People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 29 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 3-85-0753,3-85-0753
• Citation: 151 Ill.App.3d 1049,105 Ill.Dec. 309,504 N.E.2d 178
• Parties: , 105 Ill.Dec. 309 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vateness JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 178

504 N.E.2d 178

151 Ill.App.3d 1049, 105 Ill.Dec. 309

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vateness JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 3-85-0753.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

Jan. 29, 1987.

Pamela A. Peters (argued), Thomas A. Lilien, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for Vateness Johnson.

Gary F. Gnidovec (argued), State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Ottawa, Edward Petka, State's Atty., Joliet, for the People.

Presiding Justice SCOTT delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant-appellant, Vateness Johnson, and her husband, Frank A. Johnson, were indicted on charges of murder, felony murder and two counts of aggravated battery stemming from the death of Judy Moses and injuries to her sister, Quiana Moses. Following a joint jury trial, both defendants were convicted on all charges and Mrs. Johnson was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of sixty years for each murder conviction, and ten years for each aggravated battery conviction.

Co-defendant, Frank A. Johnson, appealed earlier his convictions and sentences to this court. This court reversed his conviction and granted a new trial on the grounds that he and Mrs. Johnson should have been tried separately. (People v. Frank Johnson (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 997, 99 Ill.Dec. 186, 495 N.E.2d 633 (3d Dist.) The general nature and the facts of the cause underlying the instant appeal have been presented in the opinion issued in Mr. Johnson's appeal and need not be reiterated in this opinion.

In her appeal, Mrs. Johnson raises a number of errors which she claims resulted in a denial of her right to a fair trial. The first assignment of error which we will consider is her contention that she was denied the right to a fair trial as a result of the trial court's refusal to sever her case from the co-defendant, Mr. Johnson. Counsel for Mr. Johnson filed a pre-trial motion for severance alleging two grounds as a basis for granting a separate trial. First, that Mrs. Johnson had made prior statements implicating her husband, thereby interfering with his constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation. (Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476.) Second, that the defenses of both defendants were totally adverse and antagonistic, in that counsel for Mrs. Johnson asserted their defense would be that Mr. Johnson functioned as a master-mind in the events that led to the death of Judy Moses and injury to Quiana Moses.

At Mr. Johnson's pre-trial motion for severance hearing, Mrs. Johnson's counsel orally joined in the motion and represented to the court that his strategy of defense would be consistent with Mrs. Johnson's pre-trial statements that "this was all Frank's idea." The trial court denied Mr. Johnson's motion and ordered the prosecution not to present at trial Mrs. Johnson's admissions which implicated him.

Prior to the start of trial, the trial court heard Mrs. Johnson's written motion to sever wherein she alleged she should be tried separately because Mr. Johnson had made statements to the police implicating her in the alleged murder and that he would again implicate her at trial as the person who beat Judy Moses. Mrs. Johnson's counsel reiterated that the defenses of both defendants would be antagonistic because Mr. Johnson could not present his defense without attacking the defendant. This motion for severance was also denied.

Prior to the completion of jury selection, Mrs. Johnson's counsel again renewed her motion for severance alleging that the antagonism between the two defendants had become more pronounced. Counsel asserted that Mrs. Johnson was no longer aware of her statements, denied any knowledge of what had happened, and that she could be repudiating her statements and throwing the burden on Mr. Johnson. The trial court again denied her motion for severance.

As this court noted in its earlier opinion, it is fundamental that a defendant is entitled to be tried by an unbiased jury and to be judged on the merits of his case. (People v. Bean (1985), 109 Ill.2d 80, 92 Ill.Dec. 538, 485 N.E.2d 349.) Further, the law generally holds that jointly indicted defendants should be tried together, unless fairness to one of the defendants requires a separate trial to avoid prejudice. (People v. Daugherty (1984), 102 Ill.2d 533, 82 Ill.Dec. 315, 468 N.E.2d 969.) However, if a defendant believes that prejudice will result from a joint trial, he may file a motion for severance wherein he must outline to the court how he might be prejudiced. People v. Lee (1981), 87 Ill.2d 182, 57 Ill.Dec. 563, 429 N.E.2d 461; Ill.Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 114-8.

In acting on a motion for severance, the trial court must take into consideration the averments and arguments of defense counsel, and any other knowledge of the case developed from the proceedings to that point. (People v. McMullen (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 611, 44 Ill.Dec. 82, 410 N.E.2d 1174.) The trial court must make a prediction regarding what, if any, prejudice may result to the defendant if he were jointly tried and, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling generally will not be reversed. People v. Canaday (1971), 49 Ill.2d 416, 275 N.E.2d 356.

Our review of the record in the instant case reveals that the trial court was sufficiently aware of the antagonism which existed between Mr. and Mrs. Johnson prior to trial. Both defendants intended to place the blame on the other in an effort to assert their own innocence. Further, both defendants were forced to defend against the accusations and allegations of the other, as well as those of the People. The trial court's failure to grant Mrs. Johnson's motion resulted in prejudice which rose to the level of denying her right to a fair trial. The record is replete with instances which illustrate resulting prejudice to her as a result of the trial court's denial of her motion for severance.

Though our Supreme Court in the recent case of People v. Bean (1985), 109 Ill.2d 80, 95, 92 Ill.Dec. 538, 545, 485 N.E.2d 349, 356, in reviewing whether a defendant and a co-defendant's defenses were so antagonistic as to require severance, stated "there is no requirement that the prejudice must be symmetrical," we find the circumstances presented to the trial...