People v. King
| Decision Date | 05 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 94 KA 20-00330 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. ALVIN KING, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.) |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (SUSAN M. NORMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (BRADLEY W. OASTLER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, BANNISTER, MONTOUR, AND OGDEN, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Gordon J. Cuffy, A.J.), rendered February 20, 2020. The judgment convicted defendant upon a jury verdict of assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, endangering the welfare of a child (two counts) menacing in the second degree (two counts), menacing a police officer or peace officer and resisting arrest.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is reversed on the law, that part of the motion dated January 27, 2020 seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 is granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]), arising from a series of events during which defendant, among other things, stabbed his estranged wife several times. In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals by permission of this Court from an order denying his motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment in appeal No. 1.
Defendant was initially charged by felony and misdemeanor complaints on September 5, 2018, and later charged with various offenses by indictment filed March 14, 2019, on which date the People first announced readiness for trial. The matter then proceeded with pretrial discovery and plea negotiations, the latter of which were ultimately unsuccessful, and trial was eventually scheduled to commence on January 27, 2020. In the meantime, the new discovery requirements embodied in CPL article 245 and other reforms related thereto became effective on January 1, 2020.
On the morning of the first day of trial as scheduled, defendant moved in writing for an order, inter alia, dismissing the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 on the ground that the People were not ready for trial within the applicable time period because, contrary to CPL 245.50 as then in effect, the People had failed to serve and file the requisite certificate of compliance with their discovery obligations. The People thereafter purportedly attempted to serve upon defendant, and may have sought to file with Supreme Court, a certificate of compliance. Following argument on the issue, the court denied that part of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the indictment, reasoning that the People were not required to abide by the newly effective discovery obligations under CPL article 245 and related speedy trial requirements under CPL 30.30 because they had already announced readiness under the prior law and the statutory changes were not made "retroactive."
Defendant now contends in appeal No. 1 that the court erred in denying that part of his motion seeking to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 because, upon the effective date of CPL article 245, the People were returned to a state of unreadiness, and the People's subsequent attempt to serve and file a certificate of compliance did not occur until after the time to declare trial readiness had expired. We agree.
By way of relevant background, in April 2019, as part of a suite of criminal justice reforms, the legislature amended the speedy trial provisions of CPL 30.30 (see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part KKK) and repealed CPL former article 240 and replaced it with CPL article 245 (see L 2019, ch 59, § 1, part LLL), all of which was made effective on January 1, 2020 (see generally People v Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d 199, 203 [2022]; People v Elmore, 211 A.D.3d 1536, 1537 [4th Dept 2022]). Thus, "[d]iscovery in criminal actions is now governed by the new CPL article 245, which... provides for 'automatic' disclosure by the People to the defendant of 'all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case' that are in the People's possession or control" (People v Bonifacio, 179 A.D.3d 977, 977-978 [2d Dept 2020], quoting CPL 245.20 [1]). Following amendments not material to our analysis, CPL article 245 currently provides that, "[w]hen the prosecution has provided the discovery required by [CPL 245.20 (1)]" with certain exceptions not relevant here, the People must "serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance" (CPL 245.50 [1]). In the certificate of compliance, the People are required to "state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery" and to "identify the items provided" (id.). Critically, the statute ties the People's adherence to their discovery obligations and the corresponding certificate of compliance requirement to their trial readiness by providing that, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law, absent an individualized finding of special circumstances in the instant case by the court before which the charge is pending, the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of [CPL] 30.30... until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to [CPL 245.50 (1)]" (CPL 245.50 [3]; see CPL 30.30 [5]; People v Brown, 214 A.D.3d 823, 824 [2d Dept 2023]).
With respect to the applicability of the reforms to pending prosecutions, it is well established that, when an action is "already pending," a newly enacted statute that effects a procedural change "is applicable even then if directed to the litigation in future steps and stages"; however, the statute "is inapplicable, unless in exceptional conditions, where the effect is to reach backward, and nullify by relation the things already done" (Matter of Berkovitz v Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 NY 261, 270 [1921]). Consequently, "while procedural changes are, in the absence of words of exclusion, deemed applicable to subsequent proceedings in pending actions..., it takes a clear expression of the legislative purpose to justify a retrospective application of even a procedural statute so as to affect proceedings previously taken in such actions" (Simonson v International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 289 [1964] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v McFadden, 189 A.D.3d 2086, 2087 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1099 [2021]). Applying those principles, courts, including this Court, have determined that "[t]he relevant provisions of CPL 30.30 and CPL article 245 constituted such [procedural] changes and, as such, applied to proceedings taken in [pending] matter[s] after January 1, 2020" (People v Robbins, 206 A.D.3d 1069, 1071 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 942 [2022]; see Elmore, 211 A.D.3d at 1537; People v Hewitt, 201 A.D.3d 1041, 1042-1043 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 928 [2022]; see also Brown, 214 A.D.3d at 824; People v Torres, 205 A.D.3d 524, 525-526 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 942 [2022]). Stated differently, "the procedures outlined in CPL article 245 became applicable to [pending] action[s] as soon as that article became effective" (Elmore, 211 A.D.3d at 1537).
The People and the dissent nonetheless assert, consistent with the court's reasoning in denying that part of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the indictment, that the People did not need to abide by the newly effective discovery obligations under CPL article 245 and related speedy trial provisions under CPL 30.30-most prominently the certificate of compliance requirement-because mandating compliance with the statutory changes in pending actions would improperly require "retroactive" application of the reforms and nullify acts previously taken by the People. We reject those assertions.
First contrary to the People's assertion, we conclude that the Court of Appeals' decision in Galindo does not govern the outcome here. There, "[t]he issue presented on... appeal [was] whether CPL 30.30 (1) (e), added to the speedy trial statute and made effective while [the] defendant's direct appeal was pending before the Appellate Term, applie[d] to his case" (Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d at 201). The subject amendment to CPL 30.30 provided-in abrogation of the previous interpretation of the statute that excluded traffic infractions from the criminal action subject to dismissal on statutory speedy trial grounds-that the maximum times for prosecutorial readiness would now apply to accusatory instruments charging traffic infractions jointly with a felony, misdemeanor, or violation (see Galindo, 38 N.Y.3d at 201-206). The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the Appellate Term had erred in applying the amendment retroactively on appeal to a prosecution that had been commenced and taken to judgment several years before the effective date of the criminal justice reforms (see id. at 201-202, 206-208). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the text of the amendment did not require retroactive application of the statute and that the legislative delays in abrogating the prior decades-old rule and postponing the effective date of the amendment weighed against retroactive application (see id. at 207). In sum, "there [was] no indication of legislative urgency for CPL 30.30 (1) (e) to 'reach back' and impose an immediate effect on pending matters and no basis to conclude that the amendment should be applied...
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