People v. Henderson
Decision Date | 04 March 1980 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 60920,No. 9,9 |
Citation | 408 Mich. 56,289 N.W.2d 376 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Johnny Mack HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar408 Mich. 56, 289 N.W.2d 376 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Donald A. Johnston, Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellant.
George S. Buth, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee.
Johnny Mack Henderson was convicted of arson and embezzlement. The issue is whether it was error to permit, over objection, cross-examination of Henderson concerning his financial condition.
We hold that it was not, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, 80 Mich.App. 447, 264 N.W.2d 22 and reinstate Henderson's convictions.
Henderson was convicted of arson of real property 1 and embezzlement over $100. 2 The charges arose out of a fire and theft at the service station which Henderson managed.
The station was found in flames. When they were extinguished the combination safe was found open and empty of money. Over $1,400 was missing.
There was no evidence of forced entry into the building or safe. The main power panel controlling the gasoline pumps had been unlocked. The padlocks on the individual pumps were found open and undamaged. The hoses from the pumps were stretched out and the nozzles locked open to continually dispense gasoline toward the station.
The door to the interior storeroom was unlocked and standing open. The contents of the storeroom had been drenched in gasoline. From the length of the pump hoses and the slope of the driveway, it appeared that this gasoline had been carried in and poured from a container.
The fire was started by igniting the flowing gasoline. It was extinguished before reaching the storeroom.
The employees assigned to the station were Henderson and Samuel Chapman, an attendant. Both had keys to the front door, the main power panel and the pumps. Only Henderson had a key to the storeroom, but a duplicate set was kept in the safe. Only Henderson and his district manager were given the combination to the safe.
There was eyewitness testimony tending to identify Henderson as the person who set the fire. 3 He presented an alibi defense. 4
A split panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Henderson's conviction 5 on the basis of the following colloquy during cross-examination:
We granted leave to appeal limited to the issue "whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting, over objection, prosecutorial cross-examination concerning the financial condition of defendant in an embezzlement case." 6
In People v. Johnson 7 this Court reversed a conviction of carrying a concealed weapon because of cross-examination and argument based on the financial condition of the defendant.
Johnson was extensively cross-examined on various aspects of his background, including his poverty and unemployment. In closing argument, the prosecutor said:
We reversed Johnson's conviction, saying:
8
We found an abuse of discretion in allowing "inquiries designed to demonstrate a causal connection between extraneous matters and guilt on the charge." 9
The Court of Appeals has subsequently ruled on the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's financial condition in diverse factual and procedural settings. The court has not seen Johnson as announcing a per se rule that evidence of financial condition is never admissible. 10 It has, however, been sensitive to the need to scrutinize the admission of such evidence because of its potential prejudicial impact, and has indicated awareness that decisions admitting such evidence might provide a precedent which would, in practice, weigh more heavily on the poor. 11
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals, in holding the evidence inadmissible, said that it could not "permit routine proof of impecuniousness to establish the motive for a theft offense." 12 It concluded that the evidence was legally irrelevant because its probative value, which it found to be "very low," 13 was outweighed by its prejudicial effect on poor persons as a class. The court found that this would be so even if it applied a rule that, on its face, did not discriminate against the poor:
14
In his brief in this Court, Henderson echoes the Court of Appeals concern for avoiding class-based discrimination. Citing a New Jersey case, State v. Mathis, 15 for the proposition that "there must be something more than poverty to tie a defendant into a criminal milieu," and a federal case, Davis v. United States, 16 for the proposition that "(w)here the evidence elicited only demonstrates that the defendant is 'poor,' the inquiry is improper," and arguing that admission of such evidence necessarily rests on the premise that "poor people have greater motive to commit theft crimes," Henderson warns that "(b)y allowing evidence of financial condition to be used to show motive in a theft offense, this Court would be permitting economic and social status to be routinely used against a defendant."
We agree with the propositions quoted above from Mathis and Davis. There is a need to avoid undue prejudice in individual cases and to prevent establishment of a "two-tiered standard of justice" 17 weighing more heavily on the poor. And we recognize that evidence of a defendant's financial condition, because it ordinarily has limited probative value and usually goes to a collateral issue, will often distract rather than aid the jury. 18
Our decision reversing the Court of Appeals does not, however, allow "routine use" of evidence of financial condition.
Johnson, and most of the post-Johnson Court of Appeals cases involving similar issues, concerned evidence that the defendant was unemployed and poor. 19
The prosecutor's proofs in the instant case, rather than showing unemployment, established that Henderson was not only employed, but held a managerial position. The evidence that his electricity was shut off for non-payment, viewed in light of this evidence of employment, carried with it no suggestion that Henderson was "poor."
There is a difference between evidence of poverty and unemployment evidence that a person is chronically short of funds and evidence of the sort involved in this appeal, showing that a person is experiencing a shortage of funds that appears to be novel or contrary to what one would expect is typically felt by such a person.
Evidence of poverty, dependence on public welfare, unemployment, underemployment, low paying or marginal employment, is not ordinarily admissible to show motive. 20 The probative value of such evidence is diminished because it applies to too large a segment of the total population. 21 Its...
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People v. McLaughlin
...of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MRE 403; Aldrich, supra. Our Supreme Court held in People v. Henderson, 408 Mich. 56, 66, 289 N.W.2d 376 (1980): Evidence of poverty, dependence on public welfare, unemployment, underemployment, low paying or marginal employment, is......
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...activities required reversal). 8. Even the Michigan courts acknowledge that Johnson did not create a per se rule. People v. Henderson, 289 N.W. 2d 376, 379 (Mich. 1980). 9. Although not cited by Petitioner, this line of cases also includes Ring v. Arizona, 53 US 584 (2002) and United States......
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