People v. Knoll

• Decision Date: 04 April 1932
• Docket Number: No. 216.,216.
• Citation: 258 Mich. 89,242 N.W. 222
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KNOLL.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

258 Mich. 89

242 N.W. 222

PEOPLE

v.KNOLL.

No. 216.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 4, 1932.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ottawa County; Fred T. Miles, Judge.

Leonard D. Knoll was convicted of receiving stolen money, knowing it to have been stolen, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, POTTER, SHARPE, NORTH, FEAD, WIEST, and BUTZEL, J.Carl E. Hoffman, of Holland, and Clare E. Hoffman, of Allegan, for appellant.

Paul W. Voorhies, Atty. Gen., and John R. Dethmers, Pros. Atty. of Ottawa County, of Zeeland, for the People.

SHARPE, J.

A bank at Hudsonville, in Allegan county, was robbed on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 28th day of July, 1931. John Peters and Henry Kraai were arrested, charged with such robbery, and on arraignment both pleaded guilty thereto. The defendant was also charged with the robbery, and, in a second count, with receiving stolen money, knowing it to have been stolen. He was convicted of the latter offense and sentenced to imprisonment in the state's prison at Jackson for from two and one-half to five years, and has appealed therefrom.

Peters and Kraai were both sworn as witnesses for the prosecution. They, one or both, testified, in substance, that they and Willis Gillette met at a lunch stand in the city of Holland conducted by Gillette; that the three of them drove in Gillette's Ford car to the meat market of the defendant; that Gillette went into the market and remained a few minutes; that when he came out he pointed to a Whippet car owned by the defendant, then standing in front of the market; that Peters got into this car and drove it away, and Kraai and Gillette followed in the Ford car; that when they had gone some distance in the country Kraai got out of the Ford car and into the Whippet with Peters; that they proceeded to Hudsonville, and with loaded guns entered and robbed the bank of about $4,000; that they then drove back to Holland, where the money was left in Gillette's lunch stand; that Kraai then went to the defendant's market and asked him if it would be all right to bring the car back for the reason that ‘everything went fine and that nobody had got the license nor the description of the car;’ that defendant assented thereto; that he then discussed with defendant the money which should be paid to him; that Kraai then returned to the lunch stand and Peters counted out and gave him $500, and that he then went and delivered it to the defendant, who said ‘Just keep quiet and everything will be O. K.’

Henry Aldrink testified that he saw Kraai and Petters return defendant's car to the market after the robbery, and Andrew Knoll testified that he saw Kraai come out of the meat market on one of the occasions testified to by him. The record contains the following: ‘The testimony of those three girls, whom Kraai had named, corroborated the testimony of Mr. Kraai as to his having been in the market talking with Mr. Knoll on at least one of the three occasions testified to by Mr. Kraai. The girls testified that they saw Kraai go behind the counter and that Kraai and Knoll whispered with each other and one of them testified that Knoll winked at Kraai.’

Under the common law, the defendant would have been charged as an ‘accessory before the fact.’ Our statute abolishes the distinction between an accessory and a principal.

‘Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be punished as if he had directly committed such offense.’ Comp. Laws 1929, § 17253.

Under it the defendant was properly charged as a principal. People v. Wycoff, 150 Mich. 449, 114 N. W. 242.

The defendant, as a witness in his own behalf, denied any connection with the robbery, or that he had ever had any conversations with either Kraai or Gillette concerning it.

In detailing the incidents which took place before they left Holland for Hudsonville, Peters and Kraai were permitted, over objection of defendant's counsel, to state what Gillette said to them and what they said to each other relative to the use of defendant's car and its return to his meat market after the crime was committed. The theory of the prosecution, as outlined in the opening statement of the prosecuting attorney, was that Gillette, Peters, Kraai, and the defendant conspired together to rob the bank. The facts relative to the use of defendant's car, its return to him, the conversation between him and Kraai, and the payment of the $500 to him, clearly tended to establish such a conspiracy. Had these facts been first presented to the jury, the acts and declarations of each of them would have been admissible against the defendant. In People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 476, 491, 160 N. W. 467, 472, the following from Hamilton v. Smith, 39 Mich. 222, was quoted with approval: ‘Wherever two or more conspire together to commit an actionable wrong, everything said, done, or written by any one of them in the execution or furtherance of their common purpose is deemed to be said, done, or written by every one and is a relevant fact as against each.’

In People v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268, 277, 9 N. W. 406, 410, it was said that ‘the existence of a conspiracy must commonly be made out by the detached acts and statements of the individual conspirators.’ But the admission of such acts and statements, before proof was offered of defendant's complicity, is not in itself ground for reversal. In the early case of People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119, 120, the court said: ‘It is complained that the acts and declarations of Winters were allowed to be given in evidence before proof had been made of any conspiracy. As this exception regards the order of proof merely, we think it is not one that can avail in this court. The proper order of proof in cases of conspiracy is, first to give evidence of the unlawful combination, and afterwards to show the acts of the conspirators in pursuance thereof, or in some manner to connect them severally therewith. But it often happens that the existence of the conspiracy is only made out by inference from the acts and declarations of the several parties thereto; and to exclude evidence of these until the conspiracy is established in some other way, would, in many cases, give the guilty parties immunity.’

The subject of ‘Conspiracy’ is reviewed at length in Underhill's Criminal Evidence (3rd Ed.), beginning at page 952, and a long list of authorities is cited in support of the views expressed. We summarize and quote from them as follows:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons combine to do a criminal act; and, when the crime has been committed by one or more of them, under the statute above quoted, each may be prosecuted therefor. The proof of the conspiracy in such a case is but incidental to the proving of the crime itself. It need not appear that all of the parties got together and agreed upon the means for its accomplishment.

‘The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. * * * The safest rule is to satisfy the jury by a prima facie case that a conspiracy existed and then to offer evidence of the declarations of any conspirator. However, * * * the declarations are often received before there is any proof of a conspiracy, and then, if the conspiracy be not shown, the jury is instructed to disregard the declarations. The rule is applicable where the conspirators are separately tried. * * * When men are associated for a common purpose, and with a common object in view, the law, presuming that the benefits, if any, which may ensue from their accomplishment, will be shared by all, impresses upon the conspirators or partners, collectively, the attribute of individuality so far as the common design is concerned. No member of the combination will be permitted to escape the consequences of the actions or words of his associates.’

The testimony of Kraai and Peters was a statement in detail of what was said and done by themselves and by Gillette and the defendant in their presence of the events which led up to the robbery of the bank and the return of the defendant's car and the payment to him of a share of the money secured thereby. While the incidents connecting the defendant personally with the conspiracy might more properly have been shown before the admission of testimony of their dealings with Gillette, no reversible error resulted from the order in which the proof was submitted.

On cross-examination of the defendant, he was asked about a quarter of beef which was taken out of his meat market and placed in the ice box in another store in Holland for delivery to his attorney. He was then asked if there were not ‘sears or cuts' in it and if money was not concealed in it, and answered in the negative. In his instructions to the jury relative thereto, the court said: ‘I think you should disregard this testimony entirely as there is no connection shown between Mr. Knoll and the removing of these goods, Mr. Knoll, the respondent. Disregard the entire matter. A man has a...