People v. Johnson

Decision Date23 April 1990
Docket NumberNo. 3-89-0006,3-89-0006
Citation143 Ill.Dec. 761,197 Ill.App.3d 74,554 N.E.2d 696
Parties, 143 Ill.Dec. 761 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vateness JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Thomas A. Lilien, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Vateness Johnson.

Gary F. Gnidovec, States' Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Edward Burmila, Will County State's Atty., Joliet, for the People.

Justice SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant and her husband, Frank Johnson, were each indicted for two counts of murder and two counts of aggravated battery for the death of Judy Moses, age five, and the beating of her sister Quiana Moses, age three. After a jury trial, both were convicted on all counts and defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of sixty years imprisonment for each murder conviction and ten years for each aggravated battery conviction. Frank Johnson was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-two years for murder and five years for aggravated battery. Defendant and her husband both appealed and in each case their respective convictions were reversed and new trials ordered on the basis that the trials of each should have been severed. See People v. Vateness Johnson (1987), 151 Ill.App.3d 1049, 105 Ill.Dec. 309, 504 N.E.2d 178; People v. Frank Johnson (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 997, 99 Ill.Dec. 186, 495 N.E.2d 633.

Frank Johnson subsequently pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to an eight year term of imprisonment. As part of this plea negotiation, Frank Johnson agreed to testify against defendant if necessary. Defendant was retried before a jury and convicted of two counts of murder and one count of aggravated battery. The trial court subsequently sentenced her to concurrent sixty year terms of imprisonment on the murder convictions and ten years on the aggravated battery conviction. Defendant now appeals her convictions after re-trial. No issues are raised concerning the indictment.

Defendant's second trial was scheduled for November 9, 1988. Prior to selection of the jury, however, defendant moved to have the jury panel discharged on the ground that the Will County jury selection system violated defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. Defendant argued that the Will County Jury Commission excused numerous prospective jurors without proper grounds in substantial noncompliance with statutory requirements for the jury selection process. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing and selection of the jury proceeded on November 11 and 14, 1988.

Judy and Quiana Moses resided with defendant and her family from January 12, 1985 to March 11, 1985. Prior to that time Valencial Morris, the girls' Aunt, testified that she cared for the girls on four separate weekends in November and December of 1984 and at that time the girls appeared to be in good health. Evidence was further presented that on February 1, 1985, Garland Armstrong, an insurance agent, was at defendant's home and observed Judy and Quiana Moses to be quiet but with no apparent injuries.

The next date for which evidence was presented was March 11, 1985. On this date defendant indicated that she had to separate the Moses girls after her sons had left for school. She tied Quiana to a bedpost downstairs and tied Judy's wrists to a wrought iron chair in the garage after also binding her ankles together and placing a ligature over her mouth. About noon the same day, she received a ride from a Reverend Johnson to the Harris Bank in Chicago and back. She then later contacted a Jose Holmes ("Holmes") for a ride to look for her apparent boyfriend Richard Eames ("Eames"). Defendant and Holmes made several stops in search of Eames and drank beer, champale, and possibly smoked marijuana. Holmes eventually gave defendant a ride home sometime in the evening. Defendant indicated that when she arrived home that evening Judy had been brought into the house. One of the defendant's sons then brought Judy upstairs and laid her down on the living room floor. Defendant described Judy as "fake sleeping" and further stated she went to bed but arose more than once that evening to check on Judy and called a few people including two nurses about Judy's condition. One nurse told her the fake sleeping could result from chicken pox and another stated a coma could result, but that the girl would be alright in the morning.

