People v. Jiles
| Decision Date | 26 September 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 41503,41503 |
| Citation | 43 Ill.2d 145,251 N.E.2d 529 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Willie JILES et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Frank N. Jones and Gordon H. Scott, Chicago, for appellants.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (Joel M. Flaum, Asst. Atty. Gen., Elmer C. Kissane and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
This case is here on appeal from orders entered in the juvenile division of the circuit court of Cook County which dismissed delinquency petitions that had been filed against the respondents, Willie Jiles and Lamont Arrington. The orders were entered after a hearing before a judge of the juvenile division upon the motion of the State's Attorney, who sought dismissal of the delinquency petitions so that the respondents could be prosecuted criminally.
The respondents attack the constitutionality of the statute which governs the transfer of cases from the juvenile division of the circuit court to the criminal division. They argue that it fails to afford intelligible guidance to the judge or to the parties involved as to the issues to be decided and the allocation of the burden of proof, and that it is an invalid delegation of legislative power since it fails to provide adequate standards. They also attack the statute upon the ground that it is so vague and ambiguous as to violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.
The relevant provisions of the governing statute, section 2--7 of the Juvenile Court Act, are:
Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 37, par. 702--7.
We do not reach the constitutional issues that the defendants have sought to raise, for we are of the opinion that the orders from which this direct appeal was taken were not final judgments and were not appealable. Motion by the State to dismiss this appeal was denied. But upon further consideration, after having read the briefs and heard the arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that the motions to dismiss should be granted.
Earlier decisions of this court which involved the comparable section of the predecessor statute all came before this court upon a review of the final judgment which had been entered in the criminal prosecution. (See People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466; People v. Lattimore, 362 Ill. 206, 199 N.E. 275; People ex rel. Malec v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 229, 199 N.E. 276.) Those cases arose under the judicial article of the constitution of 1870 as it existed prior to 1964, when the juvenile court of Cook County was a court of separate jurisdiction created by statute, and the criminal court of Cook County was a court of separate jurisdiction created by the constitution. Under the new judicial article which became effective in 1964, both the former juvenile court and the former criminal court of Cook County are now divisions of a single, unified circuit court. The present Juvenile Court Act provides that "Court' means the circuit court in a session or division assigned to hear proceedings under this Act.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 37, par. 701--8.) An order transferring a proceeding even from one court to another has not heretofore been regarded as final and appealable. Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill.2d 45, 147 N.E.2d 371.
We do not, however, rest our decision as to the appealability of an order dismissing a delinquency petition so that criminal proceedings may be instituted against the juvenile solely upon the fact that no appeal from such an order has heretofore been authorized. Section 7 of article VI of the constitution, S.H.A. provides: 'The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of the Circuit Court.' To discharge the responsibility of this court for the administration of the judicial system of the State, we have considered the advisability of adopting a rule which would permit interlocutory...
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People of Territory of Guam v. Kingsbury
...order not appealable under statute which permits rehearing after order "committing" or "placing" child); People v. Jiles, 43 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529, 530 (1969) (court refused to exercise rule-making power to permit review of transfer order). But see In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Mo......
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Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), In re
...applicable statutes, nothing is to be gained by a detailed analysis of the authorities from other jurisdictions." People v. Jiles, 43 Ill.2d 145, 148, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969). 1 In an attempt to suggest that the statutory right to a private hearing under General Statutes § 46b-122 is not real......
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People in Interest of L. V. A.
...we agree with those decisions which have denied such appeals as under statutes similar to ours. 15 The language in People v. Jiles, 1969, 43 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 is 'To permit interlocutory review of such an order would obviously delay the prosecution of any proceeding in either the j......
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U.S. v. Juvenile K.J.C.
...is to be prosecuted criminally, we are aware of no constitutional requirement that a State must do so") (quoting People v. Jiles, 43 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1969)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019, 95 S.Ct. 492, 42 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974). Congress enacted the Act to provide federal courts ......