People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 28 March 1978 |
| Citation | 375 N.E.2d 41,404 N.Y.S.2d 85,44 N.Y.2d 76 |
| Parties | , 375 N.E.2d 41 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Sylvester JONES, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
We hold that defendant was not denied due process when the District Attorney's office did not disclose during plea negotiations that it had received information that the complaining witness had died.
On January 5, 1975 as he was entering his car, Juan Rodriguez was approached at gunpoint by three persons including defendant who forced their way into the vehicle, drove him a distance and stole his wallet before releasing him and driving off. Following his arrest defendant was indicted for robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the third degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree and entered pleas of not guilty. The case appeared on the calendar a number of times during 1975 and was adjourned on each occasion for various reasons, among them the inability of the People to locate the complaining witness, Rodriguez. On January 15, 1976 investigators for the defense located the witness, and shortly thereafter defense counsel was informed that the District Attorney's office had also found and conferred with him. On February 3, 1976 the prosecution announced the case ready for trial.
Plea negotiations had been conducted before the complaining witness had been located, were continued after the case had been marked ready, and culminated on April 26, 1976 when defendant withdrew his prior plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty to robbery in the third degree in full satisfaction of the indictment. After defendant admitted his guilt and established a factual basis for the plea, the plea was accepted and sentencing was put over until June 7.
When defendant appeared for sentencing, defense counsel moved to withdraw the plea of guilty on the ground that it had come to his attention the previous day that the District Attorney's office had been informed of the death of Rodriguez, the victim, on April 22, 1976, four days prior to the acceptance of the plea.
In support of the motion to withdraw the plea, counsel for defendant contended that "in the spirit of Brady versus Maryland (373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215)" the prosecution was obliged to disclose the fact of Rodriguez' death to the defense and averred that had counsel "known that the witness in chief passed away, had I been informed of that fact I would not have allowed, at least I would have advised my client not to make the plea". A hearing was had on defendant's application on June 17, 1976, at the conclusion of which, following submissions of counsel, the application was denied (87 Misc.2d 931, 387 N.Y.S.2d 779). The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's judgment of conviction on the plea, and we now affirm the dispositions of both courts below. At no time did defendant assert, nor does he now, that he was innocent of having committed the criminal acts charged.
It advances analysis to focus on the precise nature of the matter which was not disclosed by the prosecutor during the plea negotiations information with respect to the death of the complaining witness. The circumstance that the testimony of the complaining witness was no longer available to the prosecution was not evidence at all. Further, to the extent that proof of the fact of the death of this witness might have been admissible on trial, it would not have constituted exculpatory evidence i. e., evidence favorable to an accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. Accordingly, it does not fall within the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; and cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342). Counsel does not now claim otherwise. Rather, as counsel tacitly admitted in his colloquy with the court on the motion to withdraw the plea, the death of Rodriguez would merely have been one of the factors though a most significant factor to be weighed by defendant in reaching his decision whether, as a matter of tactics in light of the strength of the People's case against him, to interpose a negotiated plea of guilty.
The question remains as to the extent of the prosecution's obligation to disclose information in its possession which, as here, is highly material to the practical, tactical considerations which attend a determination to plead guilty, but not to the legal issue of guilt itself. Analytically the issue is not whether this defendant was entitled to evidence in the possession of the prosecution; the question before us on this appeal is whether the pretrial conduct of the prosecutor in the course of plea negotiation was such as to constitute a denial of due process to defendant in the circumstances disclosed in this record.
The Supreme Court has observed that the prosecutor ...
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