People v. King

• Decision Date: 12 December 1952
• Parties: 115 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875 PEOPLE v. KING. C. A. 175244. Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Diego County, California
• Court: California Superior Court

Page 78

252 P.2d 78

115 Cal.App.2d Supp. 875

PEOPLE v. KING.

C. A. 175244.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Diego County, California.

Dec. 12, 1952.

J. F. DuPaul, City Atty., Robert T. Sjogren, Deputy City Atty., San Diego, for appellant.

Edgar B. Hervey and James Edgar Hervey, San Diego, for respondent.

GLEN, Judge.

Defendant was charged with violating Section 33.1541.1 of the San Diego Municipal Code prohibiting any female employee in any on-sale liquor establishment licensed under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act from drinking, dancing or mingling with any patron of such establishment.

It was specifically charged in the complaint that defendant, a female employee, 'did unlawfully mingle with a patron of the Barbett Cafe.'

In sustaining the demurrer the trial court in effect ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional as being too vague, indefinite and uncertain.

In determining the question of the alleged uncertainty and ambiguity of the word 'mingle' one must keep in mind the evil sought to be regulated by the ordinance. No one has an inherent right to engage in the business of the sale of intoxicating liquor. Such business may be entirely prohibited or permitted under close supervision, and the manner and the extent of regulation rests in the sound discretion of the legislative authority.

The obvious purpose of the ordinance under consideration is to prevent female employees from improprieties and immoral acts likely to result from intimate familiarity of the sexes in liquor establishments. It is plain enough that drinking with patrons or dancing with patrons would tend to encourage improprieties and there are, no doubt, many intimate acts of association too numerous to specifically prohibit by statute which would tend to encourage improprieties by female employees and patrons.

Under the broad legislative power females may be, and in some cases are entirely prohibited from working in establishments dispensing intoxicating drinks to patrons. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620; Ex parte Hayes, 98 Cal. 555, 33 P. 337, 20 L.R.A. 701; People v. Jemnez, 49 Cal.App.2d Supp. 739, 121 P.2d 543.

The rule that a legislative enactment will be inoperative if the courts cannot give it a definite meaning is especially applicable to criminal cases for the reason that a fair warning should be given in ordinary language of what will be criminal conduct under given circumstances, even though it is not likely that persons will carefully consider the context before violating the statutes. It would be dangerous practice for the legislature to set out a large enough net to trap all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to say who should be held and who should be set free. Such practice would substitute the courts for the legislative department of government. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840.

There are numerous rules of construction to guide courts interpreting doubtful language in statutes. See 23 Cal.Jur. page 719 et seq. Generally, some definite meaning must be given to words used to give them effect and the legislative intent is to be gathered from the whole act rather than from isolated words. Words will, when possible, be given a reasonable but not a strained construction and every statute should be construed with reference to its purpose and the objects intended to be accomplished by it and the evils to be cured. If words are given their ordinary popular significance and are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty the courts need not look further. Words used in a statute should receive sensible construction in accordance with their commonly understood meaning. See People v. Pallares, 112 Cal.App.2d Supp. 895, 246 P.2d 173.

Is the word 'mingle' as used in the ordinance here under consideration so indefinite and uncertain that it does not advise a female employee what she may or may not do under the statute? We think not. It would be next to impossible for the legislature to define, with precise nicety, all acts of a waitress in a liquor establishment that may lead to improprieties and tend to encourage the evil sought to be cured by the ordinance. If the word 'mingle' is construed in context with other words of the section in which it is found, it is apparent that the ordinance is concerned with improper conduct between patrons and employees and the extent of the impropriety depends upon the facts in each case. It thus becomes a mixed question of law and fact.

Many dictionary definitions of the word 'mingle' may be found.

Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, page 1580:

II. i. 1. To be or become mixed, united, or closely joined; put oneself in familiar relation; intermingle; participate; as, to mingle with a crowd or in a dance.

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