People v. Jones

Decision Date26 November 1976
Docket NumberDocket No. 24557
Citation73 Mich.App. 107,251 N.W.2d 264
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Alva JONES, Defendant-Appellant. 73 Mich.App. 107, 251 N.W.2d 264
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[73 MICHAPP 108] Anthony C. Lutostanski, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Appellate Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Maura D. Corrigan, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., P. J., and KAUFMAN and RILEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Appealing his conviction and sentence for armed robbery, MCLA § 750.529; MSA § 28.797, defendant is here insisting that this Court is required to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial because of four purported errors in the proceedings below.

Briefly summarized, the claimed errors are: (1) the prosecutor was improperly allowed to cross-examine the defendant and other defense witnesses regarding the unemployment and poverty of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense; (2) the failure of the trial judge to determine the defendant's confession involuntary; (3) the aiding and abetting charge should not have been read to the jury because, as defendant claims, the prosecution's theory was that the defendant committed the crime alone; and (4) the prosecutor's improper [73 MICHAPP 109] questioning of a defense witness regarding a prior bad act which did not result in conviction. We will discuss these contentions seriatim.

Argument one, just stated, is premised principally upon the Michigan Supreme Court disposition of a similar question in People v. Johnson,393 Mich. 488, 227 N.W.2d 523 (1975), and would be determinative if we were to countenance a strained interpretation of Johnson which states that the mere asking of any question by the prosecutor, regardless of the justification, concerning defendant's unemployment or poverty requires reversal. It is clear that this interpretation of Johnson is erroneous.

The basic fallacy of defendant's contention is demonstrated by the following language of Justice Williams in Johnson, at 499, 227 N.W.2d at 527:

"That is not to say, however, that the trial court does not have considerable discretion in ruling on the relevance and materiality of argument coming before it. Clearly, the trial court has broad discretion in exercising its judgment whether a particular line of inquiry or argument is to be allowed before the jury. * * * Yet there is an obvious limit to the exercise of such discretion in cases of abuse." (Footnote omitted.) (Citation omitted.)

It is plain, therefore, that the Supreme Court did not set forth a per se reversal rule. Instead, the question before us for decision is this: Whether the court below abused its discretion in allowing this line of questioning.

In reaching our decision, we are mindful of the extreme prejudice that can be engendered by irrelevant questions relating to a defendant's poverty or unemployment. The onus cannot be placed on the defendant to disprove the inference which [73 MICHAPP 110] might arise from irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony on this subject, that being: a defendant is guilty solely because he is poor. To hold, however, that it was error to allow the questioning of the prosecutor in the instance here under review would clearly be a misapplication of Johnson.

First, this Court must again note the failure of defense counsel to object promptly to this line of questioning. It is exceedingly difficult for a trial judge to exercise his discretion when the matter is not brought to his attention. A belated objection, long after these matters had repeatedly been bandied about before the jury, hardly suffices to save any alleged error for appellate review. When the untimely objection was tendered, the trial judge found the inquiries arguably relevant. Under the facts and circumstances presented herein we will not disturb this ruling.

Secondly, the prosecutor, on his part, invokes the established rule in Michigan courts that the prosecutor may question...

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17 cases
  • People v. Iaconnelli
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • March 31, 1982
    ...matter is introduced by a defendant in his direct testimony, further inquiry is proper on cross-examination. People v. Thomas Jones, 73 Mich.App. 107, 251 N.W.2d 264 (1976). (5) Defendants allege numerous other instances of prosecutorial misconduct which we find either not to be supported b......
  • People v. Ferguson
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • December 5, 1979
    ...relevant to material matters at issue. Cf., People v. Moore, 78 Mich.App. 150, 156, 259 N.W.2d 403 (1977), People v. Jones, 73 Mich.App. 107, 110, 251 N.W.2d 264 (1976). In addition, no objection was raised at trial, and under the circumstances manifest injustice is not presented. People v.......
  • People v. Henderson
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • March 4, 1980
    ...77 Mich.App. 392, 400, 258 N.W.2d 89 (1977); People v. Baldwin, 74 Mich.App. 700, 708, 254 N.W.2d 619 (1977); People v. Jones, 73 Mich.App. 107, 109, 251 N.W.2d 264 (1976). But, cf. People v. Andrews, 88 Mich.App. 115, 276 N.W.2d 867 (1979).11 See, e. g., People v. Andrews, supra, p. 118, 2......
  • People v. Pauli, Docket No. 70273
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • January 7, 1985
    ...382 Mich. 632, 172 N.W.2d 369 (1969), cert. den. 397 U.S. 1079, 90 S.Ct. 1533, 25 L.Ed.2d 816 (1970); People v. [138 MICHAPP 540] Thomas Jones, 73 Mich.App. 107, 110, 251 N.W.2d 264 (1976). We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in ruling that, because defense counsel had imperm......
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