People v. Jiminez, 82SA11
| Decision Date | 27 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 82SA11,82SA11 |
| Citation | 651 P.2d 395 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Vincent JIMINEZ, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Nolan L. Brown, Dist. Atty., Steve A. Jones, Deputy Dist. Atty., Golden, for plaintiff-appellant.
No appearance for defendant-appellee.
The district attorney appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson County District Court dismissing charges of second degree burglary and felony theft against the defendant, James Vincent Jiminez, following a preliminary hearing. We reverse.
The People filed a direct criminal information against the juvenile defendant, charging burglary of a dwelling, section 18-4-203, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) (a class 3 felony), and theft of a bicycle having a value of $200 or more but less than $10,000, section 18-4-401, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) (a class 4 felony). The jurisdictional basis for filing criminal charges was section 19-1-104(4)(b)(II), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), which authorizes the filing of charges against a juvenile when the crime is a class 2 or 3 felony and other specified criteria are met. 1
At the defendant's request a preliminary hearing was held. The People presented evidence that the defendant had entered the open garage attached to the residence of Tom Tanguma, had taken Tanguma's bicycle valued at $275 from the garage, and had ridden off on the bicycle, all without permission from Tanguma. The bicycle was not recovered. The court ruled that the proof did not establish that the garage was a dwelling within the meaning of section 18-4-203, so the burglary was only a class 4 felony. Because no class 3 felony remained to support the court's jurisdiction under section 19-1-104(4)(b)(II), the court dismissed both charges with leave to refile in juvenile court. The district attorney then appealed.
The pivotal question on this appeal is whether a garage attached to a residence is part of a dwelling within the meaning of section 18-4-203. We hold that it is. The burglary statute provides, in relevant part:
A person commits second degree burglary, if he knowingly breaks an entrance into, or enters, or remains unlawfully in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against a person or property.
Second degree burglary is a class 4 felony, but if it is a burglary of a dwelling, it is a class 3 felony. 2
Section 18-4-203(1) and (2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). "Dwelling" is defined in section 18-1-901(3)(g), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) as follows:
"Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation.
Completing the relevant statutory definitions, "building" is defined in section 18-4-101(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8) as follows:
"Building" means a structure which has the capacity to contain, and is designed for the shelter of, man, animals, or property, and includes a ship, trailer, sleeping car, airplane, or other vehicle or place adapted for overnight accommodations of persons or animals, or for carrying on of business therein, whether or not a person or animal is actually present.
The statutory definition of dwelling comprehends an entire building. There is no room in the language of that clearly worded statute to exclude from the meaning of dwelling those parts of a residence that are not "usually used by a person for habitation." Moreover, at least some of the usual uses of a residential garage, including storage of household items, are incidental to and part of the habitation uses of the residence itself. Cf. People v. Romero, 179 Colo. 159, 499 P.2d 604 (1972) (); People v. Banuelos, 40 Colo.App. 267, 577 P.2d 305 (1977) (); People v. Walters, 39 Colo.App. 119, 568 P.2d 61 (1977) ().
At the preliminary hearing the evidence was uncontroverted that the $275 bicycle was taken by the defendant without permission from the garage attached to the Tanguma residence. This established probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the charged crimes of felony theft and burglary of a dwelling. The trial court erred, therefore, in dismissing those charges.
The People argue that the felony theft charge, a class 4 felony, may also be maintained against the defendant because the facts upon which...
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Lacey v. Com., Record No. 1407-08-1.
...including storage of household items, are incidental to and part of the habitation uses of the residence itself." People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. 1982). An Indiana court found important that a "freezer full of food for use by the family was situated in the garage, as well as a p......
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People v. Young
...those parts of a residence that are not usually used by a person directly for habitation, including an open garage. See People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395 (Colo.1982). It must be presumed that the General Assembly has knowledge of the legal import of the words it uses and intends that each par......
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People v. Morales
...court has interpreted the meaning of the term “dwelling” only once and, in so doing, has given it an expansive meaning. In People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395 (Colo.1982), the court considered whether an attached garage could be considered a “dwelling.” The court concluded that it was, reasonin......
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State v. Otto
...of "dwelling" includes attached garage). See also People v. Moreno, 158 Cal.App.3d 109, 204 Cal.Rptr. 17 (1984); People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395 (Colo.1982). But see People v. Donoho, 245 Ill.App.3d 938, 186 Ill.Dec. 1, 615 N.E.2d 805 (1993) (defendant charged with separate counts of burgla......
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Summaries of Published Opinions
...used for habitation. The Court viewed the basement in this case in much the same way it viewed the attached garage in People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. 1982). Just as the garage in Jiminez was part of the building that was used for habitation, the basement here was part of the bui......