People v. Jones

Decision Date30 November 1984
Docket NumberNo. 59487,59487
Citation472 N.E.2d 455,104 Ill.2d 268,84 Ill.Dec. 495
Parties, 84 Ill.Dec. 495 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Constance R. JONES et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, John X. Breslin, Deputy Director, Patricia Hartmann, Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Ottawa (John A. Barra, State's Atty., Peoria, of counsel), for appellant.

Kenneth E. North, Solomon, Rosenfeld, Elliott, Stiefel & Glovka, Ltd., Chicago, for appellees.

RYAN, Chief Justice:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Peoria County, defendants Constance Jones, Diane (Cerami) Lanken, Jonathon Cray and James Knobloch were convicted of conspiracy to commit gambling. Defendants Jones and Lanken were also convicted of syndicated gambling. Also convicted, but not parties to this appeal, were codefendants Donald and Lois Sanders. Several issues were presented to the appellate court for review; however, that court reversed the convictions, ruling only that the trial court erred by denying the defendants' pretrial motion for discharge for violation of their right to a speedy trial. (119 Ill.App.3d 883, 75 Ill.Dec. 289, 457 N.E.2d 79.) We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. The sole issue before us is whether the defendants were denied their right to a speedy trial.

In deciding this issue we must determine which, if any, of the several periods of delay were occasioned by the defendants or by an interlocutory appeal and thus cannot be counted in determining whether the defendants were tried within 160 days of their demand for trial (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b)). Section 103-5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, in pertinent part, provides:

"Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried * * * within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, * * * or by an interlocutory appeal." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 103-5(b).)

This section, sometimes referred to as the speedy-trial statute, implements the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 8.) The statute is to be liberally construed, with each case being decided on its own facts. (People v. Reimolds (1982), 92 Ill.2d 101, 106, 65 Ill.Dec. 17, 440 N.E.2d 872.) While it was the State's duty to bring the defendants to trial within the statutory period, it was the defendants' burden on a motion for discharge to affirmatively establish a violation of their right to a speedy trial. People v. Reimolds (1982), 92 Ill.2d 101, 106, 65 Ill.Dec. 17, 440 N.E.2d 872.

In the present case, the defendants were arrested on April 29, 1981, after Peoria police infiltrated an "investment meeting" which was believed to be, in reality, an alternative to a "pyramid game." The defendants were released on bond. They were indicted on May 12, 1981, and filed their motion for trial on May 21, 1981.

A total of 465 days elapsed between the filing of the defendants' speedy-trial motion on May 21, 1981, and defendants' trial on August 30, 1982. We need only examine three periods of delay to reach our conclusion that the defendants were not denied their right to a speedy trial.

On May 21, 1981, the day that the defendants demanded trial, they also filed motions to dismiss and to quash the indictment. Also, on June 4, 1981, the defendants again filed a motion to quash the indictment, a motion to suppress evidence, and other motions. On June 17, 1981, the defendants moved for a continuance, and, by agreement, hearings on the pending motions were set for July 9, 1981. On that date hearings on the May 21 and June 4 motions commenced and were continued to July 23, 1981. The hearings on the May 21 and June 4 motions concluded on July 24, at which time the judge orally stated that he would allow the motion to suppress the evidence. He also ruled on certain other motions at that time. From the discussion had by the court with counsel following the announcement of the court's ruling, it is clear that the court contemplated that a written order embodying his holding on the motion to suppress be prepared and entered.

Supreme Court Rule 271 provides:

"When the court rules upon a motion other than in the course of trial, the attorney for the prevailing party shall prepare and present to the court the order or judgment to be entered, unless the court directs otherwise." (87 Ill.2d R. 271.)

The ruling by the court on the motion to suppress was not a final judgment, but was a ruling on a motion other than in the course of trial. Therefore, Rule 271 applies, and pursuant to that rule, it was incumbent upon the attorney for the prevailing party, in this case the defendants, to prepare and present to the court the order to be entered, unless the court directed otherwise. Although the oral ruling on the motion to suppress the evidence was made on July 24, 1981, no written order on this ruling was signed until November 6, 1981.

The first period of delay to be examined is the period between the filing of the May 21, 1981, motions and the June 4, 1981, motion to suppress the evidence, and the date the written order on these motions, including the order suppressing evidence, was signed, November 6, 1981. This period involved 169 days. There are several questions of law that must be decided in determining whether these 169 days, or any part thereof, constitute delay chargeable to the defendants. The November 6, 1981, signed order had written thereon, "nunc pro tunc 7-24-81."

