People v. Klyczek

• Decision Date: 21 February 1923
• Docket Number: No. 14859.,14859.
• Citation: 138 N.E. 275,307 Ill. 150
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KLYCZEK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

307 Ill. 150

138 N.E. 275

PEOPLE

v.KLYCZEK.

No. 14859.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1923.

Error to Second Branch Appellate Court, First District, on error to Criminal Court, Cook County; William E. Dever, Judge.

Max Klyczek was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a female child by taking indecent liberties with her (225 Ill. App. 658), and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Thompson, C. J., dissenting.Mary Belle Spencer and Peter J. Hower, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and George C. Dixon, of Dixon (Edward E. Wilson, and Clyde C. Fisher, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

DUNN, J.

The Appellate Court for the First District affirmed a judgment of the criminal court of Cook county in a case tried by the court without a jury, convicting Max Klyczek of contributing to the delinquency of a female child by taking indecent liberties with her, and a writ of error has been sued out to reverse the judgment.

The only questions controverted on the trial were the identity of the defendant and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish an alibi. The testimony clearly established the commission of the offense, but was entirely insufficient to connect the plaintiff in error with it, aside from his alleged confession, and this confession, if admissible in evidence, was amply sufficient to eatablish the defendant's guilt.

The crime was committed in the morning of February 11, 1920, on a girl 12 years old, on her way to school in the city of Chicago Heights. The criminal escaped, and no public suspicion attached to the plaintiff in error, who was a Polish boy 16 years old, then working for the Hero Furnace Company. He continued in the employ of that company until July 7, 1920. In the afternoon of that day he went swimming in a creek, and in returning home passed through a field of rye. As he approached the road, two boys who were passing called out to him, ‘Hey, you son of a bitch! Come out of there!’ He had a revolver, which he flourished, and the two boys ran down the road and reported to F. E. Parkler, the father of the girl who had been assaulted, that they had been held up, and that his wife had sent them down to the factory after him. He started home, and on the way met the plaintiff in error and began questioning him, because he suspected him of being the person who had attacked his daughter. A number of people had gathered around, including Parkler's wife and daughter, and various accusations were made against the plaintiff in error. Joseph Kotal, a police officer, took the plaintiff in error to the station. This was about 5:30 in the evening, and about 10 o'clock Kotal took the plaintiff in error into the chief's room and questioned him. It was then that the supposed confession was made. The defendant testified that the officer told him, if he answered all the questions asked him, ‘Yes,’ the officer would let him go home; that he did not know the meaning of some of the words used by the officer, and did not understand half of the questions asked, but he answered all the questions ‘Yes,’ except that he answered ‘No’ to the question about putting a gun to the girl's head. He did not know the officer took down the statement, and it was not read to him.

Kotal testified that the paper which was offered in evidence as a confession was signed by the plaintiff in error in the presence of himself and John Monson, another officer, and that they signed as witnesses; that the paper was in his handwriting, and he did not use any threats or force, but wrote the story down as the boy told it to him, in practically his own words; that he did not tell him that he could go home, but he did tell him that the best thing he could do was to tell the truth about everything he had done, and that his statement might be used against him some day. He was corroborated by Monson, who testified that he signed the statement as a witness in the presence of Kotal and the plaintiff in error; that he told Kotal, who had written the statement, to read it to the plaintiff in error, and heard him read it to him, and was present when it was signed. On cross-examination he said that there was a door between the two rooms, and that he was in the outer room a good deal of the time, going back and forth.

If the testimony of the plaintiff in error was true in regard to the manner in which the confession was secured, it was not competent evidence; but, if the testimony of the two police officers was true, it was properly admitted. A confession which is voluntarily made, free from the influence of promises or threats, hope or fear, is competent evidence. It is true that the police officer told the plaintiff in error that the best thing he could do was to tell the truth about everything he had done, and it has been held in many cases that a statement made to one accused of crime that he had better tell the truth is a sufficient inducement to render a confession made in consequence of it inadmissible in evidence. Regina v. Laugher, 2 Car. & K. 225; Regina v. Hatts, 49 L. T. (N. S.) 780; Regina v. Griffin, Russ. & R. C. C. 151; Regina v. Cheverton, 2 Fost. & F. 833. Indeed, it was said in the case of Regina v. Jarvis, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 96, that the words ‘You had better’ seem to have acquired a sort of technical meaning; that they hold out an inducement or a threat, within the rule that excludes confessions.

In People v. Heide, 302 Ill. 624, 135 N. E. 77, are cited decisions of a number of American states to the same effect. In that case we held that, where an officer in charge of a prisoner merely cautions him to tell the truth if he says anything, the competency of a confession afterward made will not be affected; but in that case the statement went further than merely to tell the prisoners it would be better to tell the truth, and its effect was to lead them to expect some benefit from the opportunity of going before the state's attorney with their statements. In other cases it has been held that telling a prisoner that it would be better for him to tell the truth is not the offering of an inducement to him to confess, or the making of a threat for that purpose. Huffman v. State, 130 Ala. 89, 30 South. 394;Hardy v. United States, 3 App. D. C. 35;State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 61 Pac. 805;State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105 (Gil. 75); State v. Anderson, 96 Mo. 241, 9 S. W. 636;Hintz v. State, 125 Wis. 405, 104 N. W. 110;Commonwealth v. Hudson, 185 Mass. 402, 70 N. E. 436. These decisions seem to have the better reason. It is not reasonable to suppose that advice to one accused of crime that it is better for him to tell the truth would of itself be an inducement to him to tell an untruth, or would alone be a sufficient inducement to make a statement falsely confessing crime.

Mere exhortation to tell the truth will not make a confession afterward made inadmissible, but the statement that it is better to tell the truth may be made under such circumstances as to make a confession afterwards made incompetent. If there is coupled with the advice a suggestion of a benefit in the particular case, a confession by reason of such advice and suggestion is incompetent. The situation in which the plaintiff in error was placed and the circumstances surrounding him at the time were proper to be taken into consideration by the court in determining the competency of the confession, includinghis youth and inexperience, his character, his intelligence, his strength of intellect, his knowledge or ignorance, and the fact that he was detained in prison...