mitigating circumstances . . . are present" (id., subd. (c)(2)). "Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety." (Ibid.)
In Jaimes's view, the statute compelled the court to strike at least one enhancement, and it abused its discretion by failing to give "great weight" to circumstances that should have led it to strike both. Specifically, she notes that a finding that she had previously been convicted of vehicle theft led the court to use a heightened sentencing triad dictated by section 666.5 for her vehicle-theft conviction in this case. She argues that the court erred by failing to consider the finding of this prior conviction an enhancement because the Legislature intended to include this alternative sentencing scheme within the definition of "enhancement" under section 1385(c).
The resolution of this issue is one of statutory construction. Under well-established law, "enhancement" has a legal or technical meaning of "an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term." (People v Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 526-527 (Romero); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(5).) Section 666.5 is not an enhancement, but an alternative sentencing scheme, which provides higher base terms for defendants who have previously been convicted of vehicle thefts. (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861 869-870 (Lee); People v. Demara (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 448, 452, 455 (Demara).) Based upon the rules of statutory construction, we hold that the Legislature did not intend section 666.5 to be considered an enhancement under section 1385(c). (In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 730, as modified (Sept. 1, 2021) [when a court has defined a term and the legislature subsequently uses the same term, there is almost an "irresistible" presumption that the legislature intended to use this established definition]; People v. Carter (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1536, 1540 ["Ordinarily words used in a statute are presumed to be used in accordance with their established legal or technical meaning."].)
Although Jaimes points out provisions of section 1385(c) she claims are surplusage and portions of the legislative history which are inconsistent with using the well-established definition of enhancement, we agree with our colleagues in the Third Appellate District that, to the extent the Legislature did not intend to use the term "enhancement" in accordance with its well-established definition, it is up to the Legislature, not the courts, to amend the statute. We therefore affirm the judgment.
No relevant facts are in dispute. As the probation report detailed, Jaimes, who was 21 years old at the time of the crimes at issue, had a very difficult childhood: Her methamphetamine-addicted parents neglected her from a very young age, and she was in and out of the juvenile wardship system "throughout her childhood."
In 2013, at age 15, Jaimes was adjudicated to have committed felony violations of Vehicle Code sections 2800.3 () and 10851 (driving or taking vehicle without consent ("vehicle theft")) and was adjudged a ward of the court. She went AWOL from several group-home placements, and her juvenile wardship was terminated as unsuccessful in 2016.
Later that year she was convicted as an adult of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and escape (Pen. Code, § 4532, subd. (b)(1)). In April 2021-after she committed the crimes at issue here, but before trial-she was convicted in Alameda County of residential burglary (id., § 459).
The series of crimes at issue in this case began in August 2019 when Jaimes stole a car and later abandoned it. In December 2019, she stole a wallet from a parked car and tried to use an ATM card. In January 2020, she stole a wallet from another parked car and used a credit card and driver's license. Later that month, she stole presents wrapped for a children's birthday party from the trunk of a minivan and tried to sell some of them online. Finally, also in January 2020, she broke into a garage attached to a home, ransacked an SUV, and stole items from the SUV and garage.
The information charged Jaimes with vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851); receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d); felony identity theft (id., § 530.5, subd. (a)); misdemeanor identify theft (id., § 530.5, subd. (c)(1)); petty theft (id., § 484, subd. (a), § 490.2); and residential burglary (id., § 459). To each of the two vehicle-related counts, the information appended an allegation, labeled an "Enhancement," that her prior vehicle theft conviction warranted a higher base term (id., § 666.5); to the burglary count, it appended an enhancement allegation that she committed the offense while released on bail or her own recognizance (OR) (id., § 12022.1).[2] The information alleged no other "enhancements."
A jury found Jaimes guilty of the above six offenses and found that the burglary was of the first degree. She waived a jury trial on the remaining allegations, and the court found that she had suffered a vehicle-theft conviction in 2016 and was on bail or OR at the time of the burglary (§ 12022.1).
After reviewing a probation report, sentencing memoranda, and juvenile records, the court held a sentencing hearing. It began by expressing its tentative view that, although aggravating factors "greatly outweigh[ed]" mitigating factors in the case, Jaimes's undisputed history of "psychological, physical, or childhood trauma" brought her within the scope and intent of the newly added subdivision (b)(6)(A) of section 1170,[3] warranting imposition of a low term for the principal offense of first-degree burglary.
After hearing arguments and a statement by Jaimes, the court adhered to its tentative view and imposed a low term of two years for the crime of burglary (§ 459), with a two-year enhancement for having committed it while released on bail or OR (§ 12022.1). The court also imposed a one-year consecutive term on the vehicle-theft conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851).[4] That term is one-third the middle term of the higher triad dictated by the finding that Jaimes had previously been convicted of the same crime. (Pen. Code, § 666.5 [].) Finally, the court imposed a consecutive sentence of eight months (one-third the mid-term) on the felony identity theft count (id., § 530.5, subd. (a)) and concurrent sentences of six months each on the two misdemeanor convictions. Thus, Jaimes's total sentence is five years, eight months: two years for burglary, with a two-year on-bail enhancement; one year for vehicle theft (given the triad dictated by section 666.5); and eight months for felony identity theft.
Jaimes filed a timely appeal. She challenges only the propriety of imposing the two-year on-bail enhancement and of using the heightened sentencing triad (§ 666.5) for the vehicle-theft count, which had the effect of increasing her term on that count by four months.[5]
As noted, Senate Bill No. 81 amended section 1385, which authorizes courts to strike enhancements, by adding subdivision (c), which we quoted in part in the introduction and set forth more fully in the margin.[6] Of the nine mitigating circumstances listed in section 1385(c) Jaimes relies on three: her crimes were "connected to . . . childhood trauma" (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)); she faced multiple enhancements (id., subd. (c)(2)(B)); and her offenses were not violent (id., subd. (c)(2)(F)). Jaimes contends that because three mitigating factors apply in this case, the court abused its discretion by failing to strike the on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1) (which is undisputedly an ...
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