Before deciding whether all or any part of the period between May 21, 1981, and November 6, 1981, is chargeable to the defendants, we must discuss some factual matters which have caused some confusion. Following the pronouncement of the oral ruling allowing the motion to suppress on July 24, 1981, the State, on August 13, 1981, filed a notice of appeal from that ruling which was docketed in the appellate court for the third district as case number 81-487. Following the entry of the written order on November 6, 1981, nunc pro tunc July 24, 1981, the State filed another notice of appeal from the written order. This notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 1981, and was docketed in the appellate court for the third district as case number 81-661. Several motions were filed by the defendants urging that both appeals be dismissed. It is unnecessary to detail the proceedings in the appellate court with regard to these motions. It is sufficient to note that on January 20, 1982, the appellate court dismissed both appeals. The court's mandate was issued on February 10, 1982, and was filed in the circuit court of Peoria County on February 16, 1982.

The notice of appeal filed August 13, 1981, was premature and did not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court. Rule 271 (87 Ill.2d R. 271) is applicable to rulings on motions and requires that a written order be presented to the court for signature. Also, the conversation between the court and counsel when the oral ruling was made clearly indicates that a signed order suppressing the evidence was contemplated. The judge's oral pronouncement on July 24, 1981, was not an order from which an appeal could be taken. (See People ex rel. Person v. Miller (1977), 56 Ill.App.3d 450, 459-60, 13 Ill.Dec. 920, 371 N.E.2d 1012.) Our appellate court has, on several occasions, held that a notice of appeal filed after an oral ruling, but before the filing of a written order, is premature and confers no jurisdiction on the appellate court. People v. Eddington (1978), 64 Ill.App.3d 650, 654, 21 Ill.Dec. 508, 381 N.E.2d 835; People v. Boston (1975), 27 Ill.App.3d 246, 248, 327 N.E.2d 40; People v. Deaton (1974), 16 Ill.App.3d 748, 749, 306 N.E.2d 695.

It is not clear why the November 6 order was entered nunc pro tunc July 24, 1981. In any event, a notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 1981, within 30 days after the entry of the written order. The effective date of this order may have related back to July 24, 1981, by virtue of the nunc pro tunc provision. We need not decide that question in this case. However, the order was entered on November 6, 1981. Rule 606(b) (87 Ill.2d R. 606(b)) provides that the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from. For purpose of determining the timeliness of the appeal, the order was entered on November 6, 1981, and the notice of appeal filed November 9, 1981, conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court.

A delay occasioned by motions by a defendant is ordinarily chargeable to the defendant. Thus, the delay occasioned by a motion to dismiss an indictment has been held to be chargeable to the defendant. (People v. DeStefano (1966), 35 Ill.2d 261, 220 N.E.2d 220.) Also, a delay caused by a motion to suppress evidence has been held to be delay caused by the defendant. (People v. Donalson (1976), 64 Ill.2d 536, 539-42, 1 Ill.Dec. 494, 356 N.E.2d 776.) Thus the delay between the filing of the motion to dismiss and quash the indictment on May 21, 1981, the motion to suppress filed on June 4, 1981, and the date that the oral ruling on these motions was made by the court on July 24, 1981, is chargeable to the defendant.

An order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence is required by section 114-12(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 114-12(e)) to state the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the order or judgment is based. As noted above, Rule 271 (87 Ill.2d R. 271) requires that the prevailing party on such a motion prepare and present the written order to the court. The delay between the oral pronouncement stating that the motion to suppress is allowed and the filing of the written order suppressing the evidence therefore is ordinarily delay chargeable to the defendant. In People v. Eddington (1978...

To continue reading

Request your trial
57 cases
  • People v. Bragg
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 29, 1995
    ...violated this statute. (People v. Smith (1993), 251 Ill.App.3d 839, 842, 191 Ill.Dec. 267, 623 N.E.2d 857; People v. Jones (1984), 104 Ill.2d 268, 280, 84 Ill.Dec. 495, 472 N.E.2d 455.) We will not disturb a trial court's attribution of delay to a given party absent a clear abuse of discret......
  • People v. Lyles
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 19, 1985
    ...The defendant also has the primary obligation of calling up his motion for hearing and disposition. (People v. Jones (1984), 104 Ill.2d 268, 278-80, 84 Ill.Dec. 495, 472 N.E.2d 455; People v. Terry (1975), 61 Ill.2d 593, 596, 338 N.E.2d 162.) The trial judge acted within the scope of his di......
  • People v. Kliner
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1998
    ...in making his proof, the defendant must show that the delay was not attributable to his own conduct. See People v. Jones, 104 Ill.2d 268, 280, 84 Ill.Dec. 495, 472 N.E.2d 455 (1984). Any period of delay occasioned by the defendant temporarily suspends the running of the speedy-trial period ......
  • People v. Hall
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 26, 2000
    ...necessarily coextensive. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d 81, 114, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850 (1998); People v. Jones, 104 Ill.2d 268, 286, 84 Ill.Dec. 495, 472 N.E.2d 455 (1984). Defendant here asserts only a violation of his statutory right to a speedy Under the speedy-trial statute, a ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT