People v. Manning

• Decision Date: 09 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2-05-0466.,2-05-0466.
• Citation: 863 N.E.2d 289,309 Ill.Dec. 59
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick L. MANNING, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

863 N.E.2d 289

309 Ill.Dec. 59

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick L. MANNING, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-05-0466.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

February 9, 2007.

Phyllis J. Perko (Court-appointed), Law Offices of Harlovic & Perko, West Dundee, for Patrick L. Manning.

Joseph E. Birkett, DuPage County State's Attorney, Lisa Anne Hoffman, Assistant State's Attorney, Wheaton, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, Diane L. Campbell, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

Presiding Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Patrick L. Manning, pleaded guilty to one count of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-3 (West 2002)). Due to his prior criminal history, defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2002)), and the trial court imposed a sentence of 22 years' imprisonment. Defendant then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for two reasons. The trial court denied his motion. Defendant now appeals, advancing both arguments he presented to the trial court. First, he argues that counsel should have investigated and advised him regarding the possibility of pleading guilty but mentally ill. See 725 ILCS 5/115-2 (West 2002). Second, he contends that counsel gave him erroneous advice about the term of imprisonment he would receive. We find that both claims lack merit, and we therefore affirm.

In determining whether a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea in a case like this, the ultimate question is whether the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d 177, 183, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005); People v. Young, 355 Ill.App.3d 317, 322, 291 Ill.Dec. 45, 822 N.E.2d 920 (2005). There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. People v. Artale, 244 Ill.App.3d 469, 475, 184 Ill.Dec. 34, 612 N.E.2d 910 (1993). Rather, as our supreme court has held:

"`Where it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State's Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court should permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and allow the accused to plead not guilty.'" People v. Davis, 145 Ill.2d 240, 244, 164 Ill.Dec. 151, 582 N.E.2d 714 (1991), quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531-32, 107 N.E.2d 721 (1952).

A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that, by objective standards, he or she is entitled to withdraw a plea; subjective misimpressions alone are insufficient. Artale, 244 Ill.App.3d at 475, 184 Ill.Dec. 34, 612 N.E.2d 910. Whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and a court of review will not disturb the trial court's determination unless that discretion is abused. Davis, 145 Ill.2d at 244, 164 Ill.Dec. 151, 582 N.E.2d 714.

Relevant here, one basis upon which a defendant may be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea is where defense counsel has given the defendant inadequate advice prior to the entry of the plea. See, e.g., People v. Correa, 108 Ill.2d 541, 553, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307 (1985). However, the simple fact that counsel provided erroneous advice is not enough to render a plea involuntary; rather, a defendant must show that he or she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. People v. Cunningham, 286 Ill.App.3d 346, 349-50, 222 Ill.Dec. 34, 676 N.E.2d 998 (1997). In determining whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the plea process, the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applies. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 209 (1985); People v. Brown, 309 Ill.App.3d 599, 604, 243 Ill. Dec. 330, 723 N.E.2d 362 (1999). To prevail, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 14, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993). In the context of a guilty plea, "prejudice" means that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's deficient performance. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at 15, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255.

Additional considerations apply in circumstances like those present in this case. First, courts distinguish between cases where attorneys provide erroneous advice and cases where attorneys fail to provide any advice. In Correa, our supreme court considered whether an attorney who advised his client—a legal alien—that a guilty plea would not lead to deportation rendered ineffective assistance. Correa, 108 Ill.2d at 547-48, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307. The court held that the defendant was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because of the erroneous advice actually given by the attorney. Correa, 108 Ill.2d at 553, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307. However, the court expressly declined to address "the passive conduct of counsel in failing to discuss with a defendant the collateral consequences of a guilty plea." Correa, 108 Ill.2d at 551, 92 Ill.Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307. Later, in People v. Huante, 143 Ill.2d 61, 68, 156 Ill.Dec. 756, 571 N.E.2d 736 (1991), the court considered this issue. Huante also involved a legal alien who, as a consequence of a guilty plea, faced deportation. The defendant and his attorney did not discuss the defendant's status as a legal alien, and the attorney provided no advice whatsoever on how the plea could affect that status. Huante, 143 Ill.2d at 68, 156 Ill.Dec. 756, 571 N.E.2d 736. The supreme court determined that the attorney's failure to address the matter did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Huante, 143 Ill.2d at 72, 156 Ill.Dec. 756, 571 N.E.2d 736. Thus, Correa and Huante draw a distinction between an attorney giving a client bad advice and an attorney failing to give a client any advice.

A second distinction that courts rely on in cases like this concerns whether the advice—or lack thereof—concerned a direct or a collateral consequence of the plea. A direct consequence is one that is definite, immediate, and largely automatic in its effect upon a defendant's punishment. People v. Frison, 365 Ill.App.3d 932, 934, 303 Ill.Dec. 703, 851 N.E.2d 890 (2006). A defendant must be advised of any direct consequences of his or her guilty plea before entering it. People v. Williams, 188 Ill.2d 365, 371, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539 (1999). Collateral consequences are unrelated to the length or nature of a sentence. People v. Pequeno, 337 Ill.App.3d 537, 545, 272 Ill.Dec. 237, 786 N.E.2d 1071 (2003). Often, they result from actions taken by entities beyond the court's control. Pequeno, 337 Ill.App.3d at 545, 272 Ill.Dec. 237, 786 N.E.2d 1071. A defendant need not be aware of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea in order for the plea to be voluntary. Williams, 188 Ill.2d at 371, 242 Ill.Dec. 260, 721 N.E.2d 539.

Thus, from the above-cited cases, the following rules emerge. First, a defendant must be advised of direct consequences of a guilty plea. Second, it is not necessary to advise a defendant about collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Third, if counsel does advise the defendant of a collateral consequence, that advice must not be erroneous.¹ With these precepts in mind, we will now turn to defendant's arguments.

Defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and advise defendant regarding the possibility of pleading guilty but mentally ill. To resolve this issue, we must first consider whether pleading guilty but mentally ill rather than simply pleading guilty leads to direct or to collateral consequences. If pleading guilty but mentally ill leads to consequences that are immediate, definite, and largely automatic, then such a plea results in direct consequences. Frison, 365 Ill.App.3d at 934, 303 Ill.Dec. 703, 851 N.E.2d 890. Otherwise, the plea's consequences are collateral. Thus, we must examine the consequences of entering a plea of guilty but mentally ill and compare them to what transpires following a simple guilty plea.

The consequences of entering a plea of guilty but mentally ill are set forth in section 5-2-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-2-6 (West 2002)). The first thing of note in this section is that, following either a plea or a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, "[t]he court may impose any sentence upon the defendant which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who had been convicted of the same offense without a finding of mental illness." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(a) (West 2002). Thus, there is no difference in sentencing. People v. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d 109, 131-32, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78 (1991). The one difference in how a defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill and sentenced to prison must be treated is that the Department of Corrections (DOC) "shall cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (West 2002). Thereafter, the DOC shall provide psychological services "as it determines necessary." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (West 2002). In appropriate circumstances, the DOC "may transfer the defendant's custody to the Department of Human Services." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(c) (West 2002). Thus, the sole mandatory difference in the treatment of a guilty-but-mentally-ill defendant is that the defendant be examined periodically. All other consequences follow only if the DOC deems them necessary. Quite simply, outside of a periodic...