People v. Knight

• Decision Date: 27 August 1951
• Docket Number: Cr. 758
• Citation: 234 P.2d 992,106 Cal.App.2d 312
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KNIGHT.

Page 992

234 P.2d 992

106 Cal.App.2d 312

PEOPLE v. KNIGHT.

Cr. 758.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

Aug. 27, 1951.

William H. Knight, in pro. per.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

MUSSELL, Justice.

Appellant was arrested by the police officers of San Diego and charged with the crime of issuing a check without funds. On March 22, 1949, he was duly arraigned in the superior court in San Diego and entered a plea of guilty. On March 28th, the time fixed for pronouncement of judgment, appellant was again informed of the nature of the charge against him and of his plea of guilty thereto and was asked by the court if he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. When he replied he had none, the court sentenced him to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. Execution of the commitment was stayed until March 30, 1949, on which day the 'stay was terminated' and the sheriff was ordered to carry out the terms of the commitment.

On March 29th, appellant, at his request, was taken before the District Court of the United States in San Diego and there informed that an indictment had been filed in that court charging him with a violation of the laws of the United States. Appellant thereupon entered a plea of guilty to the charge, was given a sentence of four years in a federal institution, committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States and in due time was incarcerated in the United States penitentiary at McNeil's Island, Washington.

On January 22, 1951, appellant filed in the superior court a 'motion to vacate sentence'. This motion was denied and in March, 1951, appellant filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the said superior court. After a hearing was had thereon, the petition was denied and this appeal followed. Appellant's verified petition, which was the only evidence presented by him at the time of the hearing, contains allegations that petitioner, after his arrest on the check charge, was visited by a deputy district attorney 'for the purpose of arranging a deal, i. e., if petitioner would not retain counsel to defend himself, a light sentence was in the offing'; that petitioner, relying upon the advice of the prosecutor, waived counsel and entered a plea of guilty on March 23, 1949; that five days thereafter the court pronounced sentence upon petitioner but ordered a two day 'stay of execution'; that pursuant to the two day stay of execution, petitioner was taken to the United States District Court where he entered a plea of guilty to a federal offense and was sentenced to a period of four years therefor; that on March 30th he was brought back before the superior court and advised that the court had no other alternative than to impose the maximum sentence provided by law for violation of section 476a of the Penal Code; that petitioner was subsequently taken by the United States Marshal and placed in the federal penitentiary to serve the aforementioned four year sentence.

Appellant's contentions are that the superior court lost jurisdiction to impose sentence upon him; that he was 'coerced' by the prosecutor to plead guilty; that he was not represented by counsel; and that he did not realize the significance of entering a plea of guilty to the check charge.

The contention that the superior court lost jurisdiction to impose sentence is apparently based on the theory that since the defendant was first arrested by the sheriff of San Diego county and then turned over to the federal authorities, the state lost jurisdiction to proceed in the matter. This contention is without merit. The crime with which the appellant was charged was violation of section 476a of the Penal Code, a felony. The superior court in San Diego county had jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence the appellant for the commission of this offense. Calif.Const., art. VI, sec. 5. The record shows that at the time of his arraignment in the state court, the appellant was in the custody of the United States Marshal. It is not clear whether such was true at the time sentence was imposed. However, the state was authorized to insist upon its jurisdiction and to procure the appellant from the possession of the federal authorities for the purpose of trial. In re Gibson, 78 Cal.App. 794, 799, 248 P. 1046. Under the facts presented by the record, we must assume that the appellant was in the state court with the consent of the proper federal authorities. There is no merit in the claim that the state court did not acquire jurisdiction of appellant's person. While it may be true that after appellant's sentence by the federal court and until the end of his term and discharge no state court could assume control over his body without the consent of the United States, where, as here, he was produced in the state court and was personally present there, with full opportunity to make his defense, jurisdiction of his person was had by the superior court exactly as if he had been brought before that court by its own officer. People v. Sichofsky, 58 Cal.App. 257, 261, 262, 208 P. 340.

The trial court apparently gave no credence to appellant's allegations that he had...