People v. Johnson

Decision Date27 December 2018
Docket NumberS075727
Citation241 Cal.Rptr.3d 782,6 Cal.5th 541,432 P.3d 536
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cedric Jerome JOHNSON, Defendant and Appellant.

Michael J. Hersek and Mary K. McComb, State Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Joseph E. Chabot, Mai Linh Spencer and Nina Wilder, Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Pamela C. Hamanaka and Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorneys General, Sharlene A. Honnaka, Jaime L. Fuster and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CUÉLLAR, J.

On November 25, 1998, a Los Angeles County jury convicted defendant Cedric Jerome Johnson of the first degree murders of Gregory Hightower and Lawrence Faggins, and found true the multiple-murder special circumstance, arming, and personal use of a firearm allegations. ( Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(3) ; id ., former §§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a); all further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Following the penalty phase trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

Many of defendant’s claims in this appeal relate to the consequences of his disruptive behavior during the proceedings. One such consequence was his absence from the trial. As described in detail below, defendant’s conduct conveyed a disregard for courtroom norms as persistent as it was severe. Beginning with his first trial on these charges, which ended in a hung jury, defendant unleashed profanity-laced tirades and accusations of racism against a number of different judges. He also expressed his dissatisfaction with his attorney, Steven K. Hauser, by repeatedly spitting on him and threatening to kill him and his family. Based on his own observations of defendant’s behavior and reports of defendant’s behavior in prior proceedings, Judge Jack W. Morgan ordered defendant to wear a stun belt in the courtroom. During jury selection at the first trial, defendant called Hauser names and threatened to beat him up. He also repeatedly interrupted the proceedings. Because the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to either count of murder—the jury was evenly divided as to the Hightower murder, and voted 11 to 1 for guilt of the Faggins murder—the court declared a mistrial.

When proceedings resumed, so did defendant’s disruptive behavior. Once again, defendant interrupted the court, spouted profanity, and spit on Hauser. Then, as the court, counsel, and defendant convened in the jury assembly room with the venire for the retrial, defendant suddenly attacked Hauser, striking him on the head and knocking him out of his chair. Defendant could not be controlled with the stun belt and was subdued only with the assistance of several deputy sheriffs. After dismissing the venire, the trial court barred defendant from the courtroom for the rest of the proceedings. Defendant declined to listen to the proceedings from his lockup cell using a speaker. When defendant returned to the courtroom for sentencing, defendant taunted and threatened the court and the attorneys: "What you gon' do when I get out? [¶] You and I both all know I'm getting out. [¶] All you lawyers."

At various points, the judges presiding over the proceedings expressed concern that defendant sought to inject error into the trial through his disruptive behavior. Not surprisingly, defendant now alleges error arising from the trial court’s efforts to manage his behavior, including the decision to bar him from trial and the finding that he forfeited his right to testify. What we conclude is that defendant’s repeated efforts to compromise the integrity of a capital trial were unsuccessful. In each instance where the trial court made decisions now challenged by the defendant, the court acted within the permissible scope of its discretion.

With respect to defendant’s other claims, we find the trial court either did not err or did not cause prejudice to defendant. So we affirm the judgment in its entirety.

I.

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant Johnson and codefendant Terry Betton with the murders of Hightower and Faggins. The first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury deadlocked on all charges. At the second trial, the jury convicted defendant of both murders and sentenced him to death. The jury also convicted codefendant Betton of Faggins’s murder but deadlocked as to Hightower’s. Betton was sentenced to an indeterminate life term for the murder, and that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (People v. Betton (July 12, 2000, B130960) [nonpub. opn.].)

A. Guilt Phase

On the night of September 26, 1996, Shetema White threw a party at her Jordan Downs apartment in Watts to celebrate her brother’s release from custody. Faggins and Hightower attended the party. But Faggins had reportedly "snitched" on someone known as "Mo-C." Many people at the party warned Faggins he was in danger and suggested he leave.

Their advice was sound. Defendant was in a nearby apartment with codefendant and Tyrone Newton. They had a view of Hightower and Faggins at the party. Defendant said, "You know we can do them right here and right now." When defendant asked Newton whether he would kill Hightower, Newton said, "he ain't did nothing to me." "It ain't the fact he did something to you," defendant explained, "we're getting rid of all the snitches."

Sometime before 10:00 p.m., after being at the party for 20 to 30 minutes, Charles "Pirate" Lewis told Hightower "something just doesn't feel right" and suggested they leave. Hightower got into the driver’s seat of his girlfriend’s car; Lewis got in the passenger seat. Robert Huggins (Hightower’s half-brother) got into his own car; he was going to join them at Hightower’s house. Faggins left the party around the same time. Around 40 to 50 people from the party were outside.

Newton went outside to smoke a cigarette. As he saw defendant come out of the apartment, Newton felt his own heart racing and wondered whether defendant could "really do this." Defendant approached Faggins with a gun and fired, hitting him in the shoulder. Faggins took off running. As Faggins ran between Huggins’s car and a van, defendant continued shooting. When defendant stopped shooting, codefendant started shooting; defendant then resumed shooting. Defendant had a handgun (perhaps a Beretta) and a fully automatic Uzi. Codefendant had a handgun in each hand. Faggins fell when defendant sprayed him with bullets from the Uzi.

