People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 06 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 136098 |
| Citation | 530 N.W.2d 128,209 Mich.App. 212 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elmo Eldridge JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Donald E. Martin, Pros. Atty., and Susan L. LeDuc, Deputy Chief Asst. Prosecutor, for the people.
State Appellate Defender by Ralph C. Simpson, for defendant on appeal.
Before TAYLOR, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and SCHMA, * JJ.
Following a six-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree felony murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; M.S.A. § 28.424(2). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his felony-murder conviction and a consecutive two years for his felony-firearm conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises out of the circumstances of the shooting death of Donald Sturdivant. On October 23, 1990, Sturdivant spent the evening with defendant's estranged wife, Mary Jones. Jones had separated from defendant and lived apart from him with their only son. At approximately 10:45 p.m., Mary Jones retired to her bedroom with Sturdivant. Later that evening, she was awakened by a loud "bang." Jones saw defendant walking up the stairs with a shotgun. Jones immediately fled the residence. Following a 911 call from neighbors, the police found Sturdivant dead from a shotgun wound in Jones' upstairs bedroom.
Defendant first challenges his first-degree felony-murder conviction. In Michigan, the elements of first-degree felony murder are set forth in M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548:
Murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or other wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first or third degree, robbery, breaking and entering of a dwelling, larceny of any kind, extortion, or kidnapping is murder of the first degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life.
Defendant, relying on People v. Wilson, 1 Cal.3d 431, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22 (1969), argues that his felony-murder conviction should be reversed because the predicate felony of breaking and entering with the intent to commit an assault is not a felony independent of the homicide. Defendant urges this Court to adopt the merger doctrine as stated in Wilson to preclude convictions for felony murder where the underlying felony is committed with the same assaultive intent as the homicide.
In Wilson, the California Supreme Court adopted the merger doctrine to ameliorate the perceived harshness and injustice of the common-law felony-murder rule codified by the California legislature:
"The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit." People v. Washington, 62 Cal2d 777, 781; 44 CalRptr 442; 402 P2d 130 (1965). Where a person enters a building with an intent to assault his victim with a deadly weapon, he is not deterred by the felony-murder rule. That doctrine can serve its purpose only when applied to a felony independent of the homicide. In [People v. Ireland, 70 Cal2d 522; 75 CalRptr 188; 450 P2d 580 (1969) ], we reasoned that a man assaulting another with a deadly weapon could not be deterred by the second degree felony-murder rule, since the assault was an integral part of the homicide. Here, the only distinction is that the assault and homicide occurred inside a dwelling so that the underlying felony is burglary based on an intention to assault with a deadly weapon, rather than simple assault with a deadly weapon. [Id. 1 Cal.3d at 440, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22.]
In comparison, the purpose of Michigan's felony-murder statute "is to graduate punishment and ... the statute only serves to raise an already established murder to the first-degree level, not to transform a death, without more, into a murder." People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 719, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). We find this distinction to be dispositive. Unlike the common-law felony-murder rule at issue in Wilson, our felony-murder statute requires proof of malice aforethought and is not meant to deter negligent or accidental killings. Rather, it is merely a degree-raising device for certain types of second-degree murders. Aaron, supra, at 718-719, 299 N.W.2d 304. Given our requirement that first-degree felony murder requires an additional mens rea besides the intent to commit the underlying felony, we conclude that defendant's reliance on Wilson is misplaced.
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