People v. Johnson
| Citation | 112 Misc.2d 590,447 N.Y.S.2d 341 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Matthew JOHNSON, Defendant. |
| Decision Date | 01 December 1981 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York County, for the People; James Fogel, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel.
Louis R. Aidala, New York City, for defendant.
The defendant was charged in an indictment which was handed down on April 28, 1980 with the crime of Manslaughter in the First Degree. It is charged that on March 23, 1980 the defendant with intent to cause serious physical injury to Renee Walker, caused her death by stabbing her with a knife.
Defendant has made a motion for an order suppressing the statements made by him on April 1, 1980 upon the grounds that the statements were obtained during the course of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for arrest and were involuntary within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Law (60.45).
(Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law have been abbreviated for official publication)
Sometime between March 23 and March 26, 1980 Renee Walker was stabbed to death in her apartment. The body of the deceased was discovered on March 26, 1980 by Ellison Rhodes, the superintendent of the building.
Detective Charles Mattson, arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. During an initial investigation, he was informed that the defendant was a friend of the deceased, and that a Victor Walker was also acquainted with the deceased. The defendant, told the detective that the deceased had been like a mother to him and that he last saw her around midnight of March 23, when he went to her apartment to ask her for money she owed him. He said that Ms. Walker went into the living room, spoke to a man whose voice he recognized as that of Victor Walker and returned with $10.00 which she gave him. He then went downstairs, helped the superintendent with the garbage and went home to bed.
During the next few days the detective questioned the defendant on a number of occasions as to his whereabouts on March 23. He repeated, each time he was questioned, the subsequent events as he had described them in the first interview.
On Sunday, March 30, Detective Mattson told the defendant that to get at the truth he, Victor Walker and Ellison Rhodes should take a lie detector test. Mr. Johnson said that he was willing to take the test since he had nothing to hide.
On April 1, between 12 and 1 p.m., Mattson accompanied Johnson and Rhodes to the Police Academy for the polygraph tests. Detective Justin Peters who was to administer the test, told Johnson that the polygraph was a machine that did not lie and that he did not have to take the test.
The initial test was then given. In spite of the fact that Peters knew that the results of this first test were inconclusive, he informed Mattson that he was positive that the defendant was lying. Mattson expressed surprise. Peters readministered the test. He told defendant that he had again failed the test, that he was lying and that it would be to his advantage to tell the truth. The defendant said that he did not kill Renee Walker. (Mr. Nat Laurendi, defendant's polygraph expert, testified that this test, as did the third test, indicated defendant had answered all questions truthfully.)
Peters again informed Mattson that the defendant was lying and then continued to interrogate him for another 45 minutes. When Peters failed to get defendant to change his story, Mattson then entered the interrogation room and read him his Miranda rights. Mattson then told Johnson that he was lying, that he had failed the tests, "that you've got problems", and "we've got the icing on the cake". The interrogation by Mattson, and at times by Peters, continued, on and off, for another six-seven hours, during which defendant at all times maintained his innocence. He was told that "if they showed the results of the test to a grand jury he could get 25 years to life." He was repeatedly told that if he confessed he would get three years. At one point he was given another polygraph test (peak-of-tension test) and again informed that he had failed the test.
The defendant told Mattson that his girlfriend was pregnant. He was told that there is a difference between murder and manslaughter and if he didn't confess "you won't see your child for a long time," and that "he would spend the rest of his life in jail." This line of "questioning" continued for hours during which he was given coffee, but was told several times during the interrogations that he would get no food until he confessed, and that he could not go home. His request for cigarettes was similarly denied. He was repeatedly told "we got to have a confession."
Finally, at about 7:45 p.m., during the final two hours of continued interrogation by Detective Mattson, he said "I'll tell you the truth", and after Miranda warnings were again read to him, he made the oral and written statements which are the further subjects of this motion. He was then placed under arrest. This was approximately 9:00 p.m. He was then transported to the 13th Precinct and about a half hour later was given a sandwich and cigarettes. The Assistant District Attorney arrived at the precinct at around 1:00 a.m. and at 1:19 a.m. he was questioned by ADA Fogel for approximately another 40 minutes which was videotaped. During this questioning he repeated his "confession". Questioning was terminated at 1:45 a.m.
I find that there was no probable cause to justify the lengthy detention and custodial interrogation of this defendant.
When a police officer acts without an arrest warrant, the Supreme Court has held that there must be "probable cause" for the arrest in order to meet the standards of the Fourth Amendment. (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 The probable cause standard has been held to apply when a suspect has not been formally arrested but is in police custody for investigation purposes. (Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 61 L.Ed.2d 824 In New York, the test for whether the defendant is "in custody" is whether a reasonable man who is innocent of any crime would believe himself to be in custody. (People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172 [1969].)
At least six hours elapsed between the time defendant was first told he was lying on April 1 and the time the first "admission" was made. The District Attorney conceded that at the time that the defendant was first told he was lying, "a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to go" and that the defendant was therefore in custody at least from the time the first polygraph test was concluded. Prior to Dunaway, the New York Court of Appeals held that "a suspect may be detained upon reasonable suspicion for a reasonable and brief period of time for questioning under carefully controlled conditions" without a showing of probable cause. (People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 64, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898, 238 N.E.2d 307 ). Upon remand for an evidentiary hearing (Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed.2d 299 ), this principle was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals. (42 N.Y.2d 129, 397 N.Y.S.2d 587, 366 N.E.2d 248 The Appellate Division upheld Dunaway's conviction based on Morales. (People v. Dunaway, 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 The U. S. Supreme Court, in deciding the issue it had reserved in Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. at 105, 106, 90 S.Ct. at 293, namely, "the question of the legality of custodial questioning, on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest" reversed, stating, "seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause." (Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 213-14, 99 S.Ct. at 2257).
It is important to note that even in Morales, the detention was a brief 15 minutes; not the lengthy many hours of interrogation involved here.
The prosecution has the burden of coming forward with evidence that the arrest met the probable cause standard. (People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 209 N.E.2d 694 ). The same rule of Dunaway applies equally to custodial interrogation.
The People contend that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant after the first lie detector test. They argue that even disregarding the results of the first lie detector, the police knew defendant lied to them about the night of March 23. They contend that considering all the information then within police knowledge surrounding the circumstances of the discovery of the body together with "those lies" constituted probable cause to arrest the defendant. I hold that even if the People had satisfactorily shown that they had a reasonable basis to believe that the defendant was lying, which they did not, this would not amount to more than a basis for reasonable suspicion.
This is not a case in which defendant's statements were "patently untrue" (see People v. Ray, 62 A.D.2d 772, 776, 406 N.Y.S.2d 75 ), or where "the police knew of their own knowledge and observation" that defendant was lying (see People v. Wheeler, 61 A.D.2d 737, 401 N.Y S.2d 793 ). As stated in People v. Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d 130, 135, 428 N.Y.S.2d 218, 405 N.E.2d 699 (1980), "summary statements that the police had arrived at a conclusion that sufficient cause existed will not do."
Certainly polygraphy, even if the results were positive, has no evidentiary standing in the administration of criminal law (People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 514, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 255 N.E.2d 696 People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188 cf. People v. Vernon, 89 Misc.2d 472, 391 N.Y.S.2d 959 ), and therefore could not be considered as a basis for raising the level of reasonable suspicion to that of probable cause. However, this case clearly demonstrates why the polygraph does not warrant judicial acceptance. Whereas the People's expert testified that the defendant had failed the last two tests, which showed he was lying, the defendant's...
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People v. Dyla
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