People v. Kanar, 83.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1946
• Docket Number: No. 83.,83.
• Citation: 22 N.W.2d 359,314 Mich. 242
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KANAR.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

314 Mich. 242

22 N.W.2d 359

PEOPLE

v.KANAR.

No. 83.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 1, 1946.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, Criminal Division; Theodore J. Richter, Judge.

Walter Kanar was convicted for a conspiracy to obstruct justice, and he appeals.

Judgment set aside and case remanded for new trial.

Before the Entire Bench.

William Cohen and Morris Luskin, both of Detroit, for appellant.

John R. Dethmers, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CARR, Justice.

Defendant Kanar was tried in circuit court before a jury on an information containing two counts, each charging conspiracy to obstruct justice. The first count alleged that on January 17, 1939, and at other times between said date and August 21, 1941, defendant and other named defendants conspired together and with persons unknown, wilfully and corruptly, to assist and enable the maintenance and operation of houses of ill fame and gambling establishments in the city of Hamtramck in violation of the laws of the State of Michigan and the ordinances of the city. The second count incorporated the material portions of the first, further alleging the unlawful purpose on the part of the alleged conspirators to procure the wilful and corrupt failure and neglect on the part of defendant Kanar and other named defendants, who were police officers of the city, to perform their respective official duties in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State and of the city in relation to prostitution and gambling. The second count further alleged that as a result of said conspiracy certain houses of ill fame and gambling establishments were operated within the city; and that gifts and gratuities were presented to said public officers, and accepted by them, by way of consideration for the unlawful agreement.

It appears from the record that one of the defendants named in the information, Isadore Green, pleaded guilty and his plea was accepted. The case was dismissed as to certain other defendants, with the result that defendant Kanar was tried alone. At the conclusion of the proofs, a motion for directed verdict in his favor was made and denied. Thereupon a motion was submitted to require the prosecutor to elect on which count of the information he would proceed, and this motion was also denied. The case was submitted to the jury on both counts and a verdict of guilty returned on each. Sentence was pronounced in accordance with the verdict.

On behalf of defendant a motion for a new trial was submitted to the trial court. Said motion was denied but the court on its own action vacated the sentence and set aside the verdict of guilty on the second count on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submitting to the jury the question of defendant's guilt under said count. Sentence was then imposed on the first count and defendant has appealed.

On behalf of appellant it is contended that conviction on the first count should be set aside, and defendant discharged, on the ground that the competent evidence of guilt on the trial was insufficient to warrant submitting the case to the jury and, consequently, insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. In view of the uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution any claim that a conspiracy, as charged in the first count, was not shown, would be clearly untenable. It is insisted, however, that the prosecution failed to establish, by the requisite degree of proof, that defendant Kanar was a party to the conspiracy, or that he took any part whatsoever in furthering its purposes.

On behalf of the people it is argued that the evidence offered on the trial clearly established appellant's connection with and participation in the conspiracy, that the facts and circumstances disclosed negatived any hypothesis of innocence on his part, and that his acts, statements and conduct generally, interpreted in the light of his relations with certain other alleged conspirators, named as defendants in the information, and whose guilt is, on the record, not open to question, established appellant's connection with the offense of which he has been convicted.

Particular emphasis is placed on evidence tending to show close association between appellant and Michael Figurski, who was, the proofs indicate, the central figure in the making and carrying out of the conspiracy charged. Figurski was not an officer of the city but the record indicates that he had some measure of political influence, sufficient at least to impress other conspirators with whom he dealt. It is the theory of the people that defendant Kanar became connected with the conspiracy through his relations with Figurski and that his participation was carried on quite largely through Figurski.

Appellant was appointed mayor of Hamtramck in January of 1939 to fill a vacancy then existing in that office. Subsequently, he was elected. It appears from the testimony of Figurski that prior to appellant's appointment he (appellant) sought the support of Figurski, whom he knew and who had been a contributor to his political campaigns. We quote from Figurski's testimony:

‘I recall the early part of January, 1939, when Dr. Tenerowicz had left the city and gone to Washington to take his seat in the United States Congress. At that time, while Dr. Tenerowicz was in Washington, I had a conversation with Walter Kanar about Walter's going to Washington. I can't tell you the dates, but it was somewhere in that time. I don't remember where this discussion took place. We were at a bathhouse on Oakland Avenue, and I guess that is where it took place. He told me if there was going to be any money made, well, it would be just as much convenient for him as it would be for me. I gave him either $300 or $400 at that time. After he got this money, he went to Washington. That is what he told me.’

The witness further testified to conversations between himself and defendant Kanar with reference to the appointment of a chief of police and also with reference to permitting certain gambling operations. Such testimony indicates that defendant knew that efforts were being made to permit various illegal businesses of the characterreferred to in the information to operate within the city of Hamtramck. Along this line Isadore Green, who was one of the defendants in the case and who pleaded guilty, testified that he talked with defendant on two or three occasions, insisting that he should be allowed to operate a gambling establishment because he had supported defendant in the election, and was finally told by defendant to see Figurski. The witness further testified that he went to Figurski twice and on the second occasion was told that he (Figurski) had orders to allow Green to operate, which Green then proceeded to do without interference by police officers.

It is in evidence that on April 1, 1939, certain houses of ill fame and gambling establishments were permitted to open. About that time Figurski collected $3,000 from Thomas Bradley and Elik Gell, both of whom are named as defendants in the information. With reference to such facts Figurski testified:

‘I went and told Kanar I had this money. I told him I promoted this money and he asked me how much of that money I thought I should get. Well, I thought-I left that to him, so he offered me $200, and I told him that $200 wasn't quite enough for me, I thought I should get more, and we talked back and forth, and then he finally agreed I should take $400. We kept talking back and forth, and he says-well, he wanted me to take two hundred, and then finally he agreed with me on $400. Before that, I wouldn't take $200, and I told him I thought I should get more. When I said I wanted more, he mentioned the name of Alex Gell; he said he could get Alex Gell to do it for nothing. I didn't say anything. We just argued back and forth, and then he agreed that I could keep $400.

‘Q. So you kept $400 and there were $2600-A. When he says I could keep the $400, then he asked me where I got the money. I told him that I had the $1,000 from Tom Bradley and $2,000 from Alex Gell, and when I told him that, he refused to take the money.’

Figurski further testified that he gave the money in question to Henry Kanar, defendant's brother. The testimony above quoted indicates that defendant Kanar raised no objection when advised by Figurski that the latter had ‘promoted’ the sum of $3,000. It is a fair inference, also, that Figurski took the money to defendant for the purpose of delivering most of it to him, after deducting what he considered a reasonable amount for himself. It is significant that the discussion between these two men had reference to the amount that Figurski was to keep; it was not until defendant was advised that Bradley and Gell had paid the money that he gave any indication that he would not accept it.

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