People v. Jones, Docket No. 23535

• Decision Date: 14 June 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 23535
• Citation: 69 Mich.App. 459,245 N.W.2d 91
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 91

245 N.W.2d 91

69 Mich.App. 459

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Stanley JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 23535.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 14, 1976.

Released for Publication Sept. 9, 1976.

Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Appellate Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., Maura D. Corrigan, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., P.J., and McGREGOR and KAUFMAN, JJ.

McGREGOR, Judge.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, and subsequently sentenced to life in prison. He appeals as a matter of right.

Defendant raises four issues for our consideration. However, we need discuss only one as it necessitates the reversal of defendant's conviction.

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing adequately to present to the jury the defense theory that the killing was accidental. On the authority of People v. Jones, 395 Mich. 379, 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975), we are constrained to agree.

In Jones, the Supreme Court stated:

'The defense theory was accidental shooting. The trial court's instruction did not adequately present this to the jury. The only places in the instruction which touched directly upon the theory of accident were two: In defining homicide the court said:

"Members of the Jury, the word homicide means the killing of one human being by another human being.

'Homicides in turn are divided into a number of classifications or degrees: felonious homicides, excusable homicides, justifiable homicides, or accidental homicides.

'It is only felonious homicides, members of the jury, that are punishable by Statute in Michigan.'

and in defining 'wilfully' the Court said:

"It means a wrongful criminal act done intentionally as opposed to an act done accidentally.'

'The Court did not instruct the jury that if the jury found the shooting was accidental it should find the defendant not guilty. While a logician or one skilled in the law could have gleaned such a rule from the instructions given, we are not satisfied that the instructions fairly and fully presented the case to the jury in an understandable manner. Whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was the central issue in the case and read as a whole these instructions did not direct the jury's attention to this issue.' (Emphasis added.) 395 Mich. 379, 394, 236 N.W.2d 461, 467.

The instructions in the instant case cannot be meaningfully distinguished from those given in Jones. The instructions in the instant case touched directly upon the theory of accident only once but did not clearly direct the jury's attention to this central issue. Furthermore, although the defendant in the instant case did not request such an instruction nor object to the instructions as given, the same situation was present in Jones and not deemed controlling. See Jones, dissenting opinion. Consequently, we hold that the trial court's failure adequately to present the defendant's theory to the jury was reversible error in spite of the fact that no request or objection was made.

Conviction reversed; remanded for a new trial.

D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., Presiding Judge (dissenting).

I am unable to agree with the majority that People v. Jones, 395 Mich. 379, 394, 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975), mandates reversal of defendant's conviction in this case. Having reviewed the trial court's instructions, I am convinced that the trial court adequately informed the jury of defendant's theory that the homicide was accidental. Since defendant's three remaining assignments of error present no reversible errors, I vote to affirm defendant's conviction for first-degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548.

The appellate courts of this state have long enforced the policy of affording a criminal defendant the right to have the trial court inform the jury as to his theory of the case. People v. Pepper, 389 Mich. 317, 319, 206 N.W.2d 439 (1973); People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334, 337, 11 N.W. 184 (1882); People v. Bonello, 25 Mich.App. 600, 602, 181 N.W.2d 652 (1970). The underlying rationale for this policy is to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial. People v Rich, 237 Mich. 481, 496--497, 212 N.W. 105 (1927) (Fellows, J., for reversal), Appeal dismissed, 275 U.S. 500, 48 S.Ct. 140, 72 L.Ed. 394 (1927). Unless the trial court sets forth defendant's theory, the jury may overlook one of defendant's valid defenses during its deliberations. See, E.g., People v. Pepper, supra, 389 Mich. at 319--320, 206 N.W.2d 439.

Before the trial court is obligated to so instruct, however, there must be some evidence introduced to support the theory. People v. Chivas, 322 Mich. 384, 390--391, 34 N.W.2d 22 (1948). In this case defendant's testimony placed some evidence in the record that the homicide was accidental.

Traditionally the trial court has been required to so instruct the jury only when requested by the defendant. People v. Bates, 55 Mich.App. 1, 5, 222 N.W.2d 6 (1974). Apparently, however, a request is no longer necessary to impose the duty on the trial court to so instruct. See People v. Jones, supra, 395 Mich....