People v. Johnson

Decision Date27 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 67319,67319
Citation585 N.E.2d 78,146 Ill.2d 109,165 Ill.Dec. 682
Parties, 165 Ill.Dec. 682 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Mark JOHNSON, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Charles Schiedel, Deputy Defender, Springfield, and Steven Clark, Asst. Defender, Chicago, both of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and Linda Woloshin, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Mark Johnson, was convicted of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)), and aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 12-14). The same jury that convicted defendant found that he was eligible for the death penalty under section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)), and further found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to death. That sentence was stayed (134 Ill.2d R. 609(a)) pending defendant's direct appeal to this court (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill.2d R. 603). We affirm defendant's convictions and sentence.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of C.L., the victim of the charged sexual assault and an eyewitness to the charged murder. C.L. testified that she was introduced to defendant on November 26, 1985, by her uncle, Willie Robinson. Defendant was introduced to her as "Allen," defendant's middle name. At approximately 1:30 p.m. on that date, C.L., Robinson and defendant went to an apartment at 3921 West Huron in Chicago. C.L. had recently been evicted from the apartment and the three intended to pack and remove some of C.L.'s possessions. Soon after their arrival, Robinson left the apartment to purchase some alcohol. Robinson returned approximately 15 minutes later and he and defendant sat and drank alcohol for about 30 minutes. Robinson then left the apartment to purchase more alcohol.

Upon Robinson's second departure, defendant told C.L. that he wanted to have sex with her. When C.L. refused, defendant put on gloves and told C.L. to "take off them clothes because I'm king and whatever I say go." C.L. saw that defendant had a knife in his hand. C.L. disrobed and defendant tied her hands and feet. After defendant had tied C.L., Robinson knocked on the apartment's outer door. Defendant told C.L. to be quiet and opened the door. When Robinson asked what was going on, defendant grabbed Robinson from behind and cut his throat. The two struggled and defendant repeatedly stabbed Robinson. When the struggle was over, Robinson lay on the floor near the door.

Defendant then forced C.L. to perform repeated acts of oral sex on him. In between these sex acts, defendant would return to Robinson's body and continue cutting his throat. Defendant attempted anal intercourse with C.L., but was unsuccessful, and raped her vaginally instead. Defendant then proceeded to urinate on C.L.

Defendant ordered C.L. to again perform oral sex on him, threatening to do to her what he had done to her uncle. Following this, defendant returned to Robinson's body and cut his throat a fourth time. After this fourth mutilation, C.L. was forced to lick the blood off the knife defendant had used. Defendant then looked out the apartment's window, checking to see that no one was watching the activities in the apartment. After making this check, defendant ordered C.L. to perform oral sex on Robinson. Defendant then forced C.L. to perform a final act of oral sex on him.

Defendant told C.L. that it did not matter if she reported him, telling her "I did this many times. If I have to I run from state to state." Defendant referred to himself as the "King of Leos" and informed C.L. that he was keeping her alive so that she could write a book about him. Defendant left the apartment at approximately 10 or 11 p.m., returning 35 minutes later for a few minutes and then leaving again. C.L. waited in the apartment for awhile before Police officer Michael Rose testified that he responded to a report of a rape and stabbing at 3921 West Huron at approximately 10:50 p.m. on November 26, 1985. Upon arriving at the apartment, Officer Rose found Robinson dead on the kitchen floor near the apartment's outer door. Officer Rose testified that C.L. was dressed only in a coat and that she was panicky and had a difficult time communicating.

[165 Ill.Dec. 686] freeing herself, after which she covered herself with a coat and ran to a neighbor's residence. There C.L. telephoned her aunt and the police.

Detective Thomas Sherry arrived at the scene soon after Officer Rose. Detective Sherry attempted to interview C.L. but she was withdrawn and did not respond well. After being informed that the perpetrator's first name was "Allen," Detective Sherry attempted to locate him. Detective Sherry went to an apartment on the 3400 block of Jackson Boulevard where he spoke to Donna Randolph, who identified "Allen" as Allen Johnson. Detective Sherry left his business card with Randolph with instructions that she have Allen Johnson contact him if she heard from him.

