People v. Kohl

• Decision Date: 03 April 1987
• Citation: 514 N.Y.S.2d 154,129 A.D.2d 987
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John KOHL, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 154

514 N.Y.S.2d 154

129 A.D.2d 987

PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John KOHL, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

April 3, 1987.

Clark J. Zimmermann, Batavia, for appellant.

Michael F. Griffith, Warsaw by Valerie Friedlander, for respondent.

Before DILLON, P.J., and BOOMER, GREEN, BALIO and LAWTON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Upon a bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of the intentional murder of Peter Schiltz (Penal Law § 125.25[1] ), depraved mind murder of two-year old Matthew Schiltz (Penal Law § 125.25[2] ), and depraved mind assault in the first degree of three-year old Joseph Schiltz (Penal Law § 120.10[3] ).

At trial, defendant asserted the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15), and conflicting expert testimony was received on the issue. The trial court found that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacked criminal responsibility, and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Of the several issues raised on appeal, only one requires comment. Defendant contends that Penal Law § 40.15, by shifting to him the burden of proving his lack of criminal responsibility, violates the due process clause of the New York State Constitution (art I, § 6). We hold that it does not. Placing on defendant the burden of establishing insanity by a preponderance of the evidence (Penal Law § 25.00[2] ) does not relieve the People of proving all of the elements of the offense charged, including the culpable mental state, beyond a reasonable doubt (see, Donnino, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 40.15, pp. 77-80).

The United States Supreme Court has sustained statutes placing the burden of proof of insanity on defendant under the Federal Constitution (Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302, reh. denied 344 U.S. 848, 73 S.Ct. 4, 97 L.Ed. 659; Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 97 S.Ct. 226, 50 L.Ed.2d 160; see also, Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267). By similar analysis, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance has been declared constitutional under both the Federal and State Constitutions (People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898, affd. sub nom. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281; cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508). Simply reconstituting the defense of insanity as an affirmative defense effects no impermissible shift of the burden of proof.

In reaching this conclusion, we explicitly reject defendant's argument that Penal Law § 40.15 is inconsistent with the decision in People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915, 310 N.E.2d...