People v. Kinney
| Citation | 202 N.Y. 389,95 N.E. 756 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. KINNEY. |
| Decision Date | 13 June 1911 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Trial Term, Clinton, County.
John Kinney was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.Patrick J. Tierney and David H. Agnew, for appellant.
Arthur S. Hogue, Dist. Atty., for the People
The appellant has been convicted of murder in the first degree for the alleged killing of one Bouvia at a small hamlet called Jericho, in the county of Clinton, December 29, 1909.
The theory of the prosecution, and in accordance with which the appellant must have been found guilty, was and is that the latter arose very early on the morning of the day in question, went some distance to the house where the deceased lived alone in a sparsely-settled locality, laid in wait and shot him as he came out of his house, thereafter dragged the dead body back into the house, procured the money which furnished the motive for the crime, locked the house, and went away. The crime was not discovered until three or four days thereafter, when the appellant was promptly charged therewith and arrested.
There were no eyewitnesses of the crime, but the testimony offered by the people consisted of alleged confessions and of various items of circumstantial evidence. The legitimate evidence which was offered and received was quite sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction if the trial had been fairly conducted. We find, however, that substantial errors were committed of a nature calculated seriously to affect the rights of the appellant, and which, therefore, we are unwilling to disregard. Some of the alleged errors are so inconsequential and so unlikely to arise on another trial that I shall not discuss them, referring simply to those which are more important and which might be repeated. As I have said, the alleged motive for the murder was that of robbery, and it therefore became important for the people to show that the deceased had money, that the appellant knew of it, and, if possible, to identify some of the bills found on appellant after the murder with those earlier in the possession of the deceased.
[1] One Spinks was allowed to testify to a conversation occurring with the deceased on the day before the homicide, when the appellant was not present, tending to show that the former had money in his possession. Of course, this evidence was absolutely incompetent, and, while the presence of other testimony tending to show the same fact might be made an excuse for overlooking this error if it were the only one, such situation made it all the less excusable to crowd in objectionable testimony.
[2] One Trudeau, called by the people, testified that nearly a month before the homicide he paid to the deceased certain bills which corresponded with those possessed by appellant after the homicide. This evidence manifestly was of substantial importance . The witness was subjected to an ordinary cross-examination in the attempt to impeach his memory as to the denomination of the bills, and therefore the reliability of his testimony. Thereupon, on the redirect examination, the court allowed in evidence in corroboration of him an affidavit made by him several days after the homicide in proceedings in no wise connected with appellant that he had made to the deceased the payment of bills detailed in the direct examination. It is sufficient to state somewhat dogmatically that this evidence was utterly incompetent, for this is so baldly the law that there is no chance for debate or discussion. It is doubtless true that there are some very exceptional circumstances under which the evidence of a witness may be corroborated and relieved from suspicion by proving something which he had said or done on a prior occasion. But those few cases are so wholly dissimilar from this one that there is no opportunity to find any similarity which would make them a precedent or authority for what was done on this trial.
[3] On the day of appellant's arrest and some considerable time thereafter he was taken to the office of the chief of police in the courthouse. There was in the building a toilet room which was never locked, which was used by all the people occupying the building and was also accessible to so much of the public as frequented the building, and this must have included a large number of people, inasmuch as there were various courtrooms therein. A deputy sheriff testified that a few moments after the appellant had visited this room he found stuck between a pipe and the wall in plain sight a bunch of keys . A bunch of keys more or less satisfactorily identified as the one thus found was produced upon the trial and received in evidence over the appellant's objection. It was testified in connection therewith that three of the six keys thus found unlocked doors in the house occupied by the deceased at the time of the homicide, some of them at least outside doors. There was not the slightest bit of proof to connect appellant with the possession of the keys except the mere fact that they had been found in a public toilet room a short time after he had been there. I regard this evidence as one of the most damning pieces of testimony found in the people's case, and, if it was incompetent, its admission was certainly a grievous error.
As I said at the commencement, the body of the deceased after he had been presumably killed on the outside was dragged back into the house and the doors locked. The presence on this bunch of three keys out of six which fitted doors in the small house where deceased lived established an apparent relationship between the keys and the house too unusual to be readily overlooked as a mere coincidence. If then the jury found, as they were permitted to, that appellant had these keys in his possession after the homicide, they could scarcely fail to draw the plain conclusion that he it was who had locked up the doors after the deceased had been murdered and dragged back into the house. After this there would be little need for the people to go...
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