People v. Knox
| Citation | 256 Mich. App. 175,662 N.W.2d 482 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 226944. |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Lee KNOX, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith B. Ketchum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Gary L. Rogers) for the defendant on appeal.
Before: WHITBECK, C.J., and BANDSTRA and TALBOT, JJ.
After a first jury trial resulted in a hung jury, a second jury convicted defendant Danny Lee Knox, Jr., of first-degree felony murder,1 with first-degree child abuse as the predicate felony, for committing the abuse from which his four-month-old son, Xavier Knox, died. The trial court sentenced Knox to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Knox appeals as of right. We affirm.
On the evening of July 22, 1998, LaToya Kelley and Knox, Xavier Knox's parents, were in Kelley's apartment with the baby and Kelley's two-year-old child. It is undisputed that, during the evening, the couple argued. Later in the evening, Kelley fed the baby a bottle of formula before putting him to bed. At that time, the baby seemed fine to Knox.
After the baby went to sleep, Kelley left her apartment to get a cigarette from Latarsha Ferguson, a friend and neighbor. Kelley was still upset with Knox when she left the apartment sometime between 9:30 p.m. and 9:35 p.m. When Kelley arrived at Ferguson's apartment moments later, Ferguson was busy and told Kelley to return in a few minutes. Kelley then went to neighbor Avery Evans's apartment.
According to Knox, he checked on the baby and Kelley's other child at around 9:45 p.m., at which time he sent the older child to the bathroom. A few minutes later, after the child was finished in the bathroom, Knox reentered the bedroom that the children shared. Knox noticed the baby making gurgling noises and saw that the baby's eyes had rolled back into his head. He tried, but failed, to get the baby to respond to him, so he ran to the balcony and yelled for Kelley. He then telephoned Kelley's mother, telling her that something was wrong. Kelley's mother later testified that she received this telephone call at 10:00 p.m.
After calling Kelley's mother, Knox said that he ran to neighbor Roberta Cruz's apartment. He was looking for Kelley and was concerned that the baby was not breathing. Cruz telephoned 911 within seconds of Knox's arrival. Emergency-service personnel arrived at the apartment at 10:16 p.m. The baby had a heartbeat at that time. At 10:25 p.m., on reassessment, the baby no longer had a heartbeat. Neither Cruz nor any of the responding emergency personnel saw any signs that the baby had been abused. Only after the baby arrived in the emergency room did the signs and extent of the abuse become apparent.
Medical experts determined that the baby died as the result of being shaken severely. During the shaking incident, his head came into contact with an object between three and seven times. Experts concluded that the baby likely would have lost consciousness within one or two minutes of being injured. Other physical symptoms would have manifested themselves within two minutes. He would not have cried normally in response to his injuries, but may have moaned. One medical expert believed that it was possible that the baby could have continued to breathe in an abnormal pattern for one or two hours before his heart rate collapsed. The pathologist who performed the autopsy thought, however, that the baby could have breathed spontaneously for only minutes after the injury was inflicted.2 Both experts agreed that it would have been impossible for the baby to consume a bottle at 9:00 p.m., which is when Kelley estimated she fed the baby the bottle, if he had been beaten before that time.
The baby's specific injuries included retinal hemorrhaging or bleeding in the eyes, a sign of shaken-baby syndrome. The baby had three distinct skull fractures, which were fatal and caused by three separate impacts. The baby had also recently sustained an injury to his liver and fractures to his right arm and left leg. In addition, the baby had healed rib fractures that were between three- and six-weeks old. Finally, the baby had seven crescent-shaped marks on the exterior of his head, which were caused either by fingernails or by the baby's head coming into contact with a rough surface. The experts concluded that the injuries inflicted on the baby were not accidental.
At trial, Knox attempted to show that Kelley abused the baby before leaving the apartment on the evening in question. Knox categorically denied that he was responsible for the baby's death. Conversely, the prosecutor sought to establish that Knox had problems bonding with the baby. The prosecution also elicited testimony that Knox had problems with anger management, including separate incidents when he had pushed Kelley, kicked his foot through a door, and punched his hand through a wall. Kelley said that Knox was taking anger-management classes. Knox said that he was taking a parenting class, not an anger-management class, though he admitted on cross-examination that Kelley told him to get help with his anger and that the class was designed to "clear the air" with Kelley. The prosecution also elicited testimony that the baby had suffered abuse before the night he died.
On appeal, Knox raises two critical issues. First, he argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it admitted evidence that he had an anger-management problem, that the baby had suffered abuse before the night the fatal injuries were inflicted, and that Kelley was a good parent who would not have committed the crime. Though Knox phrases his argument in terms of prosecutorial misconduct, this is in actuality an evidentiary issue, and we examine the substance of his arguments in that context. Second, Knox argues that he cannot be convicted of felony murder when the acts comprising the predicate felony also comprised the murder.
Because Knox did not object when the trial court admitted the evidence pertaining to his anger-management problem, the past abuse of the baby, and Kelley's good character, he failed to preserve this issue for appeal.3 Accordingly, Knox is entitled to relief only if he demonstrates plain error affecting his substantial rights, meaning that he was actually innocent or the error "`"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings" independent of'" Knox's innocence.4
MRE 404(b) provides, in part:
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.
In People v. VanderVliet,5 the Michigan Supreme Court, relying on Huddleston v. United States,6 set out the three factors that must be present for prior-bad-acts evidence7 to be admissible. First, the evidence must "be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)."8 Second, the evidence must "be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b)."9 And third, "the probative value of the evidence [must not be] substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice."10 Additionally, if the trial court admits the evidence, "the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury."11
Though a prosecutor may articulate a proper purpose for the evidence even after trial,15 a prosecutor may not merely list one of the proper purposes articulated in MRE 404(b) to make the evidence admissible.16 Rather, relevance is critical.17
Relevance is a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences that make a material fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.... The logical relationship between the proffered evidence and the ultimate fact sought to be proven must be closely scrutinized.18
In other words, the evidence "truly must be probative of something other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime."19 Even though MRE 404(b) is "inclusionary,"20 the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]f the prosecutor fails to weave a logical thread linking the prior act to the ultimate inference, the evidence must be excluded...."21
After the parties submitted their briefs and engaged in oral arguments, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Hine.22 Because we believe that Hine controls the outcome of this case, we discuss it in some detail.
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...by MRE 404(b)(1) because it was probative of something other than defendant's propensity to commit the crime. People v. Knox, 256 Mich.App. 175, 183, 662 N.W.2d 482 (2003). Additionally, defendant argues that the evidence should have been excluded under MRE 403, which states, "Although rele......
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People v. Knox
...the value parties opposing prior-bad-acts evidence once derived from the first and third prongs of the VanderVliet test," 256 Mich.App. at 188-189, 662 N.W.2d 482 Hine merely applied the rule that prior bad acts evidence that is probative of something other than the defendant's character or......