On December 5, 1985, defendant was arrested on an unrelated rape charge. Defendant was searched in connection with the arrest and two knives were recovered. One of those knives was consistent with the type of knife used to inflict the stab wounds found on Robinson. While defendant was in custody for this arrest, Detective Sherry saw the business card he had left with Donna Randolph in defendant's possession. Detective Sherry advised defendant of his constitutional rights and informed him that he wanted to question him about a murder on the 3900 block of Huron. Defendant proceeded to tell the detective about the murder of Robinson. Assistant State's Attorney Frank Edwards thereafter arrived to question defendant about the Robinson murder. Defendant talked to Edwards and agreed to reduce his confession to writing only if Edwards would agree to transcribe it verbatim and allow defendant to read and check each line as it was written. Edwards complied and defendant's written statement was taken. Defendant's written statement was introduced into evidence at trial.

Defendant's account of the events of November 26, 1985, generally corroborated C.L.'s testimony, with a few exceptions. Unlike C.L., defendant claimed that he and C.L. had engaged in what was initially consensual intercourse, though he later admitted to "making" C.L. perform oral sex and to tying her up. Defendant's explanation of the events that precipitated the stabbing of Robinson also differed from that of C.L. Defendant stated that C.L. "tried to go into [his] pocket" and that he began beating her. Defendant claimed that it was when Robinson attempted to intervene in the beating that defendant cut his throat. Other than those differences, defendant's statement corroborated C.L.'s testimony. Defendant described his attempts to cut Robinson's head off by "sawing back and forth on his neck." Defendant also stated that he told C.L. that he was letting her live so that she could "write the story" and call it the "King of Leos" because he was "the king." Defendant further admitted that he returned to the apartment after initially leaving because he had forgotten his address book. Edwards testified that defendant was very "matter-of-fact" when he gave the statement. Edwards stated that defendant reviewed the statement upon its completion and, while signing it, added a final sentence which read, "I want the death penalty."

Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, a Cook County medical examiner, testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of Willie Robinson and that the cause of Robinson's death was multiple stab wounds. Dr. Kirschner stated that he found 15 stab wounds on Robinson's head and neck, including two large slashing wounds across the neck, as well as numerous other wounds on Robinson's head, chest and extremities. Dr. Kirschner further testified that the fact that there was evidence of bleeding from each of the wounds indicated that each was inflicted while Robinson was still alive.

Following the presentation of the above testimony, the State rested. Defendant attempted Dr. Reifman also reviewed defendant's confessions to the instant crimes and to the murder of Cherry Wilson. Defendant had confessed, while in jail on the instant murder and rape charges, to stabbing Wilson to death. In confessing to the murder of Wilson, defendant stated that "something" told him to kill her and that he "got excited feeling the blood and got into sawing her throat."

                [165 Ill.Dec. 687]  to establish the affirmative defense of insanity at trial.  In support of this defense, defendant called Dr. Robert A. Reifman, a psychiatrist and director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County.  Dr. Reifman testified that he examined defendant in March of 1987 after defendant had been charged with the instant murder and rape, a second murder and a second rape.  Dr. Reifman examined defendant for approximately 1 1/2 hours.  Dr. Reifman also reviewed a social history given by defendant's mother to a social worker.  Therein, it was stated that defendant was one of seven children borne by his mother by seven [146 Ill.2d 121] different fathers;  that defendant's father was an alcoholic;  that one of defendant's brothers spent time in a mental institution;  that defendant had suffered from frequent headaches as a child;  and that defendant had been struck on the head as a child, after which he seemed to "change."   The social history also indicated that defendant's mother said that defendant had no history of mental illness
                

Dr. Reifman found defendant to be a...

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