People v. Johnson
| Docket Number | 1-20-0912 |
| Decision Date | 11 June 2021 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (1st) 200912,197 N.E.3d 162,458 Ill.Dec. 749 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Demetrius JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Joshua Tepfer and John Hazinski, of the Exoneration Project at the University of Chicago Law School, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, John E. Nowak, and Hareena Meghani-Wakely, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 The petitioner, Demetrius Johnson, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County, dismissing his section 2-1401 ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018) ) petition to vacate his 2006 conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2004) ). For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 2 The facts of this case are not in dispute. In 1991, the petitioner was charged with the murder of Edwin Fred. At trial, he interposed an alibi defense. However, on November 23, 1992, he was convicted and subsequently sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. Following his release from prison in 2004, the petitioner was arrested on August 11, 2006, and charged with UUWF. The predicate offense was the petitioner's 1992 murder conviction. On September 12, 2006, the petitioner pled guilty to UUWF and was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months’ incarceration. The petitioner did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea and did not appeal his UUWF conviction or sentence.
¶ 3 On September 11, 2019, the petitioner filed a section 2-1401 petition requesting that the circuit court vacate his 1992 murder conviction and grant him a new trial. The petitioner alleged, inter alia , that during his trial the police withheld from both the defense and the State a report stating that, on the night of Fred's murder, a witness identified an individual named Bryan Johns in a lineup as the person who shot Fred and two police officers falsely testified that Johns was not identified in a lineup as the person who shot Fred. The petitioner also alleged that one of the police officers who was present during the lineup at which Johns was identified authored a report falsely stating that the results of the lineup were "negative." On November 12, 2019, with the agreement of the State, the circuit court granted the petitioner's section 2-1401 petition, vacated his 1992 murder conviction, reinstated the original charges against him, and ordered a new trial. In December 2019, the State dismissed all charges against the petitioner that arose out of the 1991 murder of Fred.
¶ 4 On January 30, 2020, the petitioner filed the section 2-1401 petition that is the subject of the instant appeal. In that petition, he argued that, because his 1992 murder conviction—the predicate offense to the UUWF charge to which he pled guilty— had been vacated and the charges dismissed, his September 12, 2006, UUWF conviction should be vacated. On March 11, 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss the section 2-1401 petition, and on July 27, 2020, the circuit court granted the State's motion and dismissed the petition. This appeal followed. Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the circuit court entered an order on April 7, 2021, granting the petitioner's innocence petition on the murder offense.
¶ 5 In urging reversal of the circuit court's order dismissing his section 2-1401 petition, the petitioner argues that when, as in this case, the predicate felony to a charge and conviction of UUWF is vacated in a manner that negates guilt, the UUWF conviction based on that predicate felony "should be vacated as a matter of law." In support of the argument, the petitioner relies almost exclusively on the supreme court's decision in In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, 425 Ill.Dec. 547, 115 N.E.3d 102.
¶ 6 In support of the circuit court's order dismissing the petitioner's section 2-1401 petition, the State argues that it is only when a prior conviction under a statute, later declared facially unconstitutional, serves as the predicate offense that served as the predicate offense, that a UUWF conviction based on that predicate felony conviction should be vacated. The State correctly asserts that the first degree murder statute under which the petitioner was convicted in 1992 has never been held to be facially unconstitutional. According to the State, the 2019 vacation of the petitioner's 1992 murder conviction did not vitiate his status as a convicted felon in 2006 when he was arrested and convicted of possession of a weapon in violation of the UUWF statute. It argues, therefore, that the 2019 vacation of the petitioner's 1992 murder conviction cannot serve as the basis for a collateral challenge to his 2006 UUWF conviction.
¶ 7 As the petitioner's section 2-1401 petition was dismissed on the pleadings, our review is de novo. People v. Vincent , 226 Ill.2d 1, 18, 312 Ill.Dec. 617, 871 N.E.2d 17 (2007). In conducting that review we must resolve the question of whether a conviction for UUWF is subject to a successful collateral challenge when the predicate felony conviction upon which the UUWF conviction was dependent has been subsequently vacated for reasons other than facial unconstitutionality and the underlying charge dismissed. The issue is one of law that is also subject to de novo review. See People v. Reed , 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 20, 450 Ill.Dec. 618, 182 N.E.3d 64.
¶ 8 We begin our analysis with the language of the UUWF statute pursuant to which the petitioner was convicted. The statute states the following:
"It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1 of this Act or any firearm or any firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction.’’ 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2004).
¶ 9 When analyzing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Wise , 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 23, 450 Ill.Dec. 844, 182 N.E.3d 656. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. Id. "When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it as written, without resort to aids of statutory construction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 10 By its clear language, the UUWF statute's proscription is directed unambiguously at any person who "has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction." Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that the legislature intended any restriction on the scope of the term "convicted" or to limit its coverage to persons whose convictions are not subject to collateral attack. See Lewis v. United States , 445 U.S. 55, 60, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980).
¶ 11 In the case of In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶¶ 31, 33, 42, 74,, 425 Ill.Dec. 547, 115 N.E.3d 102, however, the supreme court held that a conviction under a facially unconstitutional statute is void and cannot serve as a predicate offense in any subsequent proceedings, either civil or criminal, and any conviction or finding dependent upon a conviction under a facially unconstitutional statute must be vacated. The supreme court reasoned that, when a predicate conviction is based upon a facially unconstitutional statute, that conviction is not only erroneous; it is void. Id. ¶¶ 37, 38. A facially unconstitutional statute is treated as having never existed. Id. ¶ 50.
¶ 12 The petitioner concedes that the statute pursuant to which he was convicted in 1992 "is not unconstitutional on its face." Nevertheless, he argues that "[a]lthough [In re ] N.G. concerned a conviction that was void because the statute of conviction was held facially unconstitutional *** its holding applies to any substantive constitutional error." According to the petitioner, "the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court in In re N.G. indicates *** [that] when a conviction arises from unconstitutional misconduct that negates the defendant's culpability for the crime, that conviction should not be given legal force in subsequent criminal proceedings." He concludes that, because his 1992 "murder conviction was vacated under circumstances that negate his guilt, his UUW[F] conviction based on that prior offense should be vacated as a matter of law."
¶ 13 The State argues that the rule announced in In re N.G. applies only to convictions dependent upon prior convictions under laws held to be facially unconstitutional and urges this court to reject the petitioner's attempt to extend the reasoning in In re N.G. to include circumstances, such as are present in this case, where a predicate conviction has been vacated for "individualized procedural reasons." Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. United States , 445 U.S. 55, 60-62, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), the State asserts that "the status of the prior felony conviction at the time that the defendant possesses the firearm controls, regardless of whether that prior conviction might later be invalidated." See also United States v. Lee , 72 F.3d 55, 58 (7th Cir. 1995). The State argues that "under [In re ] N.G. and Lewis , because it was the status of petitioner's prior conviction at the time he possessed the firearm that controlled, regardless of whether that prior conviction is later vacated on procedural grounds, there is no basis to vacate his UUWF conviction, which was predicated on a prior conviction under the facially valid first degree murder statute." We agree with the State.
¶ 14 We believe that the UUWF statute is dependent upon an individual's status as a convicted felon at the time that he possessed a firearm. The fact that the predicate felony conviction is subsequently vacated for reasons...
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