Lewis had already exited Hightower’s girlfriend’s car. As defendant and codefendant were walking back to the party, Lewis was moving a bicycle that happened to be in the car’s way. According to Huggins and Newton, defendant approached the driver’s side of the car and fired several times. Newton reported that defendant reached into the car with his gun; Huggins, on the other hand, said that defendant and the gun remained outside the car the whole time. Neither one saw codefendant fire at Hightower.

Leonard Greer was a few apartment buildings away when he heard the gunfire. He ran to see what had happened and came upon defendant and codefendant, who were running away. Defendant had what appeared to be a gun in his hand. A short time later, Greer saw his sister, Rochelle Johnson (no relation to defendant), walking towards him. She was crying and covered in blood. She said, "They didn't have to kill him. C.J. [defendant] didn't have to kill him." Together they walked to Rochelle’s apartment. Their mother, Annette Johnson, arrived about 10 minutes later.

The foregoing account of the homicides came primarily from the statements of Greer, Huggins, and Newton. But each had also made statements tending to undermine their accounts of what happened.

At trial, Newton denied hearing defendant talk about killing snitches in general or these victims in particular. He likewise denied knowing about any disagreements between defendant (or codefendant) and the victims. Newton’s contrary statements came from a videotaped interview with Los Angeles Police Detective Chris Waters while Newton was in custody for possessing cocaine. The videotaped interview, which occurred two weeks after the murders, was shown to the jury. At trial Newton disavowed his prior statements. He testified initially that he was intoxicated during the interview and did not know why he supplied the false information. He subsequently testified that he made those statements because he "got caught with something"; the arresting officer offered to "drop my case" in exchange for information about the murders; and he just "followed along with" what the officer was saying. Both victims were friends of his, as were defendant and codefendant.

During the videotaped interview with Waters, Newton identified defendant as the shooter of both victims and said defendant had used the same gun for each murder. At trial, though, Newton denied being at White’s party and claimed he had been at home in Hawthorne with family the whole time. He denied talking about the incident with Huggins or Greer when he saw them about a week later, or with defendant and codefendant at any time. Newton insisted at trial that he did not know where or when the victims were shot; he had told Waters the shootings occurred around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. on September 25, the day before they actually occurred. During the interview, he told Detective Waters that he had previously provided information to the police and had received benefits for his information. At trial, Newton admitted that he was released a short time after making his videotaped statement and was never prosecuted for the cocaine possession. Detective Waters confirmed that Newton said something like "the more y'all get me off y'all line, the happier I will be," but testified that she had not promised...

To continue reading

Request your trial
94 cases
  • People v. Baker
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 1 Febrero 2021
    ...is also forfeited. (See Armstrong , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 791, 243 Cal.Rptr.3d 105, 433 P.3d 987 ; cf. People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 592, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 782, 432 P.3d 536 [declining to reach bias claim when, among other things, defense neither objected on that ground nor "move[......
  • People v. Leon
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 23 Enero 2020
    ...court had the duty to instruct the jury sua sponte to view a defendant’s oral admissions with caution." ( People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 587, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 782, 432 P.3d 536, italics added ( Johnson ); see People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 392-393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 ......
  • People v. Duong
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 10 Agosto 2020
    ...failing to require a life sentence if the jury finds that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones ( People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 594, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 782, 432 P.3d 536 ; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 42, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591 ). This instruction's use of the......
  • People v. Bell
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 2 Mayo 2019
    ...discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.’ ( Allen , [supra , 397 U.S.] at p. 343 .)" ( People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 557, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 782, 432 P.3d 536, italics added.) Defendant’s statutory and constitutional claims also fail because he did not "reclaim" his right t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
10 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 4 - §3. Privilege against self-incrimination
    • United States
    • Full Court Press California Guide to Criminal Evidence Chapter 4 Statutory Limits on Particular Evidence
    • Invalid date
    ...C. §404; see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 189; Izazaga, 54 Cal.3d at 366; see, e.g., People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 570 (questions at Evid. C. §402 hearing did not seek incriminating answers, and nonresponsive answers were not used against D at trial). Fo......
  • Table of Cases null
    • United States
    • Full Court Press California Guide to Criminal Evidence Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...People v. Johnson, 21 Cal. App. 5th 1026, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 869 (2d Dist. 2018)—Ch. 5-A, §3.1.2(2)(a); §3.3.2(2)(d) People v. Johnson, 6 Cal. 5th 541, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782, 432 P.3d 536 (Cal. 2018)—Ch. 2, §1.2.2(3); Ch. 3-B, §12.1; §12.2.2(1); Ch. 4-C, §3.2.2; Ch. 7, §3.1.1(2) People v. Jo......
  • Attorney conduct
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Objections
    • 29 Marzo 2023
    ...may compromise an attorney’s loyalty to the defendant and impair counsel’s efforts on the defendant’s behalf. People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal. 5th 541, 578, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782. On appeal of an order denying disqualification, a defendant must show that counsel labored under an actual confl......
  • Disqualification of judges and judicial conduct
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Objections
    • 29 Marzo 2023
    ...a favorable result and fail to raise an objection of bias, and then argue on appeal that the judge was biased. People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal. 5th 541, 592, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 782. But failure to object does not forfeit the claim on appeal if an objection would not have cured the prejudice o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT