People v. Knight, A101095 (Cal. App. 10/30/2003)
| Decision Date | 30 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | A101095 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HAROLD JAY KNIGHT, Defendant and Appellant. |
A criminal defendant admitted guilt on a drug offense and waived jury trial on the validity of a prior conviction allegation. The trial court mistakenly believed that defendant admitted the prior conviction, and enhanced defendant's sentence for the prior strike without first adjudicating its validity. The court recalled the sentence upon realizing its mistake, conducted an evidentiary hearing on the prior, found the allegation true, and resentenced defendant to the same term as originally imposed. Defendant concedes that the trial court had the authority to recall the sentence and resentence him, but claims that the court was required to disregard the prior conviction at resentencing because it lost jurisdiction to adjudicate the allegation. We reject defendant's claim and affirm the judgment.
facts
Appellant Harold Jay Knight was charged and convicted upon guilty pleas in three separate cases. In the first case, appellant was charged with several drug offenses committed in April 2000, and it was further alleged that appellant has a prior serious felony conviction strike. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a), 11379.6, subd. (a), 11383, subd. (c); Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) In the second case, appellant was charged with additional drug offenses committed in October 2000 while out on bail on the first case. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a), 11378, 11379, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 12022.1.) In the third case, appellant was charged with multiple drug offenses committed on separate occasions in January, February, March, and May 2002, and also failure to register as a sex offender. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11350, subd. (a), 11359, 11364, 11377, subd. (a), 11379, subd. (a), 11550. subd. (a); Pen. Code, §§ 290, subd. (g)(2), 4573, 4573.6.) It was further alleged that the crimes were committed while appellant was released from custody on the first and second cases and that he has a prior strike. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 12022.1.)
On September 25, 2001, appellant pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine and waived a jury trial on the validity of the prior strike alleged in the first case. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a).) An evidentiary hearing to present proof of the prior conviction was put over to a future date. That same day, appellant pled guilty to charges in the second case that he possessed methamphetamine for sale and he admitted the on-bail enhancement. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; Pen. Code, § 12022.1.)
The matter was continued several times until a hearing on May 2, 2002. The court mistakenly stated that appellant "admitted" the prior felony strike conviction in the first case and proceeded to consider, and deny, appellant's motion to strike the conviction for sentencing purposes. The court sentenced appellant to a three-year term for manufacturing methamphetamine, doubled to six years based on the strike. The total term imposed for both the first and second cases was eight years and eight months. The trial court ordered appellant held at county jail until resolution of other pending charges, and remanded him into the custody of the county sheriff.
On July 26, 2002, the trial court recalled its sentence in the first two cases upon realizing that it had failed to make a finding on the strike. The court stated that the sentence "was not legal." The court, over appellant's objection, conducted a court trial on the validity of the prior strike on August 19, 2002, and found it valid on November 15, 2002, after taking the matter under submission.
Shortly after, on November 21, 2002, appellant entered guilty pleas in the third case to two counts of possessing methamphetamine and bringing drugs into jail. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 4573.6.) He also admitted the allegation that he has a prior strike conviction.
On December 13, 2002, the court imposed sentence for all three cases. The court resentenced appellant on the first two cases to eight years and eight months, exactly as originally ordered. The court sentenced appellant to four years and eight months on the third case. The aggregate sentence on all cases totals 13 years and 4 months.
discussion
Appellant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial on the validity of the prior conviction allegation after recalling the sentence. Appellant argues that we should reverse the court's finding on the strike and remand the case for resentencing without the strike allegation.
We conclude that the trial court acted properly in recalling the sentence and adjudicating the prior conviction. Preliminarily, we note that the record is far from clear in establishing that the trial court lost jurisdiction over appellant following the initial imposition of sentence. The parties fail to address the fact that the court did not commit appellant to prison but ordered him held at county jail pending resolution of other charges. While a valid sentence may not be increased after formal entry in the court minutes, the trial court retains jurisdiction to impose a new sentence not greater than the initial sentence prior to execution of the sentence. (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 350, 353.) Execution of sentence commences with a custodial officer's receipt of the certified abstract of judgment committing the defendant to prison. (Id. at p. 345) Here, the court stayed prison commitment, making it doubtful that the court's jurisdiction expired.
Even if jurisdiction expired, as the parties assume, the initial judgment was void and thus subject to recall and correction at any time. "Judicial error (as well as an exercise of judicial discretion) in rendering judgment cannot be corrected by the trial court once jurisdiction has expired, unless the judgment is void on the face of the record." (People v. Karaman, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 345, fn. 11, italics altered.) An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time. (People v. Reyes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 852, 857.) The initial sentence here was illegal in that the base term was doubled on the conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine without adjudication or admission of a prior conviction or other grounds for the term imposed. The record shows that the court mistakenly thought that appellant had admitted the prior conviction when, in fact, the conviction had been set for court adjudication.
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