People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 14 June 2013
• Citation: 966 N.Y.S.2d 724,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04511,107 A.D.3d 1589
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jeffrey JONES, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

107 A.D.3d 1589

966 N.Y.S.2d 724

2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 04511

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Jeffrey JONES, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

June 14, 2013.

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered January 14, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3] ). We agree with defendant that the waiver of the right to appeal is invalid because “the minimal inquiry made by County Court was insufficient to establish that the court engage[d] the defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice” ( People v. Box, 96 A.D.3d 1570, 1571, 946 N.Y.S.2d 525,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 1024, 953 N.Y.S.2d 557, 978 N.E.2d 109 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Hamilton, 49 A.D.3d 1163, 1164, 856 N.Y.S.2d 375;People v. Brown, 296 A.D.2d 860, 860, 745 N.Y.S.2d 368,lv. denied98 N.Y.2d 767, 752 N.Y.S.2d 7, 781 N.E.2d 919). Indeed, on this record there is no basis upon which to conclude that the court ensured “that the defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty” ( People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145). We nevertheless reject defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for youthful offender status ( see People v. Guppy, 92 A.D.3d 1243, 1243, 937 N.Y.S.2d 921,lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 961, 950 N.Y.S.2d 113, 973 N.E.2d 211;People v. Potter, 13 A.D.3d 1191, 1191, 786 N.Y.S.2d 793,lv. denied4 N.Y.3d 889, 798 N.Y.S.2d 735, 831 N.E.2d 980), and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to adjudicate defendant a youthful offender ( see generally People v. Shrubsall, 167 A.D.2d 929, 930–931, 562 N.Y.S.2d 290). Finally, we conclude that “the court's reliance on the presentence report for its determination that defendant would not be afforded youthful offender status ‘constitutes an adequate explanation for the denial of defendant's request for such status' ” ( People v. Wargula, 86 A.D.3d 929, 930, 926...