People v. Jenk, No. 1–14–3177.

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Presiding Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
• Citation: 407 Ill.Dec. 167,62 N.E.3d 1089
• Docket Number: No. 1–14–3177.
• Decision Date: 15 August 2016
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. David JENK, Defendant–Appellant.

62 N.E.3d 1089
407 Ill.Dec. 167

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
David JENK, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–14–3177.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Aug. 15, 2016.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 2016.

62 N.E.3d 1091

Allan A. Ackerman, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, John E. Nowak, and John J. Sviokla II, Assistant

62 N.E.3d 1092

State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

407 Ill.Dec. 170

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found defendant David Jenk guilty of misdemeanor domestic battery and sentenced him to one year of probation. On direct appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the statute allowing for the admission of his prior offenses of domestic violence (725 ILCS 5/115–7.4 (West 2012) ) was unconstitutional; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (3) the trial court erred in finding the victim credible at trial. For the following reasons after allowing the defendant's posttrial argument motion to cite additional authority and having included that authority in our analysis, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 7, 2013, the defendant was charged with misdemeanor domestic battery against his girlfriend, A.C.R., in connection with an incident that occurred on June 9, 2013. On January 21, 2014, the State filed a motion for proof of prior bad acts (motion to admit), seeking to introduce evidence of the defendant's six prior bad acts of domestic violence against A.C.R. Specifically, the State alleged that, pursuant to section 115–7.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115–7.4 (West 2012) ), evidence of the prior bad acts was admissible at trial because they occurred close in proximity of time to the charged offense; the prior bad acts were sufficiently similar to the charged offense; and they were relevant to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, and defendant's propensity to commit crimes of domestic violence. On January 30, 2014, the defendant filed a combined response to the State's motion and a motion in limine, arguing that the alleged six prior bad acts of domestic violence, for which he was never charged, were inadmissible on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional in violation of his equal protection and due process rights.

¶ 4 On March 18, 2014, prior to the start of trial, a hearing on the State's motion to admit was held during which the State described the six incidents of prior bad acts involving the defendant and A.C.R. that occurred on July 20, 2011; February 10, 2012; February 26, 2012; August 18, 2012; January 11, 2013; and May 2, 2013. The State asserted that evidence in the form of photographs was available to corroborate the February 10, February 26, and August 18 incidents. Medical testimony was also available to corroborate the February 26 incident. Defense counsel argued against the admissibility of the six prior bad acts on the basis that they were more prejudicial than probative and that the statute under which these prior bad acts may be admissible was unconstitutional in violation of equal protection and due process rights. The trial court, after considering the parties' arguments, found that all of the prior bad acts were close in time to the charged offense; that all of the prior incidents, except for the January 11 and May 2 incidents, were factually similar; and that the July 20, January 11, and May 2 incidents lacked any corroborating evidence to warrant inclusion. However, the trial court found the three remaining incidents dated February 10, February 26, and August 18 to be admissible at trial because they were supported by corroborating evidence, and the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect

407 Ill.Dec. 171

62 N.E.3d 1093

The case then proceeded to a bench trial.

¶ 5 At trial, A.C.R. testified that she was 27 years old and had dated the defendant from 2011 to July 2013. On June 8, 2013, she and the defendant were at a graduation party for a friend, which was held at the defendant's condominium. She arrived at the party at about 7:30 p.m. The defendant and A.C.R. consumed alcohol at the party and both became intoxicated that evening. At some point, they, along with their friends, left the graduation party and went to an upscale bar called the Paris Club, where they continued to drink alcohol. When they left the Paris Club at 3 a.m. on June 9, 2013, she and the defendant took a taxicab to her apartment at 1434 North Greenview Avenue in Chicago, where she lived alone. En route, the couple began to argue inside the taxicab and continued to argue when they arrived at their destination and walked through a courtyard leading to her apartment unit. Once inside, the couple engaged in a physical fight. A.C.R. recalled seeing a “hand come at the left side of [her] face,” after which she lost consciousness. When she awoke on the ground covered in blood, the defendant was cleaning the blood on the floor with a paper towel. A.C.R. looked in the mirror and noticed that her face was severely swollen with a large gash over her right eye. After A.C.R. changed into loose-fitting clothing, the defendant cleaned her bloody clothes. A.C.R. felt pain above her right eye and begged the defendant to take her to the emergency room, but the defendant told her that she deserved everything that happened to her. Eventually, the defendant took A.C.R. to Rush University Medical Center (Rush Hospital), where she was admitted into the emergency room and received five stitches above her right eye. The defendant was present during her hospital treatment, and A.C.R. gave a false account to hospital personnel regarding what had occurred, telling them that she was “jumped” on her way home. A.C.R. testified that both she and the defendant agreed to give this fictitious account. A police officer later arrived at the hospital to speak with A.C.R., who lied by saying that she was attacked getting out of a taxicab on her way home. The defendant was also present during A.C.R.'s conversation with the officer. As soon as the police officer exited the room, A.C.R. and the defendant left the hospital against the advice of A.C.R.'s treating physician, who had recommended a CAT scan as a result of the trauma to her face. A.C.R. felt terrified and, despite being in pain, returned to her apartment with the defendant. At that time, she was still in love with the defendant. She did not contact her friends and family for a few days because she was embarrassed and did not know what to say. Eventually, she lied to her parents by telling them that she was in a car accident, a story that was fabricated by the defendant. Two days later, on June 11, 2013, A.C.R., who was still unable to use her left arm and was in excruciating pain, received further treatment for her injuries at St. Joseph Hospital. At St. Joseph Hospital, A.C.R., who was accompanied by the defendant, received X-rays which revealed a fracture of her left arm. Her arm was then put into a cast. She told the medical staff at St. Joseph Hospital that her injuries resulted from being in a car accident. At trial, she testified that she and the defendant both took photographs of her injuries after the June 9, 2013, incident and after a subsequent visit to an orthopedic surgeon. She identified the photographs depicting her injuries as People's exhibit Nos. 1 to 13, which were then admitted into evidence without objection at trial. Although A.C.R. had health insurance through her employer, she received a hospital bill in July 2013 for thousands

407 Ill.Dec. 172

62 N.E.3d 1094

of dollars, for which she was responsible for $150 in out-of-pocket expenses. She contacted the defendant, who agreed to pay for her medical expenses and gave her a check dated July 15, 2013, with the following written on the memo line of the check: “settlement of medical bills.” Subsequently, A.C.R. received a second medical bill, for which she requested payment from the defendant. However, the defendant requested an electronic copy of the second bill and acknowledged receipt after A.C.R. sent it, but never paid the bill. A.C.R. further testified that after June 11, 2013, she remained in a dating relationship with the defendant because she was still in love with him, claiming that they continued to share some “happy days.” On July 25, 2013, A.C.R. ended her relationship with the defendant after he failed to show up for her doctor's appointment to have her cast removed. She testified that she felt betrayed by the defendant's absence at that time. In August 2013, A.C.R. traveled to New York with her mother, where A.C.R. finally revealed to her mother the truth about the June 9, 2013, incident. Upon their return to Chicago, A.C.R. reported the June 9, 2013, incident in person to the police. This marked the first time she had ever reported the defendant's abuse to the...