People v. Ruiz

• Citation: 417 P.3d 191,4 Cal.5th 1100,232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714
• Decision Date: 17 May 2018
• Docket Number: S235556
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Feliz Corral RUIZ II, Defendant and Appellant.

4 Cal.5th 1100

417 P.3d 191

232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Feliz Corral RUIZ II, Defendant and Appellant.

S235556

Supreme Court of California.

Filed May 17, 2018

Elizabeth Campbell, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein, Rachelle Newcomb and Peter H. Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

We granted review in this case to determine whether imposing a criminal laboratory analysis fee ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.5, subd. (a) ) and a drug program fee ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a) ) is appropriate for a conviction of conspiracy to transport a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 11379, subdivision (a).¹ The Court of Appeal answered this question in the affirmative based on Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a), which provides in relevant part that persons convicted of conspiring to commit a felony "shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony." In light of this provision, the court reasoned, because these fees must be imposed for a conviction of transporting a controlled substance, they must also be imposed for a conviction of conspiracy to transport a controlled substance. We agree with the Court of Appeal and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to judicially authorized wiretapping, law enforcement officers heard defendant Feliz Corral Ruiz II, who is a member of a Norteño street gang, conspiring to shoot and kill members of another gang in retaliation for the shooting of a Norteño gang member. On July 28, 2012, several Norteño gang members shot at an apartment complex where members of the other gang were known to gather, hitting one person in the chest and another in the leg. In connection with these events, the People filed an information charging defendant with, among other crimes, conspiracy to transport a controlled substance in violation of section 11379, subdivision (a). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to this charge. As part of his sentence, the court imposed a $50 "criminal laboratory analysis fee" pursuant to section 11372.5, subdivision (a), and a $100 "drug program fee" pursuant to section 11372.7, subdivision (a).

On appeal, defendant argued that these fees were "unauthorized"—and should therefore be stricken—because: (1) he was convicted, not of a drug offense specified in the statutes establishing the fees, but of conspiracy to commit one of the specified offenses; and (2) the fees are not "punishment" for purposes of the conspiracy sentencing statute— Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a) —which provides that persons convicted of conspiring to commit a felony "shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony." (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that the fees constitute "punishment" within the meaning of Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a). We granted defendant’s petition for review to consider this conclusion.²

DISCUSSION

Section 11372.5, subdivision (a), establishes a $50 "criminal laboratory analysis fee" for persons "convicted of a violation of" specified statutes relating to drugs, including section 11379. Section 11372.7, subdivision (a), establishes a "drug program fee," not to exceed $150, for persons "convicted of a violation of" chapter 6 of division 10 of the Health and Safety Code, which includes section 11379. However, defendant was convicted, not of violating section 11379, but of conspiring to violate that statute, in violation of Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a)(1), which makes it a crime for persons to "conspire" to "commit any crime." Because, as defendant argues and the People concede, neither fee statute refers to persons convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime, neither statute alone authorizes imposition of a fee for defendant’s conspiracy conviction.

Instead, the parties, like the Court of Appeal, focus on the sanctions provision of the conspiracy statute, which states in relevant part that persons convicted of conspiring to commit a felony "shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony." ( Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a).) Based on this language, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the dispositive question is whether the fees at issue "constitute[ ] ‘punishment,’ " and it concluded that each fee does constitute "punishment."

Defendant agrees with the court’s statement of the dispositive question—whether the fees constitute punishment—but he disagrees with the court’s answer, arguing that the charges constitute, not punishment, but "nonpunitive administrative fee[s] ... used to offset the costs of drug and crime labs." In response, the People first assert, quoting from our decision in People v. Athar (2005) 36 Cal.4th 396, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 570, 114 P.3d 806 ( Athar ), that because Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a), " ‘requires sentencing to the same extent as the underlying target offense,’ " the trial court properly imposed the fees "regardless of [their] nature" and whether they are "punitive is irrelevant." The People alternatively assert that, "[e]ven if characterization of the fees is" relevant, both fees "constitute punishment" and were thus "properly imposed."

In evaluating these opposing positions, our "fundamental task ... is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]" ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) "Because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning." ( Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672, 63 P.3d 228 ; see also Pen. Code, § 4 [provisions of Penal Code "are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect [the Penal Code’s] objects and to promote justice"].) "If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history." ( Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1107, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 738, 264 P.3d 579.)

Insofar as the People appear to assert that it is irrelevant whether the fees constitute punishment, their argument runs afoul of these rules of statutory construction. As noted above, subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 182 states in relevant part that persons convicted of conspiring to commit a felony "shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony." (Italics added.) The plain meaning of this language appears to establish that a consequence prescribed for the offense a defendant conspired to commit—the underlying target offense—may be imposed for a conspiracy conviction only if that consequence constitutes part of "the punishment" for the underlying target offense. (Ibid .) Thus, under the plain language of Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a), whether the trial court properly imposed the fees at issue here depends on whether they are part of "the punishment" for the offense that defendant was convicted of conspiring to commit. (See People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 865, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 69 P.3d 446 ["Because" Pen. Code, § 182"refers generally to the punishment prescribed for murder in the first degree, it incorporates whatever punishment the law prescribed for first degree murder when the conspiracy was committed"]; In re Romano (1966) 64 Cal.2d 826, 829, 51 Cal.Rptr. 910, 415 P.2d 798 ["punishment for conspiracy to commit a felony is the same as the punishment for the felony itself"]; People v. Superior Court (Kirby ) (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 102, 105, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 440 [language of Pen. Code, § 182"leads us to the statutes that ... set forth the applicable punishments for" the underlying target offense].) The People point to no ambiguity in the statutory language or anything in the legislative history that undermines this plain meaning construction.

Instead, as noted above, the People rely on our decision in Athar , but that decision does not support their argument. There, we held that sentence enhancements prescribed for a money laundering conviction apply to offenders convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering. ( Athar , supra , 36 Cal.4th at p. 398, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 570, 114 P.3d 806.) As the People observe, toward the end of the opinion, we stated that Penal Code section 182"requires sentencing to the same extent as the underlying target offense." ( Id . at p. 406, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 570, 114 P.3d 806.) However, we made this statement in the context of endorsing People v. Villela (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 54, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 253 insofar as it looked to whether a prescribed consequence for the underlying target offense "was a punishment" to determine if Penal Code section 182 required imposition of that consequence for conspiring to commit that offense. ( Athar , at p. 406, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 570, 114 P.3d 806.) Moreover, earlier in the opinion, in rejecting the argument that Penal Code section 182 authorizes imposition only of "the base term" for the underlying target offense, we explained: "The statute specifically refers to the ‘punishment of that felony’ [citation] and thus includes all punishment for money laundering, including enhancements." ( Id . at p. 405, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 570, 114 P.3d 806, italics added.) Notably, the defendant in Athar conceded...