Defendant stated that when she arose at 8:00 a.m. on March 12, 1985, Judy was still on the floor. Defendant then made breakfast hoping it would awaken Judy but it did not. That morning, Frank Johnson fixed the family van, and around noon, placed Judy on the van couch. Defendant, Frank, Quiana, Judy and defendant's youngest son then went to an attorney's office about other matters. Defendant, however, also mentioned to the attorney that Judy and Quiana were rebelling and was referred to the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"). DCFS then referred defendant and the children to Silver Cross Hospital. Judy Moses was pronounced dead at the hospital and an autopsy was subsequently performed by Dr. Mira Kalelkar. Dr. Kalekar described Judy's body as dirty with injuries of various ages up to a month or older and in various stages of healing. Among the older injuries were abrasions or lacerations on the lips, cheeks, neck, back, arms, legs, labia and scalp. Some of the abrasions or lacerations had a looped pattern that could have resulted from a belt or electrical cord. The fresher injuries included abrasions on the nose, chin, ear, forehead and a bruised hand. Some of the facial abrasions followed a pattern as if a ligature had been used around the mouth. Dr. Kalekar's internal examination revealed a subgaleal hemorrhage in the left frontal area of the scalp and the brain was swollen. Judy's stomach and intestines were empty and the fecal matter in the intestines was hard, suggesting dehydration or lack of recent fluid intake. Dr. Kalelkar's opinion was that Judy Moses died from multiple blunt force injuries or, in other words, had been beaten to death. The mechanism of death was neurogenic cardiovascular shock which means the pain, resulting from repeated beatings over a period of time, caused her heart to fail. The shock could have taken several days to develop. No single injury could be singled out as the cause of death, but the injuries which were more than one month old were not a contributing factor.

Dr. Demetre Soder, defendant's expert, testified that in his opinion the technical cause of death was cerebral edema, described as diffuse swelling of the brain with herniation through the skull at the base of the brain. The injury could have resulted from trauma, such as repeated blows to the head over a period of time. A child could not have caused Judy's injuries.

Quiana Moses arrived at Silver Cross Hospital dirty, smelly and apparently without haven eaten in some time. There were several open sores on her head, one of which being four inches in diameter and requiring skin grafting to close. Quiana also had wounds all over the rest of her body. There were burn type wounds in the vaginal area, on one of her toes and her hand. Some of the wounds on her legs had a looped pattern as though inflicted with a belt or extension cord.

The evidence revealed defendant to be the primary caretaker of the Moses children. Defendant, in fact, admitted to spanking the girls with tree branches, a plastic bat, tying them to a bed, tying Judy's arms and legs together and putting her in the garage, and putting cotton balls in their mouths or ears to prevent them from crying when being switched.

The evidence also revealed that Frank Johnson suffered a stroke on January 11, 1985 and was hospitalized until early February. After returning home, he was required to take high blood pressure medicine and slept fourteen hours per day. Frank twice observed defendant hit Quiana with switches, but not with such a force as to cause significant injury. Frank also testified to retrieving Judy from the garage the day defendant tied her up, placed her out there, and left for the day. Frank was not called by the prosecution as a witness. After defendant called Frank to testify, she attempted to impeach Frank regarding the disposition of the charges against him and the sentence he received. The trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to this line of questioning.

Defendant raises the following issues for review: First, (issue 1), whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to discharge the jury panel; second (issue 2), whether the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection to defendant's attempt to reveal Frank's guilty plea and sentence to the jury; third (issue 3), whether the prosecution unfairly elicited prejudicial information and raised improper insinuations before the jury; fourth (issue 4), whether the jury should have been instructed on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder and reckless conduct as a lesser included offense of aggravated battery; fifth (issue 5), whether one of the two murder convictions must be vacated and the defendant receive a new sentencing hearing on the remaining conviction, and whether the extended term sentence for aggravated battery was unauthorized. Any necessary facts not outlined above will be discussed more thoroughly with regard to each issue.

Defendant maintains that the procedures used by the Will County Jury Commission in selecting jurors violated statutory mandates and resulted in hundreds of prospective jurors being excused from service without proper grounds. Defendant does not, however, allege that members of any particular racial or ethnic group were excluded from service.

Will County relies upon a voter registration list, updated yearly, in preparing an active jury list. Each...

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