People v. Jones, 101996.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 101996.,101996. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael JONES, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin and Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Paula Borg, Alan J. Spellberg and Mary P. Needham, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Yasaman Hannah Navai, Assistant Appellate Defender, of Office of State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.
After a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Michael Jones was convicted of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The court sentenced him to two years' imprisonment and imposed several monetary charges on him as part of his imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and affirmed his sentence of imprisonment, but held that one of the monetary charges assessed on defendant was unconstitutional and that several of the other charges were satisfied by a credit to which defendant was entitled because of his presentencing incarceration. No. 1-04-3117 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Because the appellate court's decision declared a statute of this state unconstitutional, we granted the State an appeal as of right. 210 Ill.2d R. 317.
Defendant does not, in a cross-appeal, challenge his conviction or his sentence of imprisonment, and thus this appeal only involves issues arising from monetary charges imposed by the circuit court on defendant. For this reason, we need not dwell long on the facts underlying defendant's conviction. We note briefly that Chicago police officers arrested defendant during a routine narcotics surveillance. The arrest occurred after the officers observed defendant throw to the ground an object, later established to contain 0.4 grams of heroin. Defendant, charged originally with one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, was found guilty, after a bench trial, of the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance.
At sentencing, defendant received a two-year sentence of imprisonment. The circuit court also imposed several charges on defendant. A form in the record lists the "fines, fees, assessments, penalties, and reimbursements" imposed by the court on defendant. They total $1,224. The following boxes are marked on the form:
"Costs and Fees
Felony Complaint Filed-Clerk * * * $ 190
Felony Complaint Conviction-State's
Attorney * * * $ 60
Preliminary Hearing-State's Attorney * * * $ 20
* * *
State DNA ID System * * * $ 200
Violent Crime Victim Assistance * * * $ 20
Criminal/Traffic Conviction
Surcharge-Additional Penalty * * * $ 4
Automation-Clerk * * * $ 5
Document Storage-Clerk * * * $ 5
Court Services-Sheriff * * * $ 15
* * *
Controlled Substance/
Cannabis/Hypodermic Needles Offenses
* * *
Assessment Controlled Substance * * * $ 500
* * *
Crime Lab Drug Analysis-Northern * * * $ 100
Trauma Fund * * * $ 100
Trauma Fund Spinal Cord * * * $ 5
* * *
TOTAL * * * $ 1224"
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence of imprisonment, but modified the costs and fees order against defendant to reflect a credit of $604 against the $4 "Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge-Additional Penalty" (see 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004)), the $500 "Assessment Controlled Substance" (see 720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(4) (West 2004)), and the $100 charge marked "Trauma Fund" (see 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2004)). No. 1-04-3117 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court held that these charges were all "fines" and were thus wiped out by the credit to which defendant was entitled for his presentence incarceration. See 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (West 2004). The appellate court also struck from the order the $5 charge for "Trauma Fund Spinal Cord" (see 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004)). This charge, the court held, violated defendant's substantive due process rights.
In its analysis the appellate court drew heavily on People v. Rodriguez, 362 Ill. App.3d 44, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543 (2005), and People v. Fort, 362 Ill.App.3d 1, 298 Ill.Dec. 417, 839 N.E.2d 1064 (2005). Decided mere weeks apart, these two decisions contain the analytical underpinning of the appellate court's analysis of all of the statutory issues raised in the instant case. Because Rodriguez and Fort were so critical to the decision of the appellate court in the instant case, we briefly summarize them.
Rodriguez was the first case to address a defendant's due process challenge to the $5 charge payable to the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund (the Spinal Cord Paralysis charge), imposed by section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004)). The court first addressed whether the charge constituted a "fine" or a "fee." Rodriguez, 362 Ill. App.3d at 48-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. The court concluded that the charge was a fee, based on the plain language of the statute so labeling it. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. The court acknowledged that the legislature was not always rigorous about labeling charges fines and fees. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543 (). The court also considered the State's argument that the legislature intended the charge to be a fine because it was placed within article 9 of chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, which is entitled "Fines," and because it was imposed on only defendants who have been convicted. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. However, the court noted that other charges which were clearly fees were imposed on convicted defendants under article 9. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. Accordingly, the court saw no reason to look beyond the plain language of the statute, and held that the charge was a fee. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 51-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. Because of this, the court held that it need not address "whether the use of the proceeds of a fine must bear a reasonable relationship to the offense for which the fine is imposed." Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 49, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543.
The court proceeded to analyze the constitutionality of the charge as a fee. The court held that for purposes of rational-relation due process analysis, the offense of possession of a controlled substance bore no rational relationship to spinal cord injury or research. After reviewing this court's precedent, including Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill.2d 142, 272 Ill. Dec. 600, 787 N.E.2d 786 (2003), People v. Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989), and Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill.2d 444, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984), the court concluded that mere possession of a controlled substance was too remote from spinal cord injury to support requiring persons convicted of the former to fund research into the latter. The court acknowledged but rejected the State's argument that the legislature "could have found that the possession of a controlled substance is related to driving under the influence of a controlled substance and that driving under the influence of a controlled substance causes automobile accidents, which are the primary cause of spinal cord injuries." Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 54, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543. The court stated that although this reasoning could have supported the legislature's decision to impose a $5 fee earmarked for the Spinal Cord Paralysis fund on defendants convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (see 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-7) (West 2004)), the instant statute imposed the fee for mere possession, which does not require or involve the use of a motor vehicle, and was therefore too remote. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 54, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543.
Presiding Justice Quinn dissented. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 54-55, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543 (Quinn, P.J., dissenting). He noted that a court has a responsibility to construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality if it is reasonably possible to do so, and observed that the majority seemed to have implicitly admitted that section 5-9-1.1(c) would be constitutional if the $5 charge imposed therein was a fine. Rodriguez, 362 Ill. App.3d at 55, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543 (Quinn, P.J., dissenting). Justice Quinn would have found section 5-9-1.1 ambiguous, based on its location within article 9 of chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections-entitled "Fines"—as well as the fact that the charge was imposed only on those convicted of a felony drug offense. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 55, 298 Ill. Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543 (Quinn, P.J., dissenting). Justice Quinn believed that the charge could reasonably be construed as a fine, and argued that the court had the obligation to so construe it. Rodriguez, 362 Ill.App.3d at 55, 298 Ill.Dec. 220, 839 N.E.2d 543 (Quinn, P.J., dissenting).
Fort also considered the constitutionality of section 5-9-1.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004)). However, Fort did not add to the analysis of Rodriguez. Rather, the court quoted the discussion from Rodriguez noted above, concerning the lack of relationship between spinal cord injury and simple possession of a controlled...
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