People v. Jonathan V. (In re Jonathan V.)
| Decision Date | 09 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | B271319 |
| Citation | 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 161,19 Cal.App.5th 236 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IN RE JONATHAN V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jonathan V., Defendant and Appellant. |
Courtney M. Selan, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney, General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney, General, Shawn McGahey Webb and David W. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On February 10, 2016, defense counsel, in a juvenile case, walked into court for a trial setting conference and was given "notice" by the prosecutor that the People were going to seek a two-year restraining order against her client, Jonathan V. When the case was called, defense counsel objected to the issuance of the order, informed the court she had not been given prior notice of the People's application and requested time to prepare for the hearing. Overruling defense counsel's objections, the court issued the two-year restraining order.
Jonathan argues the order must be reversed because (1) he did not receive adequate notice of or a hearing on the People's application for the restraining order, and (2) the order is not supported by substantial evidence.1 Because we agree the juvenile court erred by issuing the restraining order without providing Jonathan sufficient notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard, we reverse the two-year restraining order. In light of this ruling, we need not reach Jonathan's second contention concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.
On December 4, 2015, Randy G., Brandon S., H.Y., and Justin P. (hereinafter referred to collectively as "victims" ) were walking down the street when a gray truck with a camper pulled up next to them.2 Jonathan and approximately six companions exited the truck and asked, "Where you guys from?" When the victims did not answer, Jonathan and his companions yelled, "San Fer."3 One of the companions pointed a gun at the victims while the others took the victims' wallets, cell phones and jewelry. The robbers got back in the truck and left.
A little while later, one of the victims flagged down police officers and told them he had been "jumped" by Jonathan and his companions. The police located the gray truck and attempted to conduct a traffic stop, but the truck drove away. A pursuit ensued, and the truck ran off the road and hit a guard rail. The occupants fled on foot, but were caught and arrested.
The victims identified Jonathan as one of the perpetrators. The police recognized Jonathan as a "San Fer" gang member. Jonathan denied any gang involvement.
On December 8, 2015, the People filed an amended petition alleging that on December 4, Jonathan, then 15 years old, committed second degree robbery against the four victims ( Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c) ), that a principal personally used a firearm in the commission of the crimes (id ., § 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)), that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of the crimes (id ., § 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id ., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)).
At the December 9 detention hearing, Jonathan denied the allegations of the petition. The trial court found a prima facie case that Jonathan was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and detained him in juvenile hall. On January 5, 2016, Jonathan was placed on home detention in the community detention program.
At the February 10 trial setting hearing, at which Jonathan was present, he was released from the community detention program over the People's objection. The court based its decision on the positive reports it had received from his high school and the community.
At the same hearing, the People requested a juvenile restraining order precluding Jonathan from contacting the victims of the crime. Defense counsel objected to the request and stated she
Defense counsel argued Jonathan
The People responded that rule 5.630 of the California Rules of Court authorized them to make their request orally and without notice. Additionally, the People argued issuance of the order was reasonable because of the seriousness of the charges, and the fact Jonathan was out of custody and no longer in the community detention program.
The court agreed with the People. The court noted the petition The restraining order went into effect on February 10, 2016, for a period of two years, lasting until February 10, 2018.5
The issue in this case is whether Jonathan received adequate notice and an opportunity to contest the People's request for a two-year restraining order. We conclude Jonathan did not receive adequate notice or an adequate opportunity to be heard to contest the issuance of the order.
The question whether the order was authorized under the statute, as a matter of statutory interpretation, is reviewed de novo. ( Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 948, 956, 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 ( Babalola ).) We review procedural due process claims de novo because "the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law." ( Nasha v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 482, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 772.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5 ( section 213.5 ) governs the issuance of restraining orders in juvenile delinquency proceedings.6 Section 213.5 provides for two types of restraining orders: (1) temporary orders that may be issued without notice and a hearing, and which may remain in effect for a maximum of 25 days (id ., subd. (c)); and (2) restraining orders that may be issued after notice and a hearing and which can remain in effect for a period of up to three years (id ., subd. (d)).
When a party seeks a temporary restraining order, subdivision (c) of section 213.5 permits the juvenile court to issue a temporary restraining order without notice or a hearing. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(b) & (d) ( rule 5.630 ).) A temporary restraining order issued without notice may remain in effect for a period not to exceed 21 days, or for good cause, 25 days, after which the court must either hold a hearing to determine whether to issue a restraining order or to dissolve the temporary restraining order. ( § 213.5, subd. (c)(1).) A temporary restraining order issued under this subdivision may be extended for a limited time if the court grants either party a continuance. (Id ., subd. (c)(2)-(4).) The party to be restrained is "entitled, as a matter of course, to one continuance, for a reasonable period, to respond to the petition." (Id ., subd. (c)(2).) A temporary restraining order must be issued on form JV-250. ( Rule 5.630(d)(2) [].)
Subdivision (d) of section 213.5 authorizes the court to issue a restraining order, as distinguished from a temporary restraining order, that can remain in effect for up to three years, but only "upon notice and a hearing." ( § 213.5, subd. (d)(1).) This order must be issued on form JV-255. ( Rule 5.630(f)(2) [].)
The restraining order in this case is not a temporary restraining order. It was not issued on form JV-250, the form designated for temporary restraining orders, but rather on form JV-255, the form used to issue restraining orders. And the order is effective for a period of two years, from February 10, 2016 through February 10, 2018, well beyond the 21 or 25 days permitted for a temporary restraining order. Before the court can issue such an order, however, subdivision (d) of section 213.5 requires notice and a hearing. Jonathan received neither.
The People, relying on rule 5.630, contend the order was properly issued in compliance with the "no notice" provision found in rule 5.630(d). Reliance on this rule is misplaced. Rule 5.630(d) states in relevant part: "The application may be submitted...
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