People v. Koerner

• Decision Date: 23 November 1897
• Citation: 154 N.Y. 355,48 N.E. 730
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KOERNER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

154 N.Y. 355

48 N.E. 730

PEOPLE

v.KOERNER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 23, 1897.

Appeal from court of general sessions, New York county.

William J. Koerner was convicted of murder in the first degree. From a judgment and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.

Haight and Gray, JJ., dissenting.

Abraham Levy, for appellant.

John D. Lindsay, for respondent.

MARTIN, J.

In October, 1896, the defendant was indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree. He was charged with having willfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought killed Rose A. Redgate. The action was brought to trial at the February term of the New York court of general sessions in 1897, and evidence was given showing that on the afternoon of the 23d day of September, 1896, the decedent was shot by a pistol in the hands of the defendant, which resulted in her death upon the same day. The shooting took place on Seventh avenue, between Thirteenth and Fourteenth streets, in the city of New York. That the decedent was shot by a pistol in the hands of the defendant is not denied. But he insists—First, that the shooting was accidental; that his purpose was to commit suicide, which he attempted by placing the pistol to his head, when to preventit the decedent grasped the pistol, and it was accidentally discharged, causing the injury which resulted in her death; and, second, that when the homicide occurred he was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of his act, or that it was wrong.

On the trial evidence was introduced upon the part of the prosecution tending to show that the defendant, with premeditation and deliberation, willfully and intentionally shot and killed the decedent; that he shot her three times, and that two of the wounds inflicted were of a fatal character; that the relations which had previously existed between the defendant and decedent were of an affectionate nature; that the defendant had solicited her hand in marriage and an engagement had existed between them; that her parents were opposed to her marrying him upon the grounds of his former dissipation and generally bad habits; that a difficulty, or at least a disagreement, had arisen between the defendant and her father by reason of such opposition, and that the defendant, in substance, told him if he did not marry the decedent no one else should. Without attempting to state the evidence in detail, it may be said generally that it tended to establish the defendant's guilt of the crime charged, and was sufficient to justify the court in submitting that question to the jury and to uphold its verdict.

The evidence introduced on the part of the defendant as to the manner in which the homicide occurred was perhaps sufficient to have justified the jury in finding that he did not intend to kill the decedent. The proof as to just what occurred at the time was not very definite or clear. Still, the fact that the pistol was in the defendant's hands, and in his alone, coupled with the fact that there were three shots fired from the defendant towards the decedent, tended to show that he intentionally shot and killed her.

Upon the issue of the defendant's irresponsibility a great amount of evidence was given. That of the witnesses called on his behalf tended to show that several members of his family, on the side of his father and of his mother as well, had been insane; that he was seriously injured when a boy; that he had scarlet fever, and was subject to fits, which rendered him unconscious during their continuance; and that his acts for years previous to the homicide had, at times, been of an irrational character, and such as to indicate that, at those times, he was laboring under a defect of reason. On the other hand, evidence was introduced by the people to show that no such defect of reason existed at the time of the tragedy, and that the defendant was responsible for his act. It must, however, be admitted that the evidence was such as to involve the question of his responsibility in some doubt. But, in view of all the evidence, it was clearly a question of fact to be determined by the jury. The defendant, however, contends that as the question of his mental capacity was involved in uncertainty, and one upon which there was a sharp conflict in the evidence, the various rulings of the court should be carefully examined, and if any errors were committed a new trial should be granted upon the ground that the question was doubtful, and hence it cannot be said that any improper evidence received, or proper evidence rejected, could not by any possibility have been harmful to him. To some extent, at least, this contention is correct. Therefore it becomes necessary to examine the various exceptions of the defendant, and determine whether any of them were valid, and, if so, whether they can be said to have been harmless, and, consequently, should be disregarded.

The first exceptions to which attention is called in the brief of the learned counsel for the defendant relate to the admissibility of the evidence of the witnesses Brown, Harrison, and Donovan. His first contention is that the court erred in admitting the evidence of the witness Brown as to the treatment of the defendant while in the hospital on the day of the homicide. The witness was first asked: ‘Did you give quinine for chills? During the seven years you have been there in the Tombs do you know whether or not you gave quinine for chills?’ This was objected to. The court then asked the defendant's counsel if he desired to examine the witness to ascertain if he was enough of an expert to answer the question. He replied in the negative, and the court then overruled the objection. The defendant's counsel then stated his objections to the question, which were that the evidence was immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, and that the witness had not been shown to be an expert and was not qualified to state. The question was then repeated, and the answer was that, as a rule, it was done, and that in the defendant's case it was kept up for three days. He also testified that during that time they gave him whisky as well as quinine. That this evidence was admissible, if the witness was qualified, is hardly denied. It may be conceded that the rule is that before a witness may be examined as an expert he must be shown to be qualified, and still this ruling be upheld. These questions, when examined, disclose that they did not call for any opinion of the witness as an expert, but simply for what was done upon that occasion, and incidentally for the usual practice in that hospital. When thus understood, we think it clear that the court committed no error in admitting this proof. The question was not one calling for the opinion of an expert, but related merely to facts which were within his knowledge.

The next question is in regard to the evidence of Dr. Donovan. He was asked whether, when he saw him on the day or evening after the homicide, the defendant was simulating a fit. This evidence was objected to on the ground that it was immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, and that the competency of the witness as an expert had not been established. The court then stated to the counsel for the defendant that, if he desired, he might examine the witness to ascertain whether or not he was a qualified expert. That right was, however, reserved until the cross-examination of the witness. He was then permitted to answer the question, and testified that he thought he was ‘shamming.’ He also testified that he was a graduate of the Bellevue Hospital Medical College; that he was graduated in March, 1886; that since that time he had practiced medicine; and that he was a regularly licensed physician. He then stated the grounds upon which his answer was based, which, among others, were that the defendant's respiration and pulse were normal; that everything about him appeared to be normal; and the witness gave his reasons in full for believing that the defendant was ‘shamming,’ and had no fit at the time. We think this evidence was clearly admissible, and that the court committed no error in its ruling upon that subject.

The next and last question under the exceptions to which we have referred arises as to the admission of the evidence of Dr. Harrison. He was a witness for the prosecution, and was asked whether, in his opinion, the defendant was ‘faking.’ This was objected to as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, and also upon the ground that there had been no proper foundation laid. The objection was sustained. The witness then testified that he made an examination of the defendant, and was able to form an opinion as to his condition. He was then asked what his condition was, which was objected to by the defendant as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, and that no proper foundation had been laid. The court then asked the defendant's counsel if he desired to cross-examine the witness in relation to his qualifications as an expert, and he was cross-examined. He testified that he graduated from a medical school in 1895; that he was licensed to practice; had graduated as a doctor of medicine; had seen persons in epileptic fits, while under epileptic spasms, and while under epileptic aura. Thereupon the court overruled the objections, and the witness testified that the man's condition presented nothing abnormal, except his apparent unconsciousness; that his pulse was normal; his respiration was normal; that the pupils of his eyes were normal; that his color was normal; and that, in his opinion, he was shamming unconsciousness. We think this evidence was plainly admissible.

On the trial Dr. Ward was sworn as a witness for the prosecution. He was the physician in attendance upon the defendant while in the Tombs, had treated and prescribed for him, and had occupied that relation up to the day before his evidencewas given. He testified that after the conclusion...