People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 29 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 332018. |
| Citation | 317 Mich.App. 416,894 N.W.2d 723 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. JONES. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
State Appellate Defender (by Jeanice Dagher–Margosian) for defendant.
Before: MURRAY, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BECKERING, JJ.
Defendant, Melissa Lee Jones, pleaded guilty of first-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), and the trial court sentenced her to 3 to 10 years' imprisonment with credit for 208 days served. Defendant now appeals her conviction by delayed leave granted. We agree with defendant's argument that the first-degree child abuse statute does not apply to her conduct at issue, and we therefore vacate her conviction and sentence.
This case arises out of defendant's delivery of a baby who tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. After defendant gave birth, the hospital staff became concerned about the baby because he weighed less than four pounds, despite being delivered at full term. The baby was weak, had trouble feeding, and required an IV to receive nutrition. Defendant did not participate in any prenatal care. A Child Protective Services (CPS) worker arrived at the hospital after being informed of the baby's condition and that the baby had tested positive for methamphetamine. After speaking with the CPS worker, defendant removed her own IVs and left the hospital with her boyfriend against the advice of hospital staff and against the recommendation of CPS. When police arrived at the hospital regarding the abandoned newborn, defendant had not returned to the hospital for her baby. A court order subsequently placed the child under protection and prohibited defendant from having contact with the baby.
Defendant was charged with child abuse arising out of her prenatal conduct. During the plea hearing, the factual basis for her guilty plea was established as follows:
On appeal, defendant first argues that the first-degree child abuse statute was improperly applied to her because a fetus is not included within the statutory definition of "child," and she therefore could not have caused harm to a "child" as required by the statute simply by using methamphetamine during her pregnancy. We agree.
Defendant did not preserve this issue by challenging in the trial court the applicability of the first-degree child abuse statute to her conduct. People v. Metamora Water Serv., Inc., 276 Mich.App. 376, 382, 741 N.W.2d 61 (2007). Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Wambar, 300 Mich.App. 121, 124, 831 N.W.2d 891 (2013). "Whether conduct falls within the statutory scope of a criminal statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal." People v. Rutledge, 250 Mich.App. 1, 4, 645 N.W.2d 333 (2002). However, unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763–764, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). On plain-error review, the burden is on the defendant to establish (1) "error"; (2) that was "plain," meaning "clear or obvious"; and (3) that the plain error caused prejudice, meaning "that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. "[O]nce a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse," but "[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).
In eliciting a factual basis from defendant during the plea colloquy, the trial court clearly focused on defendant's prenatal methamphetamine use and the fact that the baby tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines to support the first-degree child abuse conviction. No other facts of alleged harm to the baby were introduced, and no facts were introduced of conduct toward the baby after birth. Thus, the factual basis to support defendant's guilty plea rested solely on defendant's prenatal conduct. Therefore, the question before us is one of first impression, namely, whether a mother's prenatal drug use can support a conviction for first-degree child abuse when the statute requires the victim to be a "child" and does not specifically include fetuses within the statutory definition of "child."
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. People v. Peltola, 489 Mich. 174, 181, 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011). "The statute's words are the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted based on their ordinary meaning and the context within which they are used in the statute." People v. Lowe, 484 Mich. 718, 721–722, 773 N.W.2d 1 (2009). If the statutory language is unambiguous, then the statute is applied as written. People v. Borchard–Ruhland, 460 Mich. 278, 284, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999). "Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent." People v. Phillips, 469 Mich. 390, 395, 666 N.W.2d 657 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "If the statute defines a term, that definition controls." People v. Wiggins, 289 Mich.App. 126, 128, 795 N.W.2d 232 (2010). "Further, the language must be applied as written, and nothing should be read into a statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as indicated by the act itself."
People v. Lange, 251 Mich.App. 247, 253–254, 650 N.W.2d 691 (2002) (citations omitted). "It is well settled that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, absent a legislative statement to the contrary." People v. Boscaglia, 419 Mich. 556, 563, 357 N.W.2d 648 (1984).
MCL 750.136b(2) states that "[a] person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree if the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical or serious mental harm to a child." Under this statute, a " ‘[c]hild’ means a person who is less than 18 years of age and is not emancipated by operation of law as provided in section 4 of 1968 PA 293, MCL 722.4." MCL 750.136b(1)(a) (emphasis added). The definition of "person" that appears in MCL 750.136b serves to define the person committing the abuse rather than the child victim. See MCL 750.136b(1)(d) (). MCL 750.136b does not refer to fetuses or to conduct that harms a fetus in relation to the proscribed conduct. Furthermore, neither the definition of "child" nor the definition of "person" found in the statute specifically includes fetuses.
The fact that the Legislature did not include fetuses within either definition in the child abuse statute is in accordance with other statutory definitions of "person," which consistently omit any reference to fetuses. For example, the definition section of the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq., merely includes the following definition for the term "person": "The words ‘person’, ‘accused’, and similar words include, unless a contrary intention appears, public and private corporations, copartnerships, and unincorporated or voluntary associations."
MCL 750.10. Similarly, the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq., states, " ‘Person’, ‘accused’, or a similar word means an individual or, unless a contrary intention appears, a public or private corporation, partnership, or unincorporated or voluntary association." MCL 761.1(a).
There does not appear to be any caselaw specifically addressing whether a mother's drug use during pregnancy may form the basis of a first-degree child abuse prosecution on the theory that the drug use harmed the fetus. However, this Court previously considered, in People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich.App. 226, 229, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980), the question "whether an unborn but admittedly viable fetus is a ‘person’ as that word is used in the [negligent homicide] statute."1 In Guthrie, this Court discussed the so-called common-law "born alive" rule: ...
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...not signal the Michigan Legislature's intent that a mother's prenatal conduct constitutes "child abuse." See People v. Jones , 317 Mich. App. 416, 429, 432, 894 N.W.2d 723 (2016) (holding that a fetus is not a "person" for purposes of first-degree child abuse, and noting that when the Legis......
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...his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments in this regard are moot, and we need not consider them. See People v. Jones , 317 Mich.App. 416, 431–432, 894 N.W.2d 723 (2016).Second, in his brief on appeal, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for allowing defendant to ent......
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...Code of Criminal Procedure. MCL 761.1(a).5 The instant case is distinguishable from this Court's recent decision in People v. Jones, 317 Mich.App. 416, 894 N.W.2d 723 (2016). In Jones, this Court determined that "a fetus is not a ‘child’ for purposes of the first-degree child abuse statute,......
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